


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PLANNED CHANGE IN AGRARIAN COUNTRIES

Arthur H. Niehoff

Human Resources Research Organization
Alexandria, Virginia

December 1969



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Technical Report 69-21

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by

Arthur H. Niehoff

HumRRO Division No. 7 (Social Science)

December 1969

Prepared for:

Office, Chief of
Research and Development
Department of the Army

Contract DAHC 19-70-C-0012

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HUMAN RESOURCES RESEARCH ORGANIZATION

Technical Report 69-21
Work Unit CIVIC
Sub-Unit II

The Human Resources Research Organization (HumRRO) is a nonprofit corporation established in 1969 to conduct research in the field of training and education. It is a continuation of The George Washington University Human Resources Research Office. HumRRO's general purpose is to improve human performance, particularly in organizational settings, through behavioral and social science research, development, and consultation. HumRRO's mission in work performed under contract with the Department of the Army is to conduct research in the fields of training, motivation, and leadership.

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FOREWORD

The overall objective of Work Unit CIVIC is to provide civic action advisors with guidelines for civic program development.

The research effort in Sub-Unit I was directed toward describing the job requirements of the civic action advisor. An analysis of the job, based on participation in a civic action mission and field interviews with advisors, was described in HumRRO Technical Report 68-10, *Promoting Civic Action in Less Developed Nations: A Conceptualization of the U.S. Military Mission Role*, by Alfred J. Kraemer, July 1968.

The present report of research conducted under Sub-Unit II, which deals with programing and conduct of planned change projects in local communities of agrarian countries, is based on an analysis of case histories. Those influences, conditions, and techniques that appear to affect project success or failure are identified and discussed. Publications of a similar nature under Sub-Unit II include: "The Process of Cross-Cultural Innovation," by Arthur H. Niehoff and J. Charnel Anderson in *International Development Review*, vol. VI, no. 2, June 1964 (issued as HumRRO Professional Paper 36-67, August 1967); *A Selected Bibliography of Cross-Cultural Change Projects*, by Arthur H. Niehoff and J. Charnel Anderson, Research Memorandum, October 1964; and "Peasant Fatalism and Socioeconomic Innovation," by Arthur H. Niehoff and J. Charnel Anderson, in *Human Organization*, vol. 25, no. 4, Winter 1966 (issued as HumRRO Professional Paper 33-67, June 1967).

Another publication of Work Unit CIVIC was *Human Factors in Civic Action: A Selected Annotated Bibliography*, Research Memorandum by Robert J. Foster, June 1963.

Work Unit CIVIC research was conducted at HumRRO Division No. 7 (Social Science), Alexandria, Virginia; Dr. Arthur J. Hoehn is Director of the Division. Dr. Alfred J. Kraemer was the Work Unit Leader, as well as Sub-Unit Leader for CIVIC I. Dr. Niehoff was Sub-Unit Leader of CIVIC II; Mr. Charnel Anderson assisted Dr. Niehoff in analysis of the case histories.

HumRRO research for the Department of the Army is conducted under Contract DAHC 19-70-C-0012. Language and area training research is carried out under Army Project 2Q062107A744.

Meredith P. Crawford
President
Human Resources Research Organization

RESEARCH AND CONCLUSIONS

Operational Problem

During the past 20 years national and international agencies have become increasingly involved in programs to improve the living standard of the populations in the agrarian nations of the world, and thus increase political stability. The United States has been one of the chief sponsors of such efforts. While civilian agencies such as the Agency for International Development have had primary responsibility for government-sponsored programs of planned change, the Department of Defense has recently participated through civic action projects.

There has been growing recognition of the need for special training of personnel whose overseas assignments include the planning and implementation of planned change programs. Until now, such special training has been concentrated on providing administrative information, technical expertise, and language and area studies. It has become evident that many programs carried out by persons with such training have failed to achieve the expected goals—improvement of the local living standards with greater political stability. Such failures may be partially attributable to lack of adequate consideration, in training and program implementation, of the process of innovation and the techniques for successful introduction of innovations.

Research Problem

More adequate treatment of the processes and techniques of innovation in training and program implementation will come about only under the following conditions: (a) increased awareness of the importance of this kind of knowledge and know-how, and (b) availability of an acceptable body of relevant and usable knowledge about the change process. The research reported here was designed to help achieve both of these conditions.

The objective has been to provide operationally relevant concepts and general guidelines for planning, monitoring, directing, or implementing change projects in villages or small communities in the agrarian countries. Specifically, the research sought to (a) identify factors that influence the success or failure of planned change projects, and (b) provide a set of general hypotheses and guidelines, applications of which could increase the likelihood of success in change projects, including civic action projects.

Approach

The approach consisted of the analysis of 203 case descriptions of projects in the developing countries—written accounts that described the process of change from the time a change agent first introduced some new idea or technique to the time there was a reasonably clear indication of the project outcome.

Initial analysis focused upon development of a taxonomy for factors which the case study writers reported as exerting positive or negative influences upon the progress of innovative efforts. The second step was to abstract and organize the case material according to the list of factors. The information on each factor or influence was then studied as a basis for generating concepts, hypotheses, and guidelines relating to the ways in which the factor or influence operates in affecting project outcome.

Summary of Findings

The results of the case study analysis suggest that success in efforts to introduce innovations through voluntary participation of recipients in agrarian communities will be more likely if the change agent follows one or more of the actions suggested.

(1) Introduces innovations through local leaders, because their support is critical for the sanction and implementation of new ideas and programs. Types of local leaders whose backing can be crucial to the introduction of innovations include administrators, educators, religious leaders, civic leaders, and non-institutional leaders.

(2) Adapts innovations to suit the existing social structure. However, if an innovation is not compatible with the existing social patterns, but the recipients perceive considerable advantages over the existing practices, they may be motivated to alter their social patterns on their own accord. It should be noted that in most instances in which social structure has been mentioned as significant, it was reported as having had a negative influence on the process of innovation. Presumably this may have happened because the Western and Westernized change agents were largely ignorant of, or made few attempts to adapt the projects to, the local patterns of social structure. The more important types of social patterns affecting change projects are those associated with kinship and caste or class relations.

(3) Utilizes an innovation strategy that produces maximum benefit to the recipients, with minimum disruption to the traditional economic pattern. However, when the recipient people perceive great economic benefits from an innovation, they also tend to be willing to modify the traditional economic practices. In those cases in which local economic factors were mentioned as having had an effect, their influence tended to be negative. Local economic patterns of significance in the innovation process include work methods, work schedules, work groupings, proprietary rights, and distribution patterns. Of these, work methods and proprietary rights appear to be the least amenable to change.

(4) Initiates an innovation project in a manner which the recipient groups perceive as being closely compatible with, rather than counter to, their existing beliefs. Despite the fact that, when mentioned in case histories, beliefs usually were reported as being negative toward the goals of the respective projects, they did not generally prevent innovation acceptance, especially when innovations were presented in ways which promised significant benefits to the local people. The beliefs of primary significance are those involving supernatural concepts, traditional medical beliefs, and attitudes toward the possibility of change through self-help.

(5) Introduces innovations that accord with customary habits of food consumption or can be adapted to the existing recreation patterns. Consumption patterns were more likely to be mentioned as a resistance factor when the perceived gain for changing habits was quite low in relation to the extent of the behavioral changes involved in adopting the innovation.

(6) Introduces innovations that satisfy existing or felt needs of the recipients. Utilization of recipients' own felt needs was found to be the most significant motivational force for inducing change. More specifically, success is more likely if the change agent introduces innovations on the basis of:

(a) *Recipients' demonstrated felt needs*—needs which the recipients have attempted to fulfill through their own efforts.

(b) *Solicited felt needs* of the recipients—needs of which they are aware to the extent that they solicit assistance from the change agent. It should be noted, however, that recipients may solicit assistance not so much because they are interested in the innovations but because of material rewards they expect to obtain by cooperating. In such instances innovations may be discontinued when the material rewards are withdrawn.

(c) *Needs deliberately generated* by the change agent, provided that the recipients perceive the innovations as advantageous.

(7) Introduces innovations that provide practical benefits, especially economic ones. The important point is that it is the recipients' perception that matters most in the selection of innovations by the change agent; what the change agent perceives as economically beneficial

may not be so perceived by the recipients. With respect to short-term and long-term benefits of innovations, it is postulated that:

(a) Innovations that the recipients perceive as providing immediate benefits will be more readily accepted than those based on long-term gains.

(b) Although innovations that produce benefits over a long period of time may be the most valuable, the success of initial innovation projects can be expected to be greater if the change agent selects innovations that provide a combination of short- and long-term benefits.

(8) Introduces innovations that provide individuals and groups with a positive stimulus for competition. However, where recipient groups are characterized by factionalism and rivalries, competition may be expected to have a negative influence on the innovation process.

(9) Has a favorable image to the people he is trying to influence. The critical element is not so much what the change agent is but how he is perceived. The image as perceived by the recipient group can be subdivided into (a) personal characteristics of the change agent, especially his ability to establish rapport and to empathize with the recipients of innovations, (b) his technical expertise, and (c) his organizational affiliation. A program is more likely to succeed if the recipient group has a favorable image of the change agent's organization.

(10) Utilizes culturally acceptable and effective communication strategies that provide a two-way flow of information between him and the people he is trying to influence. Mass media are most valuable in presenting new programs and creating awareness of change possibilities, whereas interpersonal communication is most effective in convincing the recipients to adopt innovations. Field demonstrations facilitate communication of innovations by providing "proofs." The degree to which a communication strategy can be effective in inducing a recipient group to accept innovations depends also upon the extent to which form and content of messages are adapted to the cultural predispositions of the recipient group.

(11) Utilizes participation by recipients in project planning and implementation. Participation at the planning stage helps adapt the project to the existing social and cultural patterns and subsequent participation in the form of contributions, such as material goods and labor, helps create a vested interest in the project.

(12) Follows a flexible approach and makes alterations to deal with unanticipated situations that usually arise during a project.

(13) Helps the recipient group to establish patterns of maintenance as the project approaches the terminal stage. Such patterns are essential to ensure that the change program is continued when the external supports are withdrawn. Three important patterns to establish are training of local people in new skills, provision of continued sources of supply of new materials and setting up an organizational system.

Conclusions

(1) The case history analysis has yielded an organized body of concepts and generalizations related to the planning and implementation of change projects in agrarian countries that should be of assistance to military or civilian personnel who are responsible for change projects. It should enable them to benefit from the experiences of others.

(2) For success in planned change projects, it is essential that the innovation, as well as the process by which it is introduced, be compatible with existing cultural patterns. Conceiving of existing cultural patterns as intrinsically being barriers to change is unproductive since these patterns become obstacles only where change projects and processes are not designed to fit the existing patterns.

(3) The factors that appear to be most important to successful change projects are (a) the extent to which the innovator works with and through local leaders and succeeds in enlisting

their support; (b) the degree and immediacy of the practical benefits that intended recipients perceive as likely to result from acceptance of the innovation; (c) the adequacy of communication processes associated with the innovative effort; (d) the degree of success achieved in inducing participation of the local people; (e) the provision for patterns of maintenance of the innovation to ensure its continuance after the change agent leaves the situation.

(4) The technical competence of the innovator is often important, but it does not ensure that an innovator will be successful. Success is much more likely where the innovator is not only technically competent but also knowledgeable about and skilled in the management of change processes.

(5) The generalizations and guidelines derived in this research project are tentative and qualitative in nature. Attempts at quantitative analysis of the case studies found in the current literature proved to be of limited value because the case studies were not reported in terms of a common, systematic framework. If future case study observations were reported in terms of the framework developed in the present study, more rigorous analysis would become possible.

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Planned Change in
Agrarian Countries

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

THE MILITARY PROBLEM

Social and political waves of unrest and dissatisfaction have swept over much of the world since World War II. In contrast with earlier periods, unrest in the second half of the 20th century has not been primarily an affair of the educated classes; political movements generated by members of the educated elite have spread to the poorer classes, or have been imported from other countries, or both. These movements sometimes have had an ideological base; however, even where no ideologies were imported to any significant degree, unrest has assumed serious proportions. Most such unrest probably has occurred as a result of improved communications and a rising awareness among the ordinary people of the disparity between what they possess and what is possessed by more favored classes. This has been described as the "revolution of rising expectations."

Dissatisfaction in the developing nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America has often been channeled into insurgent efforts. Almost everywhere people's expectations have risen faster than governments have been willing or able to satisfy them. This has produced a fertile ground for insurgent movements, whether organized by outsiders or wholly indigenous.

This dissatisfaction has been recognized by national and international organizations and led to the institution of extensive programs for development, in order to satisfy some of these new expectations. Relatively recent participants in the endeavor have been the military organizations, which, by the 1950s emerged with their civic action programs. Most of these programs have had three main goals: to improve the image of the local government with the civilian population, to contribute to the nation's socioeconomic development, and to help prevent insurgency. U.S. military advisors frequently function as civic action advisors to host country armed forces.

The official U.S. Army definition for civic action is: the participation by an agency, organization, or group in economic and sociological projects which are useful to the local population at all levels, but for which the sponsor does not have primary governmental responsibility. Projects may be in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others which contribute to the general welfare and serve to improve the standing of the sponsor with the population.

Military civic action, according to the U.S. Army definition, is civic action performed or supported by military or paramilitary forces using their military skills, equipment, and resources in cooperation or on behalf of host government civil authorities, agencies, or groups. The major contribution of military forces to the internal development program of the internal defense and development efforts of foreign governments is military civic action.

Development programs sponsored by governments are in some measure concerned with the continuance of the regimes in power. Thus, the desire to satisfy needs of the common people is often tempered in development programs by a wish to maintain the status quo. That is, development may be undertaken in measured amounts as a palliative, in order to maintain the existing social or economic order. When such conditions prevail, insurgency may be a more likely route for trying to achieve improved conditions than cooperation with the government.

The treatment of civic action in this report will focus on the positive goals of development rather than goals of maintaining existing conditions. People and nations change, either through orderly development or through revolution and insurgency.

THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

Background

As a preface to discussion of the induced change process in local communities, it is useful to consider sociocultural change in general, and its relationship to planned change. Sociocultural change has been a constant in man's history, due to three processes which occur in all societies: invention, diffusion of new ideas, and competition between societies:

(1) People, from those at the most primitive level of development to those in highly industrialized societies, have always produced ideas which helped in performing traditional tasks more efficiently or made possible the performance of new tasks—that is, inventions. Archeology provides ample record of constantly improved tools among different peoples up to historic times; the rate of technological advance is accelerating continually and it has become ever more apparent in recent times.

(2) The second important process—diffusion—is the spread of beneficial new ideas beyond their place of origin. This spread is largely a matter of the advantages the new ideas bestow. Those which provide very significant advantages spread very widely and rapidly, while those which provide only marginal advantages spread shorter distances and more slowly.

(3) The third process is cultural competition. All people are in competition with their neighbors, whether or not they wish to be. If one group obtains an advantageous new idea or device, through either invention or diffusion, those who did not acquire it may be at a competitive disadvantage. Those who do not adopt the new idea or obtain the new device may suffer considerably from the lack, even to the point of being exterminated by the acquiring group.

Prior to the 20th century most cultural change took place in one of two ways: it was unplanned or it was brought about through force or coercion. Change of the first kind is exemplified by the spread of certain food crops. Within four hundred years after maize (corn) was discovered among the American Indians by Europeans, they carried it to those areas where it would grow. There was no agency or formal body which decided that corn would be a beneficial crop, and consequently embarked on a deliberate policy of spreading it. Travelers with other occupations took corn along incidentally; they carried the seed and told others how to plant it.

In addition to the accidental diffusion of new ideas, change has been—at least since the development of the great city states around 4000 B.C.—brought about by coercion, usually imposed by conquering people on those they dominated. Taxation exemplifies this kind of change, where newly dominated people were forced to give over a portion of their production to the central authorities. When the Romans or the Incas conquered other peoples they quickly imposed systems of taxation, an idea they inherited from prior conquerors.

A third type of change is voluntary on the part of the recipients but it is planned by outside change agents. Voluntary planned change before the 20th century involved either small-scale efforts or specialized innovations. Colonial governments instituted small programs of voluntary planned change in the countries under their administration in the 19th century. Agricultural extension programs began in the United States in the latter part of the 19th century. Christian missionary efforts of planned innovation, from the 16th to the 19th centuries, to a considerable extent were entered into voluntarily by the converts. But voluntary planned change programs were infrequent and quite minor through the 19th century.

Agricultural extension programs and many other change efforts in the United States, and to a lesser extent in Europe, increased enormously in the years just

prior to World War II. The colonial governments in Africa and Asia began to rely increasingly on voluntary, self-help programs in the territories under their control. Since World War II such voluntary development programs have reached large proportions. The process began with the wealthy, industrial nations providing the poorer nations with monetary and technical assistance, and help in planning, while the newly emergent nations started their various 5-year plans or 10-year plans, with local participation often being on a voluntary basis.

Three main types of specialists have been involved in such programs during most of the post-World War II period: economic planners, technicians, and administrators. Military organizations concerned with civic action programs often did not include the first type, although when lacking, the needed expertise was sought from such specialists in cooperating agencies. Thus an American civic action officer would consult an economic planner in AID while the counterpart civic action officer would consult a qualified member of his own government. The use of specialists indicates that operational agencies recognized a need for expertise in economic planning, administration, and technology. However, none of the specialists mentioned implies recognition of a need for cross-cultural innovation specialists.

The sociocultural aspects of planned change are, we believe, just as important as the technical; for this reason, the present exploratory effort was undertaken. It was decided that an effort would be made to identify the main sociocultural influences of the process by which new ideas or techniques are transferred from one culture to another and utilized.

This study can be considered the second in a three-step effort to produce generalizations and guidelines for action to help generate socioeconomic change in agrarian countries, by using concepts and techniques of applied anthropology. In the first step, exemplified by *Introducing Social Change* [Arensberg and Niehoff, 1], an intuitionist approach based on general knowledge of the field, was taken to describe what seemed—on the basis of the authors' experience and reading—the most important factors in the change process. The second step, in this report, is an effort to provide a more empirically based set of principles of change, derived from a more thorough study of the case history literature.¹ A third step would be to test the principles derived in the present study by means of field studies designed for that purpose.

The case studies are believed to describe some, if not most, of the influences which control the change process. By extracting and conceptualizing the information into a system, future researchers will have something more tangible than intuition or concepts derived from studies in industrial societies, for quantitative testing. The search and analysis presented in this report were performed more methodically than the customary preresearch scanning undertaken for most field studies. Since the work was limited to cross-cultural change studies, it should show far less Western bias than is characteristic of the typical study of social scientists other than anthropologists. Certain limitations are described in this chapter, under the section on Approach.

Scope of Study

Kraemer [2] suggests the use of a central focus for civic action, "the development of people," stating that this entails certain changes in social and psychological characteristics (organizations, values, motivation, knowledge, skills) which appear to be necessary for the economic development of traditional societies. While endorsing the proposition on how civic action might be treated

¹Case studies referred to in this report are indicated by CS followed by the number of the case in parentheses, for example, (CS 69). The case studies are listed under *Case References* at the end of this report. Publications other than case histories, listed under *Literature Cited*, are referred to in brackets, giving the number of the reference.

more efficiently, this report will be more specific and treat civic action as a vehicle for introducing new ideas and techniques. Any organization concerned with promoting socioeconomic change must be concerned ultimately with how to persuade members of the client population to accept new ways of doing things.

To quote McKittrick of the World Bank, "Economic development always involves sooner or later introducing new routines—new attitudes towards life and work—among very large numbers of people" [3, p. 2]. In practically all development programs, money and goods are provided to the host populations on the assumption that goods or money will help in their development or modernization; however, it is undeniable that accepting such materials or money without changes in practices or beliefs on the part of the recipients will not produce real developmental change.

Not only will civic action be treated in this report as a program primarily designed to introduce new ideas and practices to members of local populations, but also it will be assumed that there are techniques for the introduction of new ideas just as there are techniques for accomplishing traditional military tasks. The role of providing goods and materials in such programs will be considered only as a means of effecting changes in beliefs and behavior.

Military personnel with responsibilities for promoting civic action projects need at least limited knowledge of the techniques of innovation in local communities. Through advisory efforts, the U.S. military assists in the selection and conduct of such programs; they can succeed only if the projects are based on knowledge of the techniques which influence the outcomes. It can be expected that normally, the military officer has had little training in how change is brought about among civilians in village communities of the developing countries: the kinds of communication channels that are most effective, how to get the villagers' participation, or which kinds of motivation will cause them to act—in brief, the principles of cross-cultural innovation. Apart from technical expertise, such knowledge should constitute the main focus of advisory efforts. This is as true for the program planner, the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) officer, as for the person responsible for operations on a local level.

To help fill the need for such training, this study was undertaken in an effort to isolate and describe the principal influences which affect success or failure of socioeconomic change projects in local communities of the developing nations. The particular concern has been to describe the techniques available to the change agent (civic action personnel) which will influence the outcome of such efforts.

Such techniques can be included in training programs, and in contrast to other kinds of variables, are subject to some control. The type of communication that is used to reach the local people and the choice of local leaders through whom to work are examples of controllable techniques, the climate on the physical location of village communities are examples of variables about which, usually, little can be done.

The study focuses on a description of the process of induced change in small communities in the developing nations. Because of unevenness in existing case study descriptions and lack of a standardized research design by authors of the case studies, there can be no certainty that all influence variables in the change process will be represented. In any event, this effort will help to provide a basis for more systematic studies to follow.

An effort is made to systematize many individual bits of behavior to enable the change agent to relate his project to principles and hypotheses of a more general nature, but at the same time to be specific enough to provide a basis for judgment and action. Thus, there are chapters on local practices and local beliefs. The overall significance of such practices and beliefs, as well as those which have been most often noted as being relevant to the process or outcome of change projects, can be described. In other words, the change agent or program planner will have guidelines, but the specific practice he is dealing with must be judged independently. This problem does not differ from that of a technician

such as an engineer who has learned guidelines for constructing a bridge, but the actual terrain and other conditions for any specific bridge project must be evaluated independently, apart from all other bridge construction projects.

APPROACH

Selection of Case Histories

The anthropological method of case-history analysis of past efforts has been chosen for this study in order to describe most variables and their interrelationships. This approach has an advantage for the field practitioner not only in making him aware of certain influences in the change process, but also in clarifying their relative significance and interrelationships.

The case histories were selected from the literature describing efforts to introduce new ideas or techniques into local communities in the developing nations. The change agents in the cases were AID advisors, members of voluntary and international development organizations, missionaries, social scientists, and members of local ministries concerned with programs of socioeconomic development. In none of the projects were the change agents members of military organizations directly engaged in civic action projects; literature on developmental change did not include descriptions of civic action projects at the time the case histories were selected, primarily because civic action, as the term is used here, is a more recent type of effort toward developmental change. Civic action is a relatively new activity in military organizations of the world.

If it is assumed that the AID advisors or the United Nations development specialists were engaged in work similar to that of the civic action advisors, it is reasonable to apply their experience to the needs of the military. In general, this assumption appears to be sound. The civic action advisor does have most of the same problems and is engaged in the same kind of work, even though his background may be considerably different. As soon as he undertakes a civic action task, he is engaged in a direct activity dependent upon voluntary participation, the same as his civilian counterparts. Perhaps the one significant area of difference between the civic action worker and the civilian development specialist is the image created by his organization affiliation. Many peoples of the developing nations have had little contact with the military except when young men have been conscripted into the armed forces or when the military have entered villages on military missions. To such people, the military have appeared to be an exploitative organization. Thus, even when the military undertakes constructive development activities, a hostile image may be there initially. Conceivably, the image of the change agent could influence results in a more definite (or different) way if data could have been obtained from civic action projects.

Other influence categories should be as applicable to the military as to civilian change agents. Adaptation of innovations to local cultural patterns, utilization of existing motivations, or use of the most effective communication channels are techniques with which any change agent needs to be concerned when he is trying to introduce new ways of behavior.

The technique used in this study was to search for case histories in which social scientists or development specialists described specific efforts to promote change in social units of agrarian countries. Only case histories in which the change agents could be identified were selected, since one of the primary purposes was to describe interaction between the change agent and the project recipients. Selection was also limited to small social units, those which normally would be classified as communities. In most instances, the change agents either were foreigners who came from assisting countries, or were members of change agencies of the indigenous national governments; in almost all instances they were introducing ideas or practices derived from Western industrial countries. Thus, the idea of cross-cultural change was maintained even when the country of the change agent was the same as that of the recipients. Frequently he had

absorbed a new idea from the industrial West and attempted to transfer it to his non-Westernized countrymen, such as village farmers or urban residents recently emigrated from villages.

The case histories were evaluated to ascertain whether they met the necessary minimum conditions for adequate analysis: that they had been described by a reliable researcher, that they contained sufficient detail for an understanding of the process of interaction between the change agent and the recipients, and that the general outcome could be reasonably ascertained. If, for example, there was no information regarding the techniques of the change agent, the case was not used. If a report discussed theoretical aspects of change but provided no details on how it happened in that particular case, or if many problem areas were listed but no information was provided on whether the innovation was accepted or rejected, it was not selected for study.

The outcome in the case studies was often difficult to determine from the published reports. It is fairly clear that a project which was abandoned was a failure or that one in which the goals were achieved was a success. However, projects that were not abandoned, but where the original goals were not completely achieved, were sometimes difficult to categorize. For example, if change agents tried to introduce significant changes of an institutional type and failed, they may have managed to introduce a few minor noninstitutional changes. In general, a project was classified as successful if a significant new idea or procedure was introduced into the recipient group, even if it accomplished less than the change agent had planned.

Final assurance that an innovation has been transferred comes only when it has been integrated into the local society and no longer needs the influence of the change agent. All cases that were classified as successful contained enough data to indicate that integration was probable, even though specific information to that effect was frequently missing. Integration as an index of successful transference of an innovation is, in a sense, parallel to abandonment as an index of failure; both signify termination of the change agent's role.

Analysis of Cases

Once a case was selected and its general outcome decided, it was necessary to isolate the behavioral components that influenced the outcome. An attempt was made to extract all influences, both negative and positive,¹ for each case history and to identify a general class for each influence.

A file card was prepared for each case, listing the location, project type, statement of goal, general outcome, bibliographic reference, and each influence. A brief statement was added for each influence factor, indicating why it was considered a valid influence. Examples from an effort to establish literacy among women in one district of Kenya (CS 69) are:

Kinship The males in general felt it was a waste of time for women to learn to read. Husbands made fun of their wives for studying.

Leadership: Educators Village teachers and leaders were enlisted for the effort.

Demonstration Women in one village were sent to another to observe the success of the program there.

The fact that a given variable tends to exert a negative influence on the innovation process does not necessarily imply that the outcome of the project will be a failure. Likewise, if a given variable has a positive influence, it does not imply a successful outcome of the innovation project. The outcome is determined by a multiplicity of interactive factors, some tending to have a positive influence while others tend to have a negative influence.

When 108 case histories had been assembled, frequency distributions were made of the influences. From these, it seemed that although all categories had validity in that they existed in some case histories, some appeared much more frequently than others. Some influences were evident in almost every case, while others occurred in only a few cases. Methods of communication established by the change agent and participation obtained from the recipients were almost always described, while categories such as timeliness of introduction of the innovation and flexibility of innovating techniques were noted in less than one-fourth of the cases. Therefore, it was decided to merge some of the less significant types of influences, subdivide those occurring very frequently, and leave unchanged those where the frequency was neither very great nor very small. Thus, communication was subdivided into six types, such as formal, demonstration, and intragroup. Both motivation and practical benefit were subdivided into four separate categories. In contrast to this further elaboration, recreation and consumption patterns were merged into one category, *traditional practices*. The final set of categories is shown in Table 1.

A total of 203 case study reports were analyzed with the revised system. These reports, of course, represent descriptions by different authors with

Table 1

Final Analysis Categories

Local Cultural Characteristics

1. Leaders
 - A. Administrators
 - B. Educators
 - C. Religious
 - D. Civic
 - E. Noninstitutional
2. Social Structure
 - A. Kinship
 - B. Caste-Class
 - C. Ethnic
 - D. Political
 - E. Central Authority
3. Economic Pattern
 - A. Work Methods
 - B. Work Schedules
 - C. Work Groupings
 - D. Proprietary Rights
 - E. Distribution Patterns
4. Beliefs
 - A. Supernatural
 - B. Medical
 - C. Attitude Toward Change
5. Practices
 - A. Consumption
 - B. Recreation
 - C. Bathing

Motivation for Change

6. Felt Needs
 - A. Solicited
 - B. Demonstrated
 - C. Ascertained
 - D. Generated

7. Perceived Practical Benefit

- A. Economic
- B. Medical
- C. Educational
- D. Convenience

8. Other Motivation

- A. Competition
- B. Reward-Punishment
- C. Novelty

Project Strategies

9. Image Characteristics
 - A. Personal
 - B. Age
 - C. Technical Competence
 - D. Organizational Affiliation
10. Communication
 - A. Use of Local Language
 - B. Formal Meetings
 - C. Mass Media
 - D. Demonstration
 - E. Interpersonal
 - F. Intragroup
11. Participation
 - A. Labor and Material Contributions
 - B. Organizational
 - C. Passive
12. Other Strategies
 - A. Flexibility
 - B. Continuity
 - C. Timing
 - D. Maintenance

varying abilities and purposes. Thus, this is an analysis of reports rather than of the projects, which introduces limitations stemming from the nature of such data. But the outcome of analysis of 203 field studies from all parts of the world yields an amount of data that otherwise would be difficult and expensive to collect. While there are gaps in the reports, only reports characterized by clarity, specificity, and internal consistency were used.


The types of projects included are those that required self-help action by people in local communities of the developing world, in 50 nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Most projects were concerned with innovations in agriculture, education, public health, transportation, resettlement, housing, and community development. The majority were in rural communities, although a sizable number of projects were in poor or slum areas of cities.

Most of the reports were produced by two types of professionals: action administrators and research scientists. The first type is represented chiefly by the British in African countries. A secondary group of action administrators who produced field reports were citizens of the recipient countries (members of development agencies such as community development or agricultural services.) The second type, the social scientists, comprised chiefly anthropologists but there were also some sociologists, political scientists, social workers, missionaries, and writers.

The original intent was to prepare a quantitative report of the primary variables in the change process. A number of problems arose, chiefly as a result of the lack of a common research design by different authors. Analysts described the influences which they considered important; consequently, what some have mentioned, others have disregarded. In many instances one could only surmise whether or not a particular influence was present. There is also unevenness in length of the reports—some are four or five pages long, others as much as fifty. Even though case histories were selected in which the outcomes were reasonably ascertainable, there still was a considerable degree of variation.

As a consequence of all these problems, it was decided that the data were not precise enough for a sophisticated quantitative analysis, and that it would be better to treat the study as an exploratory effort in which the primary variables of the change process were to be identified and categorized. Statements of the hypothesized influence of the variables could be made, based on the frequency of their occurrence, but such influence would need to be validated by other research studies. Therefore, presentations of raw frequency occurrences and percentages must be considered only as rough indications of the strength or prevalence of a particular variable.

A model of the change process has been presented in two publications [Niehoff and Anderson, 4, 5]. The change process is depicted as the introduction into a local community of a new idea or technique, which continues through a period of interaction between the change agents and the recipients and ends by being integrated into the local society. Two forces impinge on the process line: the action of the change agents and the reaction of the recipients. The process can be halted at any time through discontinuance of effort by either the change agents or the recipients.



In one of the formulations [10], recipient variables of motivation and local cultural patterns were identified to indicate that there may be barriers to change in a culture, irrespective of the innovation techniques or strategies of

the change agent. However, it is now felt that such barriers can be overcome if adaptation to local cultural patterns and existing motivations is considered as a matter of planning for the change agent and as an integral part of the change strategy. Thus, the concept, *barriers to change*, regardless of technique, appears to be inadequate. Barriers are best viewed as existing only in relation to the innovations and techniques that are used; therefore they are subsumed under *innovation techniques* in this report.

AN OVERVIEW

This report is divided into chapters which represent the conceptual frame derived from the study of the case histories. The chapters follow the order in which a change agent would need to regard the process. Chapters 2 through 6 are concerned with the need for adapting to specific characteristics of the local cultural patterns.

Chapters 7 through 9 describe the principal motivational forces of people in local communities which influence them to adopt innovations. The actual motivations for accepting or rejecting a new idea or practice are largely inferred, since the nature of the data would not permit identifying precise cause and effect relations.

Chapter 10 deals with image characteristics of the change agents as they affect relationships with potential adopters of innovations. There is an attempt to show the relationship between cooperation of local people and the kind of image presented by the outsiders, the change agents.

The methods of transmitting and receiving information—communication channels—are the subject matter of Chapter 11. The importance of communication techniques cannot be overemphasized, since no change can take place unless people are informed of the nature of the change and are, moreover, convinced that it is advantageous.

Participation by local people on a self-help basis is the topic of Chapter 12. Although, in general, participation will result naturally from proper innovation strategies, the kinds and amounts of participation that local people provide tend to depend on what the change agent tries to accomplish. For any given project, the local people will usually accept all that is given to them and will provide only that which is asked for. Thus, the requirement of local participation can also be considered a strategy available to the change agent.

In Chapter 13 several secondary strategies are discussed—the change agent's continuity of effort, flexibility, use of positive timing, and efforts to provide ways of maintaining the innovation in the local group. It is worthwhile to consider the significance, independently, of these secondary strategies, even though they occur to a great extent as part of other primary strategies such as communication methods or utilization of local leadership.

Finally, Chapter 14 provides an overall summary.

Although some frequencies of individual strategies are reported in the body of the report to indicate their relative importance, another indication of a factor's significance is the length of its treatment in the text. Some chapters are considerably longer than others, and some individual variables are grouped to constitute a chapter. For example, Chapter 2, *Local Leaders*, is much longer than Chapter 6, *Local Practices*, while flexibility and continuity of implementation are discussed in the same chapter. This difference derives from the fact that there were more extensive data on the influence of local leadership than on the influence of local practices or on the influence of continuity and flexibility.

Chapter 2

LOCAL LEADERS

Western planners and change agents have long accepted the necessity for knowing the customs and beliefs of the local people. Virtually every American change agency advocates this need, even though efforts to obtain the knowledge usually are not very extensive. It is suggested that most technical specialists regard the change process, when they think of it at all, as a simple one of replacement. According to this manner of reasoning, the noneconomic or nonpractical ways will be replaced by practical ones, the practicality being decided from the point of view of the outside change agent. The difficulty involved in this approach is that what appears to be more practical to the outsider may not appear so to the member of the local community, the potential adopter.

A fact which is often ignored, or not understood by change agents who lack training in the social sciences, is that every cultural system is a functional whole, even if it is operating on a relatively low level of productivity. People as primitive as the African pygmies or the Australian aborigines still do have socioeconomic systems that permit the majority to survive and to obtain satisfaction from life. Various customs are interwoven to the extent that an economic practice is normally related to religious beliefs, social structure, and other aspects of the cultural systems. A change in one of these spheres of activity can bring changes in any number of others. Unless new ideas or practices which conflict with the traditional patterns provide significant advantages over the old ways, there is a strong likelihood that they will be rejected.

A well known case history in the anthropological literature concerns an innovation which did seem to be so advantageous to the local people that they adopted it enthusiastically and, as a consequence, practically destroyed their entire cultural system. A tribe of aboriginal Australians gladly accepted the steel axes offered by local missionaries to replace their traditional stone axes. The advantages of the steel axes in cutting wood and accomplishing other tasks so impressed the tribesmen that they ignored the problems that use of the steel axes was creating in other areas of their culture. Three of the most significant problems were: the steel axes were given to women as well as to men, which undermined the traditional authoritative position of the men, who had been the makers and keepers of the stone axes; the patterns of intertribal trading broke down, since the men stopped making stone axes, their principal trading item in the old system; and the tribal myths fell into disrepute, since the stone axes had been fully explained in the old stories whereas steel axes, naturally, had never been mentioned. At the time of the study, the tribesmen had lost belief in their old ways without having adopted the new ways of the white men who were giving them the axes. [Sharp, 6]

Some of the people concerned with helping to bring socioeconomic change to peasant groups in Asia or Latin America may feel that the experience of such a primitive tribe has little relevance to their work. However, it must be remembered that all people have their mythologies or sacred literature, as well as their social relationships. It is not difficult to envisage disruption in American society if, for example, solid evidence were produced that the Bible was nothing more than a hoax, written by someone perpetrating a trick. If all Judaeo-Christian beliefs were suddenly thrown into doubt, as were the supernatural beliefs of the Australian aborigines, new justifications for our present

morality, or new morality, would have to be generated. Churches and synagogues would be put to other uses, the financial holdings of churches would change rapidly, and many core beliefs of Americans would be lost.

Fortunately, men usually recognize potential threats to their cultural systems; when threats are as strong as those posed by the introduction of the steel axes, the society usually tends to reject or modify the new ideas or practices. This permits societies to maintain their cultural cores, their beliefs and values, even if these are somewhat changed. It must be emphasized that a group of people without a central core of beliefs and values is not a society but merely a disorganized mass of humans.

How does the disruption of cultural patterns, even when accidental, affect the process of innovation? Very simply, it causes resistance to, and possible rejection of, new ideas or practices. It is not a matter of whether local practices are better or worse than the projected innovations, but merely that by proposing replacement, the change agent complicates the process of change.

It may well be, as a number of social scientists have suggested, that economic development will not come to the nonindustrial nations until they accept a fair number of Western practices; in general, it appears that such replacement must be gradual and need not be complete. For those aspects of culture that are not critical for economic change, there is no reason why the local customs cannot remain.

Thus, we are here approaching traditional culture as something that exists in nonindustrial countries; and that needs to be taken seriously on purely pragmatic grounds; by ignoring it, the change agent reduces his chances for successful innovation. The local cultural system needs to be considered by the planners long before the first change agent begins work in the local community, since the types of innovations selected and the means of adapting them to local conditions will be set largely by the initial plans.

Certain innovations have practically no chance for adoption by certain cultural groups. Some are obvious. Attempts to innovate beef production for human consumption among Hindus or pork production among Muslims are examples. Many others would encounter difficulties, but the sociocultural objections are not so obvious. The introduction of milk consumption into Southeast Asia and West Africa has encountered problems, not because of any strong cultural taboo against milk, but simply because it was not a traditional part of the diet. Introducing dog meat to Americans would meet with similar conditions. No religious beliefs held by Americans prohibit the consumption of dog meat; the animal is simply considered as serving another function, being a pet, and the idea of eating it is traditionally repulsive. For such projects, so strongly in opposition to the local beliefs, adaptation to cultural values would pose problems so great that they would have to be eliminated in the planning stage. Even when innovations are not in opposition to local beliefs and practices, their sheer novelty will create a certain resistance. This can be counteracted most easily by attempting to modify them or adapting them to existing forms of social organization and other beliefs or practices.

The most significant overall characteristic of a local culture that a change agent must adapt to, insofar as bringing change to that group is concerned, is undoubtedly the leadership pattern. Leaders influence opinion and have vested interests in their positions. If powerful influences come into a community without the leader's sanction, his position is threatened. An outsider cannot ignore a local leader and still expect to influence his followers positively, since ignoring the leader implies that he is powerless and he is thus threatened. If outsiders attempt to ignore the local leader, he has the choice of either accepting a weakened position or opposing the outsiders. Usually, the reaction is to oppose the outside influence; few leaders willingly relinquish power.

Leadership patterns are important in all cultures and, fortunately, they are usually recognized as such by outside action agents. No matter how unsophisticated a change agent might be about behavioral patterns of a culture other than his, he will usually assume that a pattern of leadership exists and will consider

it important. One of the first things a Western change agent or member of the elite of an Asian or African country does when he walks into a local village is to ask to be taken to the leader. There is no assurance that he will get to the real source of power and influence but he will try—and he will probably have more chance for success in this attempt than he will for success in the project if he seeks to deal directly with other aspects of the behavior or belief system, no matter how pertinent these may be to the innovation to be introduced. This would normally be true even for change agents who operate solely with the replacement theory of innovation. While they may conceive of an economic change or preventive health measure as one of simple replacement, they will rarely think of approaching the task without involving the local leaders. The author recalls, from his experience (non-HumRRO) with an American aid mission in Southeast Asia that the most frequent question raised in the meetings of the advisors was, "Who are the local leaders?"

These American change agents rarely thought about other aspects of the local culture, and when they did they produced stereotyped answers. Questions on local beliefs or motivation for accepting new practices by villagers were passed over lightly, while a constant, conscious, active quest for local leadership went on. At the end of the two-year tour which this author served, the American advisors were still puzzling over the question of who were the "real" leaders. Thus, it may be that leadership is stressed more often in case histories of induced change projects than any other cultural pattern because change agents and analysts are conscious of it. Leadership also appears to correlate highly with acceptance or rejection of new ideas, which strongly suggests that it is truly significant.

Innovations which local leaders do sanction tend to be adopted, while those opposed by leaders tend to be rejected. Thus, we believe that the leadership pattern is the single most important characteristic of local culture to adapt to for successful innovation. In the analysis of influence categories, five different types of local leadership of significance in the local communities of the nonindustrial countries were isolated, four based on group membership and the fifth noninstitutional:

- Administrators
- Educators
- Religious Leaders
- Civic Leaders
- Noninstitutional

Basic distinctions can be made within these categories, but since the presentation is general the categories will be treated as units. One characteristic should be mentioned, since it represents a result of common events in most of the nonindustrial countries: A consistent duality of leadership exists in the usual local community, one being oriented toward traditional practices and the other being a product of Western influence.

Most nations of Asia, Africa, and to some extent Latin America are in transition toward more centralized government control. The nation-building process usually began by a dominant ethnic group gaining control, then starting to institute a central bureaucracy based on Western patterns. Appointed bureaucrats have been put in charge at all levels of government above the village, persons whose positions depend either on modern education or relationship with the group in power. Where traditional headmen have been retained, their authority has been greatly reduced. Much of the authority that was originally in the hands of the traditional local leaders has been transferred to local bureaucrats appointed by central authority. Since the process of centralization has rarely been completed, both types of leaders often exist side by side. Most of the real power, including police power, is available to the government appointee, while most of the villagers' allegiance is to the headman. This situation will vary from country to country, but it seems to be generally true for Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. It is less so in Latin America where centralization of government authority has been under way considerably longer.

In education there is a parallel situation. In many parts of the world, particularly the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia, education in the past was the province of traditional religious leaders. The new educational systems are almost always based on Western models and usually ignore the traditional religious teacher. In countries where Christian missionization has been relatively successful, new types of church organizations and religious leaders have emerged in local communities alongside the traditional religious leaders.

ADMINISTRATORS

As might be expected, in the great majority of cases where local administrative leaders were brought into projects either to sanction or to help implement the work, the efforts were successful. Of the 75 projects in which such leaders did cooperate, only five failed to reach successful conclusions. The types of leaders who affected the outcomes of various projects positively were village headmen, elders, village council leaders and chiefs, local government officials, and mayors or council leaders in urban areas. In most instances, the change agents actively attempted to bring the leaders into the projects although a few local leaders took the initiative to participate in change projects. The following two examples show how change agents deliberately sought leadership support.

A project in Somalia was designed to halt soil erosion caused by overgrazing and the cutting of trees. Community development officials first toured the area intensively, holding discussions with local chiefs, village headmen, religious leaders, and the people in general. As soon as there was agreement to undertake erosion control efforts, formal classes were conducted, followed by the organization of local development societies, each based on a village unit. The development committees, with the advice of the change agents, drew up rules to close off certain areas for soil regeneration. After two rainy seasons, results were so spectacular that neighboring communities, in imitation of the original ones, began to close off areas in their jurisdiction (CS 146).

An urban renewal development project in Colombia was initiated by making a formal study of the leadership pattern. The data collected were used for making the first contacts, which were with municipal authorities, institutional leaders, priests, doctors, and teachers. Meetings were held first at the homes of the leaders, after which visits were made to individual households, where mimeographed material explaining the purpose of the project was distributed. As a result of a 10-week campaign and a followup a year later, road improvements were made, drainage canals were cleared, a bridge was built, and a rubbish collection system was inaugurated (CS 12).

When initiative for assistance is taken by village communities, it is usually through their traditional leaders; this is illustrated by a project in Northern Nigeria where schools were built through self-help. The project was started when a village committee, composed of the headman and village elders, went to the government office three miles away to request a school. The committee was informed that no money was available for this purpose, but they countered with a proposal that, if the government would provide a teacher, the local people would build the school. The proposition was accepted, but the government was also able to provide enough money for the cement, doors, and windows. The villagers provided all other materials and the labor. In the first year, six schools were built and 10 were repaired in this manner (CS 93).

A few projects have failed despite cooperation of the local leaders. All were projects in which leader participation was obtained to initiate the projects, but there was insufficient understanding of the real goals on the part of the leaders, or their followers, or both. The projects were discontinued during the implementation stage, or were expected to be discontinued later. Most of the projects were in public health and the benefits of the new practices were not clearly understood by the participants.

Four undertakings that failed to reach their goals were a latrine project in India, two venereal disease projects in Africa, and a home hygiene project in Syria (CS 41, CS 101, CS 156, CS 158). In all instances the administrative

leaders cooperated initially. Even though there were other complicating factors, the most relevant observation that can be made is that the goals were in preventive medicine. In types of innovations where benefits are more readily perceived by local people, sanction by local leaders may be enough. But motivation is low with these kinds of projects, so that initial sanction by local leaders may be insufficient to provide the necessary momentum. However, even in other kinds of projects, if the expected gains do not materialize the local people will tend to react negatively despite the initial sanction of their leaders. For example, a project to introduce improved varieties of pigs into a Filipino village reached an impasse when it was discovered that the new pigs were inferior to the old varieties. The report implied that the villagers would discontinue keeping the new pigs as soon as the change agent would permit them to do so. This was the situation despite the fact that the local council had initiated the project (CS 128).

In another example, an irrigation project in Peru was implemented through the local headman, but the goals were communicated poorly to the local participants. The local villagers did not understand much of the work and what was asked of them. They resented giving up land for the canal, claiming that it drained their pastures during the rainy season. They also complained that the new canal was a hazard to their children and animals. Merely utilizing the headman as chairman of the irrigation committee proved insufficient to get the villagers' cooperation. The local people used the canal for drinking water and for bathing but not for irrigation, the purpose for which it was built (CS 199).

In instances where leaders did not cooperate on projects, usually it was not because the change agents deliberately ignored them, but rather because the leaders did not perceive any advantage either for themselves or for their followers. The local leaders either refused openly, or more often simply failed to cooperate and went through formalities with the change agents without actually attempting to sway their people. Most frequently, the "cause" of such lack of cooperation was that leaders could not visualize any political or power advantage to be derived from such action. Thus, a community development project in a rural area of Colombia, sponsored by the government with assistance from Peace Corps volunteers, was expected to operate through local leaders whenever possible. The religious and civic leaders cooperated, although the mayor and governor actively opposed the project. Evidently these political figures did not believe they could gain any political advantage from association with the effort. This project was exceptional in that it was brought to a successful conclusion despite lack of cooperation from administrative leaders. However, the local priest, who was aggressive and concerned, was able to counteract the administrators' negative influence (CS 172).

Only one clear-cut example was found of an effort in which the change agents deliberately tried to avoid involving all local leaders. The intention was to circumvent the traditional lines of leadership by creating a nonpolitical community development council. The country was Brazil and the community was politically oriented, as are many in Latin America. As might have been expected, the ignoring of existing leaders converted them into enemies of the project. Factionalism erupted in the development council and the effort was ultimately abandoned (CS 5). This is an exceptional instance; while it is not at all uncommon for American or government bureaucrats to ignore some local cultural patterns, the one which they are most likely to take seriously is leadership.

EDUCATORS

Of the types of leader found to be instrumental in change efforts, second in frequency of occurrence was the local schoolteacher or headmaster. The administrative leader is readily recognized by a Western change agent or a government bureaucrat as important in development efforts because he has been designated for that responsibility. The teacher and religious leader in the bureaucracies of industrial states have been shorn of most responsibilities except for those concerned with formal education and religious services; this is primarily due to the

pronounced division of labor in technologically complex societies. However, such specialization does not exist in the agrarian nations, where the functions of the teacher and religious leader tend to be much broader.

The primary significance of the local teacher is that he straddles the two worlds of the agrarian nations. He is potentially capable of helping to close the gap between the educated elite and the village peasant. He is educated and thus partakes of the modernizing trends occurring in his land. He has absorbed some modern concepts and is not opposed to change, at least when it does not challenge his position. At the same time, he lives or works in the world of the village peasant or the urban poor. His advantage over the county, district, or provincial official is that he works, and sometimes lives, in the midst of the common people while still being a member of the educated class. In contrast, the traditional local leader, the headman, may know more of the conditions of local life, but usually he is not well educated and is only partially aware of modernizing trends. The educator is the man in the middle.

A second positive characteristic of the educator is that he brings to the local community something which is highly desired—education. Peasant villagers and urban poor all over the world have come to recognize that education is a key to a better life. In community development projects which are based on felt needs of the local populace, the improvement of schools or education is almost always near the top of the list (CS 77, CS 78). It is no accident that approximately 50 percent of Peace Corps efforts are in education [Carter, 7].

In the induced change projects studied, although schoolteachers or headmasters were less likely to be involved than administrators, when they did become involved their influence seemed just as great. In 27 projects where schoolteachers were involved positively, only one project failed to attain the designated goals. Thus, in an urban district of South Africa, a project to sponsor home economics was inaugurated in a local community center, where classes were given in nutrition, cooking, and literacy. Local African teachers, brought in initially by the outside change agent to help teach night school, became so interested that eventually they took over the program's administration (CS 151). In a public health program in Guam, teachers were brought in at an early stage to lecture children and to give class assignments in sanitation. The change agent continued to rely on schoolteachers, as well as religious and civic leaders. The campaign was successful to the extent that intestinal diseases and fly and rodent problems were significantly reduced (CS 153).

Since the local schoolteacher is aware of modernization trends to some extent, frequently he seeks information about and even initiates innovation projects. In this regard he can be very valuable if he understands and accepts his own limitations, which are usually technical. In such instances he is playing a dual role, that of change agent bringing new ideas into the community and that of local leader, sanctioning and/or helping to implement the change process. In a community development project in a city suburb in Northeast Brazil, the change agent was the headmistress of the local primary school. Her goal was to broaden the school's service and make it into a center of community development. The school became the physical focal point of the project and the headmistress brought in the other teachers as participants. She also involved the local religious and administrative leaders, as did the change agents in the sanitation project in Guam. The physical accomplishments of the project included paving streets and installing an electrical transformer. The appointment of a priest for the newly created parish was an achievement that could establish a feeling of self-pride and "community," which is as significant as physical construction (CS 4).

An educator took a similar active role in a project to produce tomatoes as a cash crop in a small district of Jamaica. The market for the previous cash crop, tobacco, had been destroyed by the depression of the 1930s. The local schoolmaster heard that a good market for tomatoes was open in Canada. He requested a technician from the agricultural department to provide directions on the technical details of growing and exporting the crop, thus avoiding the pitfalls of giving inaccurate technical advice. He was well established in the community as a trusted and respected leader, as well as being the headmaster.

This combination enabled him to overcome the initial skepticism and refusal to plant the seeds, and ultimately to develop a cooperative with 15,000 growers involving some 80,000 acres (CS 61).

The one consistent difficulty with teachers as promoters of change is that they frequently accept outside ideas too freely, without assessing the possibilities carefully, and without having the necessary technical background to fulfill the demonstration requirements. An index of the judgment of the headmaster just described is that he obtained necessary technical expertise from a qualified technician. The effort of a teacher in Costa Rica was just the opposite when he attempted to get local farmers to cultivate vegetables to improve their diet. A demonstration garden which the teacher himself cultivated failed because of improper soil conditions, which confirmed the village cultivators' opinion that he was not an agricultural "expert." As might be expected, they did not adopt the new practice (CS 15).

Another instance of the same kind of problem is described in a previously cited venereal disease eradication campaign in Tanzania. Most of the local leaders, including teachers, supported the innovation and two teachers were on the health committee. However, despite all efforts, the belief persisted that venereal disease was not a serious ailment and the local people stopped treatment as soon as preliminary cures were effected (CS 158). Even though other leaders may sanction a new idea, teachers will probably be among the first to accept Western techniques, since they have better background for understanding them. However, frequently they fail to recognize the gap between their knowledge and that of the villagers among whom they work. And rarely do they have sufficient social science background to be able to understand the change process as more than a simple matter of substituting new practices for traditional ones.

Educators, like other kinds of leaders, fail to support a change project when they believe it will harm their own position or when they become alienated, usually through poor communication with the change agents. A particularly complicated effort in highland Bolivia to provide land reform and community development suffered greatly from poor innovation techniques by the "experts". In particular, the change agents failed to establish any effective means of communication with either the local leaders or the Indian villagers. The local teachers were alienated by being given the impression that the project would provide them with better schools, equipment, and housing, which did not happen. As a result, they disparaged the project to the villagers; their negative influence undoubtedly contributed to the poor participation by the local people in most aspects of the project (CS 3).

In most countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, the teachers, who are the lower level educators, are appointed to their positions primarily on the basis of qualifications and thus are not greatly involved in political maneuvering. However, this does not always hold true with administrative school officials. With such people, political considerations may take precedence. Previously cited was the community development project in Brazil in which the change agent attempted to bypass the traditional leaders, who consequently turned against the project. Education officials were among the first to drop out (CS 5). A similar outcome resulted from similar influences in a Mexican village project to establish a cooperative medical clinic. In spite of initial acceptance by local leaders, they were evidently not convinced that the project would help them. An election was coming up, and the local mayor, school principal, and other officials, realizing that they could take no credit for the new clinic, fought against it. The change agent abandoned the idea (CS 85).

RELIGIOUS LEADERS

The leadership type that ranked third in frequency of occurrence in change projects was the religious leader. In most of the accounts involving religious leaders, they supported the projects; all 22 projects in this category were relatively successful. In contrast, of six projects which religious leaders opposed, only one achieved its expected goal. These figures indicate the very

high degree of influence this type of leader has in local communities. Such leaders were not included in descriptions more often, it is believed, primarily because most change agents do not actively solicit their sanction or assistance. Religious leaders are not utilized as much as they could be because they are not regarded as "legitimate" prime movers in modern international development philosophy.

One interesting finding from these case histories was that positive influential religious leadership usually was Christian. In only five of the 22 instances of positive influence did the religious leaders belong to other world religions, even though most development work is carried out in non-Christian countries. Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and the Philippines are the only regions of the agrarian nations where a majority, or even a considerable portion, of the population is Christian. In North Africa, the Middle East, and all of Asia with the exception of the Philippines and South Vietnam, the Christian population is quite small. The fact that Christian leadership occurred in a higher proportion of the cases than would have been expected can be interpreted in two ways: the leaders from non-Christian religions have not been interested in secular development, or the change agents made no attempt to involve them. The second possibility seems to be the more likely; that is, the change agents apparently viewed Christian leaders as useful in bringing about change, but regarded non-Christian leaders either as irrelevant or as barriers to change. It must be stressed that communication is usually easier with local Christian leaders than with non-Christian, since a high percentage of change agents or their foreign advisors are from Christian cultures. The change agent has much more in common with Christian missionaries or with local Christian leaders than with the non-Christians. Besides being closer in education and in understanding of the modern world, the change agent and Christian leader often speak the same or another European language, whereas the non-Christian leader usually speaks only the local language.

The author's experience as a community development advisor in Laos serves to illustrate this principle. Although he made considerable effort to know the local leaders and ultimately did a little work with the Buddhists, relationship with them was far more tenuous than with various members of Christian denominations who were working in the same area. He succeeded in knowing Swiss, French, and American missionaries on a social as well as a working basis, and assisted them directly on development projects in local villages. Much less was done with the Buddhists, even though they considerably outnumbered Christian leaders. In fact, the author failed to recognize the high significance of Buddhist leadership until after his tour (CS 80). Possibly this same kind of relationship in other countries partially explains the relative lack of cooperation by change agents with Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, and tribal religious leaders.

In most instances of positive influence from Christian leaders, the change agents sought out their assistance, although in a few cases the church leaders were the change agents as well as the accepted leaders. Two examples of the first type follow. A small project to install an irrigation system in a rural Nigerian village was successful, due in no small measure to the positive contribution of the local leaders. The local pastor's support was secured because the dam raised the water level of the nearby stream, providing him with a more convenient baptismal location (CS 2). The Vicos project in Peru initially had little local support beyond that of the Indian recipients. The only locally organized group favoring the project was the Catholic Church. The parish priest admired the effort and the area bishop was also sympathetic. He visited the site several times, thereby sanctioning the work to the Catholic Indians (CS 112).

Some religious leaders, particularly educated missionaries, share one characteristic with the educator: They are aware of modernizing trends in the countries where they are working and can, themselves, initiate change projects. During the last decade, a formalized role of missionary-change agent has been created. These are the missionaries trained to be specialists in agriculture, cooperatives, health, and other development activities. An excellent example of this kind of effort was the development of credit unions among the Indian poor

in Puno, Peru, a project so successful that it spread to other parts of the country. The principal change agent - religious leader was an American Catholic missionary who, utilizing the influence of the church, instituted a credit union which charged considerably lower rates of interest than local banks; within about six years the credit union expanded to Lima and other cities through the auspices of the church (CS 109) *Time* [8].

When non-Christian leadership was brought into change projects, it was usually after initial difficulties made it apparent that the sanction of the religious leader was important if the goal were to be reached. This appears to have been particularly likely to happen with Hindu and Buddhist leaders. Perhaps the most dramatic example was the role of a Hindu priest in a vaccination project in India. Initially, the Indian change agent attempted a direct, personal approach with the villagers, going from house to house and explaining the vaccination program. The villagers became uneasy because of the aggressiveness of the health official, coupled with their lack of understanding as to how the vaccination would help. Furthermore, the local Brahmin priest was unsympathetic to the proposed vaccinations and advised the villagers not to cooperate, but instead to sacrifice a goat to placate the goddess of smallpox, which was the traditional method of controlling the disease. The health officials were almost ready to abandon the effort when the priest's nephew became quite sick and the priest came to them for help. While the behavior of the Brahmin priest may appear to be inconsistent, local people frequently turn to Western-type "healers" when their own techniques do not produce results, particularly for therapeutic medicine [Niehoff, 9]. The health officials provided treatment for the nephew on condition that the Brahmin priest sanction the vaccination program. The most conspicuous act that provided a sanction was the priest's permitting the nephew to be vaccinated, to demonstrate to the other villagers that it was a simple procedure. Relationships were improved to such an extent that the priest later took an active role in helping to introduce better health practices to the village (CS 190).

It is interesting to note from this incident that the Indian change agent failed initially to appreciate the influence of the priest. This is not uncommon among the educated elite in Asian nations; the most likely explanation is that such people view the modern change process as separate from traditional ways. Specialists, such as health officials, have been trained to advocate Western-inspired innovations such as vaccination, and through their training have come to believe that these practices are not to be mixed with traditional patterns of conduct, the goat sacrifices being an example. The difficulty insofar as the change process is concerned is that the local religious leader still possesses considerable influence on a local level and, to reiterate, the act of ignoring him threatens his position.

A particularly relevant instance of utilizing local religious leadership came to our attention after the case histories were analyzed. In part of the Comilla Academy Program in East Pakistan, the imams (Muslim religious leaders) were trained to be teachers of both children and adults. Thus, the traditional prestige and experience of religious teachers were utilized to sanction secular teaching. In the latest report that we have seen, 96 imams were working in 88 schools [Murrell, 10].

The religious leader, non-Christian as well as Christian, can play a role beyond sanctioning a new idea, particularly by assisting in the implementation and maintenance of new practices. This is especially relevant in countries where religious leadership is incorporated into large, viable organizations. The value of the incorporation of the credit loan association into the Catholic organizational structure of Peru has already been mentioned (CS 109).

There was a similar instance among Buddhists in Laos in connection with a well project in local villages. The main effort was a failure, primarily because the problem of maintenance of the wells was almost completely ignored by the technician-change agent. Almost all of the wells were broken and abandoned within 18 months after installation, despite the desire of local people to have them. However, two wells had been installed in Buddhist temple compounds, and

the monks assumed responsibility for their care and maintenance while permitting local villagers to use them as much as they wished. When a metal arm attached to a pump handle of one well broke, the monks had the local carpenter fashion the same piece in hard wood. The monks also fashioned a concrete base some 40 feet in diameter with a gutter to carry run-off water. As both wells were on temple grounds, the surroundings were kept clean and dry; wells which were left in open village areas faced a serious problem since most of these were ultimately surrounded by stagnant pools of water (CS 80). It is significant that the Buddhist monks were the most efficient tenders of the new water facilities, which they used for their own purposes but kept in condition for use by other villagers.

As noted, in the five cases where religious leaders were opposed to change projects, the projects were rejected by the local communities. In these instances other local leaders also opposed the innovations, so it is not possible to be certain that the religious leaders provided the most critical influence but their influence was probably as important as any. Theoretically, it is possible to bypass such leaders, but under these circumstances chances for success in establishing the project are undoubtedly poor. In the community development effort in Northeast Brazil, where the local priests were opposed to the project and all established leaders including the Catholic priest worked against the effort, it was subsequently abandoned (CS 5).

A similar project to introduce wells into a Peruvian community also ended in abandonment, because the change agents failed to recognize the true local leaders and worked through a government body which did not represent the community. The priests, in particular, fought against the innovation—wells to provide irrigation and a stable water supply for household use. They preached that the problem could be solved through prayer and faith rather than through improved facilities (CS 111). Their objection apparently was not so much to the wells as, again, to the fact that their position was being ignored by the change agency. When this author worked with Catholic priests in Laos on problems of village development, they were concerned with getting better water supplies for their followers above all else; they viewed the problem as purely technical and gave no indication that they felt it could be solved by prayer alone. The obvious difference in the two cases was that the wells in the Laos situation were being brought to the villages under the auspices of the missionaries while in the Peruvian project the credit would have gone to outsiders—a matter of power and influence rather than a choice between prayer and technology.

CIVIC LEADERS

The three leadership types already discussed are most often influential in local communities of the nonindustrial countries. However, in the villages and poor urban districts of these areas there are certain organizations which are dedicated to community improvement efforts, and the leaders of these constitute a significant, if not very large group. Their significance lies in the fact that they are dedicated to change and thus can be expected both to sanction and to help implement outside development projects. Of 13 instances that were found where such civic organizations and their leaders were involved in change projects, in all but one they worked toward the project goals. Local health committees, organized earlier, cooperated with the change agents of the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Egyptian government in a project to improve health conditions (CS 21). In three instances, assistance was given by local youth groups that had been organized for rural improvement purposes (CS 56, CS 114, CS 130). Other participating groups were one farmers' club, one PTA, one social service club, and various civic welfare institutions. In most instances, other types of leaders in addition to the civic leaders also supported the projects.

NONINSTITUTIONAL LEADERS

The community position of the noninstitutional type of leader does not depend on holding office in a formal organization; rather, he is looked up to or followed

because he is wealthy or fits certain traditional qualifications for leadership. Most leaders so identified owed their positions to their relative wealth. Their influence was usually strong. Such leaders were reported to be involved positively in projects in 18 instances, and in three they opposed the projects. Two examples illustrate the positive influence of such leaders. An adult education campaign in Grenada, West Indies, was organized to utilize all types of leaders, including local plantation managers and shopkeepers, who played a prominent role in implementing the project along with institutional leaders (CS 29). In a community development effort in Hong Kong, locally prominent families were the main spark for the ultimate success of the project. Such well-to-do merchant families were also mainly responsible for the organization and support of the Kaifong Welfare Associations (CS 34).

Rarely will a noninstitutional leader be able to oppose institutional leaders directly, since he does not have an organized group of followers. However, this does happen on occasion when the noninstitutional leader is persuasive enough, or when a social situation is in flux and the position of the official leaders is declining.

Such an occurrence is exemplified in a water supply improvement project in Ghana. In this case, the traditional administrative leader opposed the ideal almost throughout the implementation process; only toward the end did he stop resisting the effort. The project, to improve the local water supply by clearing an area around the spring and cementing the base, was a small undertaking but required two years, principally because it was opposed by the village headman. He consulted the local fetish and reported to the villagers that if the project were undertaken, all those involved would die. He was able to convince the others on the village development committee to oppose the project. However, a 75-year-old village carpenter became convinced that something could be done with the water supply without supernatural punishment, and he was able to persuade about one-fifth of the villagers to cooperate. He was also supported by the local teacher. After the work was initiated, there was a 12-month delay for additional cement, during which time the carpenter and his group enjoyed normal health. Thus, the misfortune predicted by the headman did not materialize, and other villagers were persuaded to cooperate on the final stages of implementation (CS 26).

Summary

The most consistent aspect of local culture which appears to be critical for the sanction and implementation of new ideas or practices is the pattern of local leadership. In sociological terms, local leaders serve as the gatekeepers for the passage or acceptance of new ideas. Five types were identified: administrators, educators, and religious, civic, and noninstitutional leaders. The administrative leaders were found to be most influential, presumably because they are normally designated to look after the economic and social welfare of their followers. However, change agents have probably tended to concentrate on them as the natural representatives of their people to the exclusion of other types of leaders.

Educators and religious leaders have been found to be quite influential, although they were described in connection with projects far less often than administrative leaders. It would seem that the influence of educators and religious leaders has often been overlooked by outside change agents, since development is not their chief responsibility. In those projects where educators or religious leaders did become involved, their influence was even stronger than that of administrative leaders. The educator, we believe, is highly significant because he takes part in two worlds: He is aware of modernizing trends in his country and throughout the world, while still working in a village environment. Moreover, he usually has prestige because he brings a very desirable gift to the illiterate—education. The religious leader is significant

because he, too, brings a desirable gift—supernatural assistance. He has a further advantage in that he is often part of a hierarchy which extends beyond the village, while still being a village resident. His most important characteristic, however, is that he retains considerable sway over the minds of his religious adherents. As with other leaders, if he is bypassed he resists the agents of change because his position is threatened.

The influence of civic and noninstitutional leaders, although occasionally critical, was usually found to be secondary to that of the other three types of leaders.

Chapter 3

SOCIAL STRUCTURE

Every human society is composed of organized groups of people, each having some common goal for its members. Three principal bases for group classification are kinship, territoriality, and special interest. Kinship derives from the universal practice of marriage and the construction of relationship units; examples of kinship groups are families, clans, and castes. Territoriality evolves from the fact that people living in a given territory have common interests which are most efficiently met through group action; examples of territorial units are villages, counties, or nations. Special interest groups derive from the condition and needs of certain groups within the larger entity; examples are religious organizations, fraternities, and business associations. Some social units have characteristics of more than one type of group, an example being a *montagnard* tribe in Vietnam, which inhabits a common territory and in which all members theoretically have common ancestry.

Organized groups also have leaders, whose influence has been discussed in Chapter 2. What will be emphasized in this chapter is that, apart from the role and vested interests of leaders, there are group patterns that may sanction or inhibit acceptance of innovations. It is probably significant that social structure, as an influence on change projects, was noted far less frequently than leadership in the descriptions studied. This is also true of the other aspects of local culture to be discussed later, namely, local economic organization, beliefs, and practices. Moreover, the influence on projects of all these sets, except leadership, was described chiefly as an inhibiting force rather than as a sanction to innovations. The most likely explanation for this point of view appears to be that knowledge of the local cultural patterns of another people does not come as easily, nor is it sought as often as are the characteristics of local leadership. Most change agents do not spend the time necessary to learn the intricacies of local behavior. The same people who actively seek to learn who the significant leaders are, will not, or cannot in the time available, make sufficient effort to learn the most significant characteristics of the social structure. Thus, innovation projects are designed and implemented in ignorance of local social structure more often than in ignorance of local leadership; consequently, when difficulties arise, the local social practices are regarded as barriers.

Another problem is that the development philosophy which has emanated from Western industrial nations is usually linked to the Western notion of equality of status and opportunity. Ascribed status, based on hereditary class or caste differences, is normally condemned by Westerners, as well as by those who have been influenced by Western culture. Almost all Western change agents look with disfavor on social systems that are not egalitarian in principle, even though equality of opportunity may be somewhat circumscribed in their own societies. Although Westerners may accept hereditary social groupings such as the castes of India as a fact of the people's cultural life, it is only because they see no way to change the system of relationships quickly. The author believes that most Western action people tend to view this kind of relationship as an archaic remnant of a social system which is no longer functional--a viewpoint similar to the Western attitude toward Hindu reverence for cows. The possibility that a viable modern social system based on unequal ascribed status could exist rarely crosses the mind of most Westerners. The fact that most "development" in almost

all preindustrial societies, and through a long part of the industrial period, occurred on a social basis of inequality is now largely ignored. Western development specialists also usually lose sight of the fact that Japan, the only Asian nation that successfully industrialized itself, did so within a "feudal" society [Abegglen, 11].

This attitude toward egalitarianism has been so pervasive in the postcolonial period that many leaders of the nonindustrial countries also accept it as valid, even if it is not always incorporated in their actions. For example, most Indians concerned with rural development tend to regard the caste system, or at least its most exaggerated manifestations, as a barrier to socioeconomic change. Of course, they usually claim to be merely following the precepts of Gandhi and Nehru, but both of these men, as well as a high proportion of other Indian leaders, spent many of their formative years in Western countries, where they absorbed much Western thought. It is not likely that the critical attitude toward castes in India in the 20th century was exclusively a local development.

Without characterizing egalitarianism as either good or bad, the author maintains that a positive relationship between egalitarianism, economic progress, and national security has not been proved, despite the fact that egalitarianism seems to have worked better in Western democracies than in most other societies. But even if egalitarianism were so important, some strategic problems still remain. People of other cultures will not willingly abandon the core behavior of their social relations for changes or innovations which provide only marginal or unproven benefits, at least not in a short period of time. This is frequently what is expected by Westerners confronting inequality in Asian, Latin American, or African nations. A further complication is that, unwittingly, Westerners are frequently caught in the problem of cultural linkage. Quite subconsciously, they link egalitarianism with projects that are aimed at providing economic, health, or military benefits, then are dismayed to learn that the social circumstances outweigh other considerations with the local people.

One of the clearest recent examples, which received widespread publicity, was the treatment of mountain tribesmen in Vietnam by Americans. The goal of the American advisors was to build a military capacity among the *montagnards* as well as among the Vietnamese. Traditionally, the Vietnamese had kept the *montagnards* in an inferior social and economic position—a tradition that involved considerable vested interests. The American advisors treated the tribal soldiers on a level of equality with the Vietnamese, according to the practice in the American military. The local Vietnamese were not happy with this breach of tradition, and the tribal people used it in a thoroughly unexpected manner. Some of the *montagnards* used their training and arms against the Vietnamese garrisons in an abortive effort to create a new state, instead of fighting the Vietcong. Dedicated American officers saved the situation by persuading the *montagnards* to stop attacking the Vietnamese. This incident illustrates how Americans unconsciously carry the egalitarian ideal as part of their cultural baggage, usually favoring the underdog. This idea may create as many problems as it solves in societies where social groups are arranged traditionally in unequal positions.

Five types of social structure significantly affected the change process in the cases studied:

- Kinship
- Caste-class relationships
- Ethnic relationships
- Political relationships
- Central authority

The first four are based on specific group membership. The fifth represents group membership in a sense, but is a more general kind of relationship which reflects a basic problem of the developing nations—the attitude of the rural peasant and the urban poor toward their central governments. To most of the poor in these countries, the central government has been an exploitative power for so long that, even though such nations are now taking steps to integrate their

citizenry in a positive way, many of the old attitudes remain. Reaction to development projects is frequently conditioned by this attitude.

KINSHIP

The basic kinship unit in most societies is the nuclear family, composed of husband, wife, and children. A variety of behaviors are associated with the maintenance of this unit. New ideas or practices that support these behaviors and provide additional benefits tend to be adopted, as might be expected. In 9 of the 10 instances described in the case histories where the kinship patterns were in harmony with the projects, the projects generally were successful.

One significant kind of relationship within the marriage unit is that of the male as protector and provider for the female. This relationship is prevalent in most societies, but especially so in countries where women are partially or wholly secluded from contacts outside the family, particularly in the Middle East and India. Perhaps this process is best illustrated by reference to two latrine-building campaigns in village areas of India. Latrine projects are particularly difficult in rural areas, mainly because of the problem in demonstrating the advantages of the new practice. In India, the added complication of ritual pollution has plagued latrine projects. Defecation and urination are held to be ritually unclean acts by Hindus, who take elaborate measures to restore cleanliness after elimination. The idea of numerous people using one place for elimination is particularly repulsive to Hindu villagers. This contributed to the failure of a latrine project in the village district of Barpoli in Orissa. A year after the campaign, some 26 latrines had been purchased by the villagers although only six had been installed and how many were used was not reported. (CS 40). A latrine program had considerable success elsewhere. By contrast, after two years of effort in a project in Maharashtra, some 120 latrines were built of which only 27 were not being used, according to the report (CS 179). Moreover, enough of a demand developed for latrine bases that the local potters' cooperative started to build and sell them.

There was considerable communication input in both latrine projects. But there was a significant difference in connection with the project in Maharashtra—utilization of the local desire for female modesty. It was difficult to persuade the villagers to accept the innovation until the time when a change agent noticed that the area which had customarily been used for defecation by women had become quite public. A new road had been built, and the trucks going by in the darkness illuminated the area with their headlights, forcing the women to scurry for cover. After that, change agents appealed to the traditional concept of males as protectors of females with responsibility to provide privacy for the women. At the end of the project, it was noted that the sanitary benefits of latrines still were not understood although their value in providing privacy for females was appreciated (CS 179).

Women can sometimes improve their own position while at the same time contributing to the nuclear family's benefit. In such instances, males may not resist changes in social organization as they would if there were no overall benefits. In an urban community development project in Puerto Rico, where women had seldom worked outside the household, the agent called upon them to take an active role; because there was general acceptance of the project, women were allowed to do so, thereby contributing to the morale of the whole group (CS 142). Men will encourage participation by the women if they can see benefits for the whole family. In a home economics project in Kenya, the husbands were quite anxious for their wives to learn the new money-saving techniques being taught (CS 71).

When the roles of either males or females may be changing in a given society, the changes usually occur first among males. But females may be concerned about keeping up with their husbands, and in an effort to do so, may step beyond their traditional role to some degree. This is exemplified in a literacy campaign in Sarawak which was highly successful. Large numbers of males were already literate and others studied on their own because they could not wait for the classes. The

teaching sessions were utilized primarily by the Dayak women, who were not literate, and who were anxious not to lag behind the men (CS 144).

If innovations do not potentially threaten the status quo too greatly, men may go along, even if reluctantly. In the long run, providing literacy or other training to women may affect the social structure a great deal, but the possible threat usually does not seem great to local men. This was true of two projects in Africa, one concerned with literacy only, the other with general home improvements plus academic subjects. In spite of objection by the men in both instances, the women were permitted to participate. In the literacy project in Kenya, the men felt it was a waste of time for the women to learn to read; although the husbands made fun of their wives, they permitted them to continue (CS 69). The other project, in Uganda, was an effort to form women's clubs for home improvement and female education. The men were reluctant to give their wives the freedom required to go to the meetings and the wives had trouble getting the 10 cents per week subscription fee. However, the clubs were helped when they became status symbols to local chiefs (CS 165).

The one area of kinship relations where the resistance factor is quite high and where anticipated benefits must be considerable before changes in behavior can be expected is the area of sexual relations. Local people in the nonindustrial nations will not alter such habits readily unless clear-cut advantages are perceived. These particular habits have caused major problems for family planning programs, most of which are started and operated as a means of solving national population problems. Adopting family planning programs depends on perception of personal benefit to individuals. This is, of course, a general problem in socioeconomic change entailing the translation of national goals to individual motivations, which is accomplished more easily in some fields than in others.

For example, when economic program planners decide on an improvement in the agricultural sector of a nation, this need can be translated into individual terms without too much difficulty. When fertilizer is introduced, the benefits can be seen by local people within a few months after the planting; if these are multiplied in many villages, the agricultural sector will be affected. Moreover, in agricultural projects, the local people need not alter their established behavior greatly.

On the other hand, in projects connected with sexual activities, local people will have to use new devices and sometimes even alter their sexual activity for benefits which no one may be convinced are fully worthwhile. Chances for success are greatest where families are fully convinced that they want to limit births and where necessary behavioral changes are few. Such was not the case in early family planning efforts in Puerto Rico and results were minimal. Males prized their virility and having children was social evidence of that virility. Many men also felt that their wives' use of contraceptives robbed them of their traditional authority. Also, traditional female modesty prevented women from seeking information or discussing the matter with their husbands (CS 140).

Sexual relations remained a barrier to prevent project success in the previously cited venereal disease eradication campaign in Tanzania. Most of the women belonged to older men but had sexual relations with younger males. Venereal disease treatment was accepted, but there was little interest in changing sexual relationships and rapid reinfection negated the effect of treatment (CS 158).

In one particular type of international development, resistance is encountered from kinship patterns because of the basic philosophy. This is the field of community development, which operates on the assumption that village people, and more rarely urban poor, should work together on cooperative endeavors for the good of all. Theoretically, it is hard to argue against this approach, but unfortunately in some parts of the world there is little existing community feeling, thus requiring considerable readjustment of relationships among the local people. This is probably more applicable in Latin American than in any other area of the world.

Frequently, there is a strong feeling of family in rural communities and the strength of such feeling inhibits strong community consciousness. Where strong

family feeling exists and community consciousness is weak, it would seem that innovations geared to the smaller units (family) would be more likely to be accepted than those requiring community participation. However, many community development specialists have accepted the philosophy of their approach so thoroughly that they sometimes regard individualistic or family-based endeavors as improper.

The author recalls talking to one young American Peace Corps volunteer who was working in a village in a Central American country and having considerable difficulty in organizing the community to work together. He resisted, absolutely, the idea of sponsoring innovations that could be carried out on a family basis, even though there was considerable evidence that the local people were interested in improvement on these terms. A process of village rejuvenation had started spontaneously, to a considerable extent because the village was reacting to the presence of the volunteer and his colleagues. No outsiders of any consequence had lived there before. The change took place principally on the basis of prestige emulation. One of the best houses was painted by the owner, after which a house across the street was painted, and then the activity spread up and down both sides of the main street. Despite his observation on how change was taking place without direct intervention and despite his difficulties in getting group activities organized, the volunteer would not consider projects based on individual or family competition. Such work was not "community development," which for him had a positive moral connotation.

Certain projects do need community participation for fulfillment; even so, the reality of family interests should be taken into account. Where people are primarily oriented to their family units rather than to the community where they live, there will be some resistance to cooperation with the larger group. This problem reportedly contributed to the lack of success of a public health project in Mexico. The change agent, an anthropologist, attempted to introduce a communal health clinic. Although there were other problems (previously cited), he reported that the strong individualism and self-sufficiency of the family worked against the idea of a cooperative endeavor (CS 85). An effort to introduce irrigation facilities in a highland Peruvian village suffered from the same handicap. The tightly knit family relationships added to the dispersed settlement pattern made community cooperation quite difficult. The goal of providing irrigation facilities was not achieved (CS 199).

The influence of wider family relationships on the change process has been less frequent than that within the immediate family, presumably because the most intense relationships, even with extended families, are within the nuclear family. However, the extended kinship network of the African and Asian world is a reality, and its relationships do influence the acceptance of outside ideas. There is usually more trust as well as more communication with relatives than with outsiders.

Family relationships provide a communication channel for the spread of innovations. If a person is persuaded to try an innovation, he tends to spread the news to his relatives more quickly than to anyone else. Thus, in a campaign to establish a blood bank in Ibadan, Nigeria, difficulties were encountered in getting sufficient donors. The donation of blood is usually frightening to non-Western village people and the urban poor, principally because they see it as a loss and rarely understand that the blood is regenerated quickly. In this instance, however, the lines of relationship assisted, in that numerous donors came because they had relatives who had given blood without ill effect (CS 94). A similar process took place in a tractor cooperative project in East Pakistan. Initially, the villagers were pessimistic about the whole idea, since they had seen cooperatives organized previously when the money was squandered or misused. However, the village leader was willing to take another chance, although the only people he was able to convince at first were his relatives. After one or two successful group rentals, the fears of the nonrelated villagers were largely allayed and they also joined (CS 104).

Kinship beliefs and behavior frequently involve the dead as well as the living in African and Asian countries, particularly where ancestor worship is strong.

In this way the reactions of the dead can be as important to local people as those of the living. In certain cultures, the actions of the dead are more critical than those of the living because of the belief that the dead leave spirits behind which can easily become dissatisfied and do harm to the living. This kind of attitude created a minor problem in a resettlement effort in Nigeria. The old village was overcrowded and unhealthy, and the land was worn out. Numerous practical advantages were projected for the new model village. The local people, reluctant to leave the homes of their ancestors, were influenced to do so by the younger leaders who were not so concerned with the older beliefs. However, it still took several years to convince them (CS 91). The emotional or ritual tie to the land apart from economic interests should not be overemphasized, however. It has been reported that in a warfare situation, Vietnamese villagers who have elaborate ancestral beliefs showed less concern for abandoning the grave sites of their ancestors than for having adequate land for cultivation [Rambo, 12].

The feeling toward deceased relatives can be utilized positively, as was illustrated in a community development effort in Ghana. The village council had decided to build a post office, but not everyone took part in the work sessions. In order to apply sufficient pressure, the local chief devised a method based on feelings toward relatives. Anyone who refused to work was reported to the chief, who would first warn the person. If the offender ignored these warnings, the chief would delay the burial of the next relative in the family who died. The post office was successfully completed (CS 27).

CASTE-CLASS RELATIONSHIPS

Despite the emphasis on egalitarianism in the industrial countries, both communist and democratic, a fact of social structure worldwide and throughout history is that the great majority of societies have been based on systems of inequality. It is the purpose here, not to discuss whether societies should or should not base status exclusively on achievement, but to point out that the social reality in most nonindustrial countries includes nonachievement bases for status. Classes and castes exist in most nonindustrial countries and these groups have vested interests. Change agents will have to view this situation realistically, rather than simply in terms of their own values—and the basic reality is that when class or caste interests are violated, resistance is produced. Moreover, class or caste groups, being relatively large and sometimes relatively well organized, can provide strong resistance.

Vested interests based on class or caste privilege will rarely be given up voluntarily, simply to satisfy arguments based on democratic relationships in other countries. It has already been mentioned that modern development processes have been inspired chiefly by the Western industrial countries, and egalitarianism has been linked to most efforts, sometimes consciously and sometimes without awareness on the part of the change agents. As a result, caste and class have occurred far more often as a barrier to innovation efforts rather than as a sanction.

Of the projects studied, caste or class relationships were present in 16 instances and in only one was the adoption process assisted. Even so, it is apparent that sanction from caste relationships was accidental insofar as the change agents were concerned. In fact, the case history where the sanction was given is one of the best illustrations of this influence we have, since it is in India where caste relationships are strong, and since a variety of projects were undertaken, all but one irrespective of local caste behavior. The American Friends, whose egalitarian philosophy is particularly strong, attempted to introduce six different innovations. Three of these had characteristics contrary to caste beliefs and practices, one fitted caste relationships, and in two caste relationships were not directly relevant.

One of the projects was an effort to introduce wells into local villages. As is usually the case in efforts sponsored either by the government or outsiders, the change agents attempted to require that the wells be used in common by everyone. In traditional Indian village society, "clean" castes attempt to prevent

those of lower caste from using their wells, because of fear of ritual pollution. This particular objection was raised in this case. The change agents attempted to change the attitude of the high castes, but when they realized the effort might be abandoned in entirety, they relinquished the requirement of common use of the well and installed separate wells for the different groups (CS 42).

Another project, an effort to introduce poultry husbandry to the villagers, again was undertaken without consideration of caste attitudes. The innovation intended was to introduce poultry keeping as a systematic occupation to replace the casual, open-flock methods used traditionally by lower caste villagers. Unfortunately for the project, even the untouchables had little interest in large-scale chicken husbandry because they feared that it would reduce the possibilities of caste mobility (CS 43). Chicken keeping traditionally has been considered a ritually unclean occupation in village India; there has long been a trend for low castes to give up such "unclean" activities in order to assume the status of a higher caste. Keeping large numbers of chickens would lessen the possibility of a status change.

The third project was an effort to organize a weavers' cooperative. Unfortunately, the change agents took in members from a variety of castes that had not cooperated previously. There were clashes in decision making and it was expected that the project would collapse as soon as the change agents withdrew their support (CS 45).

The one project that fit well with caste relationships was another cooperative, though with membership from a single caste, Chamars. The cooperative was to process animal hides and bones, the traditional occupation for this group, and caste solidarity worked to the benefit of the movement. This was the most successful of the four efforts (CS 44).

Caste relationships will affect decisions of local people in Indian villages more than in any other country, simply because this social institution is so pervasive there. However, caste attitudes are changing as a result of economic and political pressures and are not the only criteria affecting decisions to cooperate in projects. The degree of perceived practical benefit to be derived from an innovation is always relevant. In general, the greater the perceived advantage, the greater will be the willingness to alter old behavior patterns, a generalization which is applicable to other customs as well. Thus, a project to install a Persian wheel in an Indian village community suffered from the same problem—there were caste quarrels over who could use it. However, the local leaders wanted this advantageous innovation badly enough to be willing to modify their caste relations. They also obtained other benefits through this project. The members of high castes cooperated in all respects except that they insisted on having separate community meals. Significantly, segregated eating is one of the most important symbols of caste exclusivity; when village Indians eat together, they have probably dropped almost all caste restrictions except inter-marriage (CS 176).

Class relationships differ from those of caste mainly in that they are primarily based on economic position, and ritual pollution is not usually involved. In village societies, the situation is generally one of "haves" and "have nots," wealthy landowners and landless laborers or very small farmers. These relationships enter into adoption decisions when one group believes that at its expense, the other will benefit. Then the group that does not see any benefit to be gained will either oppose the project or neglect to provide the necessary cooperation. If any change project ignores these relationships on a local level, a high degree of resistance and probable rejection by the community can be expected.

This was clearly the case in three innovation projects, in which the change agents underestimated the influence of either the "haves" or the "have-nots." A project in Peru to introduce improved water resources was abandoned because the poorer farmers, whose cooperation was necessary, concluded almost at the outset that the benefits would go primarily to the wealthy landowners (CS 111). In a village development project in Mexico the change agents tended to work

through the wealthy, and alienated the poorer farmers, who soon lost interest in the project (CS 87). And in a community development project in Pakistan the change agents tended to work through the large landowners, which made the small farmers resentful and noncooperative (CS 106).

It is easy to understand why change agents frequently tend to work with people who are more well-to-do at the expense of relations with poorer people. The more well-to-do are usually better educated and have enough land to experiment with, and they are usually more oriented toward change. And it may be that these people afford the best avenue for change. But if community-wide participation is the intention, exclusive concentration on the wealthy will tend to alienate the poor, thus reducing chances for project completion. In projects that require cooperation by members of different classes, the only consistently workable strategy is to adapt to the class relationships. A change agent can choose to oppose the class with most power, but this is similar to opposing local leaders—the change agent must have considerable power, since he will have to apply coercion to some extent. Just as with local leaders, the change agent does not have the option of ignoring the class interests, for ignoring them is, in itself, a threat to their basis of power.

One of the best examples of adapting to class relationships was reported in a community development program in the Philippines. The project was simple enough, to build a feeder road into the village. The landowning class refused to grant the proposed right of way because it would cause their fields to be divided, they would lose some land and a survey of land titles would be necessary. The change agent attempted to persuade the landowners to cooperate, but without success; in fact, at one point he became so exasperated that he stopped promoting the effort. However, the local leaders, except for the landowners, were quite dedicated to getting the road and were able to persuade the change agent to continue his efforts. Together they found the solution, which, while far from perfect from an engineering viewpoint, did satisfy the social circumstances. They laid out a crooked road that would follow the edges of the properties and would not divide fields. Instead of one landowner donating all the land needed for a given stretch, under this plan two persons could give adjacent strips (CS 115). A technician might criticize such an imperfect road, but a social scientist would note that what was required was a choice between an imperfect road and no road at all, as well as between a positive and a negative development experience in the community.

ETHNIC RELATIONSHIPS

Ethnic groupings exist in most countries on the basis of real or supposed common racial ancestry, and usually have language, customs, and beliefs in common. Examples of ethnic groups are the tribal people of Southeast Asia, the *montagnards*; the Kurds of Iraq and Iran; the tribal people of Luzon in the Philippines; and the highland Indians of Peru and Bolivia. It is interesting to note that most ethnic minority peoples of the nonindustrial nations live in the mountains, while the valleys are held by the dominant majorities. The reason is that the valley land is more valuable and the dominant people have pushed the minority groups into the less hospitable hills. These ethnic groups normally are controlled, at least partially, by the majority populations who administer the national governments.

Ethnic relations are similar to class relations in the sense that there are vested interests within the groups. The majority people, who have a superior position in the control of power, tend to look down on the ethnic groups and tend to exploit them. In keeping with our observation that egalitarianism is usually linked with the introduction of new ideas in modern development efforts, in six reports, all incidents of influence from ethnic relationships had a negative effect on the projects' goals. In none of the efforts did ethnic relationships help the innovation process.

A project in the Middle East was handicapped by tribalism, which can be considered a form of ethnic relationship. Political action became tied to ethnic attitudes, not an unusual occurrence. With the intention of introducing modern practices of range management in Somalia, the change agents paid little attention to tribal boundaries or claims. Water catchment tanks were built in a restricted area and many adjacent tribes were neglected. The neglected tribes brought considerable pressure on their political representatives, who put pressure on the prime minister, who stopped the project temporarily. Continued action by politicians threatened the entire project. Tribesmen were also cutting fences and using areas for grazing which had been set aside for land renewal (CS 145).

It is often difficult to distinguish between class and ethnic interests, since the two are frequently the same. This is particularly relevant in Latin America, where descendants of Indians or Negroes are usually in a lower class than those of Spanish ancestry. Thus, in a project in a Peruvian town to promote the practice of boiling water, the change agent was of the "cholo" group, of Spanish background. She had little success with any of the people; those who did follow her advice were of her own ethnic group. The minority groups of Indian or Negro ancestry did not respond at all (CS 110). And in the Vicos project of highland Peru, the one group that attempted to discredit the effort were the local people of mixed Spanish ancestry, who spread the rumor that the change agents were trying to cheat and exploit the Indians rather than assist them (CS 113).

Ethnic relationships, it was found, did not occur as influences in the change process on a local level nearly as often as did kinship. Kinship behavior takes place in the lives of all peoples almost constantly, whereas considerations regarding ethnic groups become important only when two groups come in contact. However, ethnic considerations can provide strong resistances when one group believes another is gaining at their expense or when the relationship between two ethnic groups is being changed through an outside influence. Ethnic considerations are frequently combined with class attitudes.

POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS

Political considerations, along with caste, class, or ethnic group attitudes, have emerged in this study principally as negative influences in innovation projects. Political groups have vested interests in their positions, and when these are threatened members react to protect them. Moreover, political groups usually have considerable capacity for power manipulation, and thus can offer serious resistance. Another reason for the negative effects from political groups is that in most instances the change agents did not attempt to adapt to them. Although one of the prime aims of socioeconomic change by both donor and recipient countries is political, projects are usually presented to local communities as nonpolitical. This is particularly true of American-sponsored projects. A problem arises in that, irrespective of whether local political groups adhere to national political aims, they usually react to projects according to their own local interests. Thus, insofar as particular projects are concerned, the matter of whether the local political bodies will improve their position by taking part is more relevant than the approval of the national government. Of 17 instances in which local political considerations were reported, 14 were negative. Even so, 8 of these 14 projects still ended with relative success.

Usually the "cause" for local political resistance was that those in power thought their positions would be weakened if they backed the effort, or at least they did not see that they would obtain any advantage. In the chapter on *Leadership*, two projects which suffered in this way were mentioned. The effort to establish a cooperative medical clinic in a Mexican village was abandoned by the change agent because of resistance from leaders of the local political party; they had not been included in the new organization and did not see how their participation would help them to be elected (CS 85). As for the effort in Brazil to organize a nonpolitical community council, political considerations entered and factionalism erupted to such an extent that the project was ultimately withdrawn (CS 5).

Political relationships are frequently associated with either class or ethnic interests. This was indicated in the range management project in Somalia, where ethnic groups exerted political pressure to protect their own interests (CS 145).

So much political factionalism exists in some communities that a basis of common action cannot be found. In such cases, two strategies are open—to work through one of the political factions on the assumption that it has enough power or influence to counteract the negative influence of the other faction, or to try to convince the entire community that the change will not affect political interests. Obviously, the first option requires a fairly good understanding of the existing power relationships. The second is a difficult alternative in that political bodies very frequently will not accept the argument that new activity is nonpolitical, regardless of what the change agents may tell them. In any event, organized group activities will be much less acceptable in communities riddled by political factionalism than innovations that can be adopted by individuals.

Although most political influence is for local considerations, national intervention can be highly significant if it is brought to bear locally. Most often, however, local change agents do not have sufficient influence to bring national influence to the local community. The Vicos project was an exception in that the organizers did have a strong voice in the affairs of the central government and were able to utilize it effectively. Ultimately, they were able to force the estate owners to sell their land to the Indians at a fair price (CS 112).

CENTRAL AUTHORITY

The final group attitude to be discussed here is a product of the most extensive social barrier found in the nonindustrial countries, that which separates the national government from the mass of the people, primarily rural villagers. It is expressed here as an attitude because it is not embodied in any social group that can be defined more narrowly than the mass of the peasants and the urban poor. This is obviously a two-sided relationship, because an attitude of central government officials toward the common man also exists. However, what is recurrently significant in change projects is the attitude of the peasantry and urban poor toward government authority in response to treatment they have received in the past.

As would be expected in view of the past relationship of the underprivileged with their own governments (often controlled by colonial powers), this attitude has most often been negative. Only in the past two decades have the central governments of the nonindustrial countries shifted away from highly authoritarian or exploitative approaches toward their rural farmers or other poor, and tried to incorporate this majority of the population into positive development efforts. Even with the changes, the process still has a long way to go in most such countries. To the villager, the government has meant primarily land regulation, tax collection, support for wealthy landowners or money lenders, or military conscription. In most of his dealings with a government official, the villager has been the loser; what services he has received in return have been either very slight or not apparent. More often than not, government expenditures and development took place in urban centers from which the peasant could reap little benefit. There is little wonder that the village man looked upon the central government with a suspicious eye.

An influence of this kind was described in 24 instances, in 13 of which it was negative. As would be expected, when the attitude toward the government is positive it tends to prompt local people to cooperate on change projects. Not surprisingly, this happened in countries where the government had actively assisted the local people for some time. Jamaica was one such country, and in a project to assist in developing agricultural cooperatives, the government's assistance was viewed positively throughout the project. The local people had received economic assistance previously and, with the help of government loans, a healthy cooperative was developed (CS 61). A similar positive attitude was even more apparent with Puerto Ricans in a San Juan housing development project. It took place after Operation Bootstrap had been under way for some time and

the government had acquired a very positive image. Moreover, the people in this slum district had recently been through a relocation experience with the government housing authority and felt they had been treated fairly (CS 142).

The attitude toward government authoritarianism does not necessarily produce overt resistance to projects by village people. In countries where central authority has been strong and even exploitative, village people may well accept suggestions and projects which come from government officials. They may feel powerless to object, at least openly, and choose compliance as the lesser evil. However, this kind of acceptance is fraught with difficulty in that the initial adoption may not indicate any real interest or intention to continue. Thus when pressure from the central authority is relaxed, the adopters may well abandon the new practices.

This phenomenon has been documented by S.C. Dube, the anthropologist, in his description of the community development program in India. In two villages of North India, one of the principal initial reasons for joining projects was to comply with the desires of government officials. There was a variety of projects, including cattle improvement, new agricultural practices, cooperative development, and sanitation. The initial acceptance of many of these innovations did not, by any means, indicate they would be continued. In general, villagers accepted inoculations for their cattle but were unwilling to permit the castration or disposal of scrub bulls, thereby largely negating the breeding program (CS 175). Some improved seeds which produced clear-cut gains were adopted, but those which produced only marginal benefits were resisted. Little interest was shown in planting orchards or fuel trees (CS 173). A village cooperative was organized, but most members were persons of high status and income, who did not particularly need its benefits; the bulk of the villagers viewed the cooperative as an outside official organization, not designed for their benefit (CS 174). The sanitation efforts were undertaken only for visits by VIPs; between visits, the compost and soakage pits were not used and no appreciable change in attitude regarding sanitation took place (CS 194, CS 195).

Theoretically, a new idea or practice could be accepted on this basis if it required no more from the adopters than a single act or short-term participation; but if continuous or long-term independent action is required from the adopters, then compliance with government officials as the primary motivation is probably a poor means of assuring continuation. It is possible, of course, to maintain the pressure, but this requires large numbers of people, far more than are usually available for change projects.

In most projects where the attitude toward central authority was described as negative, the goals were in the main still achieved. Does this mean that such negativism is unimportant? The author does not think it is of primary importance. Man and his cultures have a definite plasticity which always permits fresh adaptation to new conditions. Even if people in neglected communities have become apathetic about conditions, and negativistic toward authorities that have failed to help them, almost invariably they are willing to take another chance. It is rare, in the author's opinion, that communities become so apathetic that they will not try another approach to solve their problems. This is not to say that negativism toward authorities, due to previous exploitation or broken commitments, does not influence the behavior of local people. Where such negativism exists, local people are probably less willing to go along with new plans than they would be otherwise. The point is that such negativism probably is not a primary influence factor.

Another probability derived from the nature of the case histories may help to explain why such negativism does not appear to be a serious inhibiting factor. The very fact that negativism is included in the descriptions may indicate that the case-history writers who mentioned it have learned a good deal about the local people involved. Negative attitudes are not ascertained by change agents who deal only superficially with local people and primarily with a technical orientation. In some cases where it was significant enough to contribute strongly to project failure, negativism was probably not described because neither the change agents nor analysts involved knew it existed.

Negativism toward authorities for the most part resulted from fear of land loss and/or increased taxation. This was exemplified by a project which was an effort by the American Friends to reintroduce grape cultivation into a rural area of Jordan. The change agents tried to record the plot and parcel numbers of the fields, which created so much suspicion among villagers that they refused to cooperate. The project was ultimately abandoned (CS 68). There was similar reaction among the Peruvian villagers, mentioned previously, in a project to institute an irrigation system. The villagers feared that the new canals would bring increased taxation and possible confiscation of their lands (CS 199).

The effect of such suspicions can be overcome if a change agent persists in his efforts and if the innovation does produce perceived advantages. This is illustrated by a project which was plagued for four years by a negativistic attitude of the local people. The effort, on the island of Dominica (British West Indies), was to improve the diet of the local people. The project included "achievement day" shows to encourage local competition in the production of animals and vegetables. The local people generally refused to participate because they were afraid the government would tax them for the new animals they had obtained through the project and would also cut off their import quota of flour and rice. They did participate in the project and improved their food habits, but always with suspicion of the government (CS 17).

In most such instances, the attitude of villagers is based on real occurrences. The use of authoritarianism is still resorted to in most of the nonindustrial nations, even though projects may be operating with newer concepts based on voluntary participation by the local people. The author does not maintain that such authoritative actions are either proper or improper. In fact, a case can be made to show that authoritarian directives can accomplish a great deal of development; however, to mix authoritarian techniques with voluntary participation is difficult, if not impossible. If the philosophy of community development or self-help is used, then authoritarian techniques will merely confuse the issue. Authoritarianism discourages initiative while community development philosophy was designed to encourage it.

In most nonindustrial countries, authoritarianism is probably so deeply entrenched and community development such a novel concept, that a mixture of the two does occur frequently. This was the case in a community development effort in Egypt. One part of the project was to fill a stagnant pond for village sanitation. When the work was too slow to suit the governor, he sent troops to enforce a speedup. This alienated the villagers temporarily. Fortunately, such action was not typical of the government's role throughout the project and the change agent, a well-trained young Egyptian, used customary community development procedures. He was successful in convincing the villagers that both he and the government were working for their welfare and, in the long run, the project was successful (CS 22).

Summary

Social structure has functioned chiefly, but not strongly, as a negative influence on the change process. In most instances where innovations produced clear benefit, local people were willing to alter their social patterns, at least to a limited extent.

Social structure was usually a negative influence on the cases being described. This may well have happened because the Western and Westernized change agents described in these accounts have been largely ignorant of, or made few attempts to adapt their projects to, the local social conditions. Frequently, they also attempted to introduce egalitarian concepts into traditionally inegalitarian societies.

It is significant that local leadership, in contrast to local social patterns, usually had a positive influence on the change process. We will attempt to show that in this regard, the patterns of other local behavior and beliefs are similar to local social patterns. The difference, in our opinion, is that leadership is

accepted as an important characteristic of communities by all peoples, and change agents operating in cross-cultural environments make special efforts to locate such leaders. In contrast, local patterns of behavior and beliefs are not as universally believed to be significant, nor are they as easily learned.

In socioeconomic change projects the most significant types of social patterns have been those associated with kinship and caste or class relations. Local patterns of class and caste relationships have, almost universally, a negative influence, principally because of an attempt to impose conditions of egalitarianism on societies that had clear inequalitarian distinctions.

Chapter 4

ECONOMIC PATTERN

The simplest definition of an economic system is "a pattern of behavior for the production, distribution, and consumption of goods." It is obvious that enormous elaborations of these three types of activities are possible in different societies. In a simple tribal society the same people tend to perform all three functions; that is, the same individuals tend to produce the goods, trade small portions, distribute some to relatives, but consume most of it themselves. On the other hand, in a complex industrial society the producer will have little to do with distribution and will consume a very small part, if any, of his production. The typical peasant community is somewhere between these extremes; there is more division of labor, distribution, and consumption of outside goods than in the tribe, but still far less than in the industrial society.

The fact that tribal and peasant peoples have patterns far less complex than those in industrial societies does not mean that they do not have economic systems, or that such systems are not vital to their interests. The economic pattern is probably as important to village people as any aspect of their culture, even if it appears to be deficient by Western standards. It is a system that permits survival and will not be abandoned willingly unless there are clear advantages for doing so.

The economic system also constitutes a pattern where change in one part is likely to affect other parts. To undertake a new practice such as cultivating vegetables instead of grains is not merely a matter of plant substitution; a change of this kind can affect the work patterns, work schedules, means of distribution, means of consumption, and other kinds of economic behavior. The potential adopter soon becomes aware of conflicts that may result from undertaking such a new economic practice and if the advantages do not clearly outweigh the difficulties, he is likely to discontinue the practice.

The economic pattern of a people is also linked to other aspects of local cultural patterns, and this can affect acceptance of a new practice. In this report, cultural patterns are separated into different types of behavior only for the sake of convenience, because in actuality they are interrelated. For example, economic patterns are associated with class structure in significant ways. Proprietary rights, primarily land ownership, is one subcategory of economic patterns that is found to be significant in change projects. Usually, the ownership of land is closely correlated with class position; those of higher class tending to have the most land. And though most people in the nonindustrial countries are vitally concerned with the possession of land because of its economic value, they are also concerned as it affects their positions in the class hierarchy. Thus, a change in economic practices may be influenced by considerations of the social order.

In the case histories on which this study was based, the local economic pattern was, in the main, a negative influence toward the changes proposed (in 36 instances compared to 12 instances of positive influence). The author believes that this reinforces the idea, presented in the chapter on *Social Structure*, that in general change agents pay little attention to traditional patterns of behavior with the exception of leadership, either through lack of knowledge or lack of concern. This can also be interpreted as a product of the usual concept of socioeconomic change—that it should take place by replacement rather than by adaptation. Most change agents do not recognize the necessity of adapting new

ideas or practices to existing cultural conditions, except in the matter of working with local leaders. Consequently, opposition occurs more often than accord, because the innovations conflict with customary practices.

The following types of economic behavior were found to be significant, with each described as influential in from six to nine instances of attempted innovation:

- Work methods
- Work schedules
- Work groupings
- Proprietary rights
- Distribution patterns

WORK METHODS

All peoples in all cultures traditionally have learned manual techniques for economic production. Once people have become habituated to such methods, they tend to resist changing them, simply because to do so they must go through another learning process. Thus, traditional work methods can normally be considered to constitute forces of resistance to new practices. New work habits usually will be undertaken in proportion to the perceived advantage of the innovation. In all six of the instances in the case histories when working techniques were described, they acted as barriers, and all the projects failed to reach the goals hoped for by the change agents.

It is significant that in all instances, the local people did not perceive clear advantages to be derived from the changes. Two such examples were in animal husbandry where the introduction of new breeds of chickens required relatively complicated methods of handling. Traditionally, chickens had been allowed to run in open flocks (as cited previously) where they fended for themselves, the customary method of chicken handling in peasant societies. Ordinarily the birds were given little extra feed. The new breeds required high-quality, scientifically prepared chicken feed, as well as other complicated methods of handling. In both India and Laos, the villagers accepted the new breeds but did not adopt the new husbandry practices (CS 43, CS 76). These two examples illustrate a common type of problem in animal husbandry innovations in peasant villages. The techniques used in Western industrial societies are so complicated and animals are so highly bred, that simply transferring certain breeds without changing all the practices and much of the economy is probably quite difficult.

The option of attempting to replace the old practices with an entirely new complex is also fraught with difficulties and requires considerable changes in economic behavior. A poultry project undertaken in Eastern Nigeria in the 1960s was based on this replacement idea and at first appeared to have considerable success. A training institute was established and courses were given to those willing to try the new method. During the first few years a large number of people learned the new methods and began to raise chickens in the new manner. Unfortunately, this manner of raising chickens was not well integrated into the local economy. High-grade chicken feed was not produced in sufficient quantities in Nigeria, and the cost of importing it put egg prices beyond the reach of the average Nigerian. In 1966 the government tried to get farmers to grow a special type of corn that was suitable for making chicken feed, but there were also problems in connection with this effort. Among other things, the farmers tried to eat the new variety of corn, which was very hard, since it had been developed as an animal feed. Similar problems with hard corn have been reported in other parts of the world [Apodaca, 13] [1]. There was an added difficulty when the chickens were attacked by epidemics. Many villagers who had begun the new practices were phasing out by 1966 because they were not making money.

It must be remembered that possible future advantages will rarely carry as much weight as the local people's assessment of immediate consequences. The requirement to change work methods may be the deciding factor for unwillingness to cooperate, when not compensated by perception of considerable gains. An irrigation project in highland Peru (which has been cited previously) is a case in point. The proposed change to irrigation farming required considerable

immediate changes in agricultural methods while the proposed benefits were not apparent (CS 199). The project might have been more acceptable if the advantages from irrigation had been clearly demonstrated, but this had not been done.

Working habits cover a wide range of activities and enter into change decisions in ways that many agents, because of their cultural biases, would be slow to recognize. Aside from any moral issue, a practice such as prostitution is a method of work, and its economic aspects affect decisions by its practitioners. Ignoring or not knowing such a work habit can affect certain change projects adversely, which was the case in the venereal disease eradication effort in Tanzania, previously cited. The problem derived principally from the division of labor by sex. The chief crop, bananas, was tended almost exclusively by women, although the benefits were retained by the men. In order to be more independent of their husbands, and to have incomes of their own, many women frequently went to urban areas to practice prostitution. The author of the project report noted that for many years, large numbers of prostitutes from that area could be found in every sizable town in East Africa. This economic activity kept the incidence of venereal disease high, since the women would become reinfected almost as quickly as they were cured (CS 158). Probably, unless some other means of obtaining money were provided, the women would not give up the economic pursuit they were accustomed to, especially since there was little perceived benefit to be derived from the cure.

WORK SCHEDULES

A vital necessity for accomplishing work in all cultures is that it be scheduled in some manner. Nonindustrial peoples, like people in Western societies, have scheduling patterns. The difference is principally that in industrial societies time is handled mechanically, according to the clock, while in village societies work is usually arranged to fit seasonal variations or the requirements of the agricultural cycle, or division of the workday according to temperature—the hardest work being done in the coolest periods. Almost always there is a "rational," economic reason for such traditional scheduling; however, established custom is also involved. In any event, local people will not willingly abandon these habits unless there are obvious advantages for doing so.

One of the problems of rural populations in tropical countries which concerns many government planning agencies is that agricultural pursuits are controlled fairly rigidly by annual rainy seasons, such as the monsoons of South-Southeast Asia. Farmers work quite hard before and during the rainy season, but as the land becomes dry, their labor slackens a great deal. Many believe that rural villagers in such areas can perform many productive tasks during these slack seasons. Three projects, which change agents deliberately scheduled for such periods, were aided as a result. All three were in India, although probably this is only coincidence. Two were planned by the same change agent, who utilized the local scheduling factor. He helped start a brick-making cooperative to function in the agricultural off-season (CS 49); he also sponsored a project to improve or build roads in village areas through self-help techniques, organizing the work during the period of seasonal unemployment (CS 52). The third project was the introduction of vegetable gardening during the period between rice harvest and planting for the next year. This effort was also aided by the fact that irrigation facilities were introduced at the same time, which produced a double advantage: the farmers had free time to work and the work was considerably more productive (CS 53).

Although it is probably advantageous to adapt innovations to local time usage in all instances, it is most important when there is low perceived benefit of the innovation. Even so, some projects may have such basically low motivation that no amount of adaptation to timing patterns will influence the local people to alter their habits. This was the case in the Peruvian health project (cited previously) where the women were ostensibly too busy with other household chores to boil water. However, they were not really convinced of the utility of this practice (CS 110). If an innovation had been introduced which really provided perceived advantage, the women probably would have found the time needed.

If local people are very positively motivated, they are usually willing to alter their schedules, or at least cooperate as much as they can without jeopardizing their economic future. Literacy-training projects offer a good contrast to preventive medical efforts, since the ability to read and write is widely desired by rural people in the nonindustrialized nations. Thus, even though most of the male students in a literacy campaign among the Ijaw of Nigeria had to be absent for two to three weeks at a time on fishing trips, they would try to make up their lessons when they got back. In general, the enthusiasm was very great; the local population was 60% literate at this time and the illiterates felt that they were at a considerable disadvantage (CS 96).

A project to develop an agricultural cooperative in Israel generated enough motivation among the Arab farmers so that they willingly altered their planting schedules. They planted wheat before the rains came, a practice they had not followed previously. The first year they were afraid that they would lose their crop, but were reassured by the good harvest. At the end of the project, some four years later, planting before the rains had become the generally accepted practice (CS 59). Obviously the positive demonstration in this instance was also a crucial factor which helped promote the change.

Perhaps the best illustration of how local schedules will be altered if the advantages are clear is derived from a community development effort in Laos in which the author was personally engaged. The project was planned to coincide with the slack working season, but because of administrative difficulties within the assistance agency, the materials promised were not provided on time. Most projects, which had been selected by the villagers themselves, were not finished when the rice cultivation season began. However, interest was high enough that many of the efforts were continued right into the work season. Women and children were also brought into the work by the village leaders, and on several occasions work was carried on into the night. This development was quite unexpected for the change agents, who had previously believed that Lao villagers would do little if any extra work during the rice growing season (CS 78). The critical factor appears to be motivation; if people are sufficiently interested, they will alter their traditional schedules.

WORK GROUPINGS

Work is controlled not only according to when it will be done, but also according to who will do it. Much work is accomplished through group effort, ranging from individual families to communitywide work groups. Probably most development projects, except those in agriculture, are oriented primarily toward the larger work groups. The entire philosophy of community development rests on this basis. Fortunately, there are traditional work groupings in many parts of the world to which such concepts can be grafted. When this has been done deliberately by change agents, their projects have been aided greatly. A very successful Peruvian credit union (cited previously) was started among highland Indians who, in the pre-Spanish period, had been highly collectivistic and had continued some of these traditions (CS 109). Also, in a Venezuelan community development project the change agents revived, in an urban setting, collective working practices that had formerly been used by farmers to gather crops. The people concerned were recent migrants from rural environments who were still familiar with the old patterns and willing to apply them to the urban problems (CS 171). Other successful community development projects which utilized traditional work groupings are described for Kenya and the Philippines. (CS 75, CS 133).

It was noted in the chapter on *Social Structure* that some village societies place strong emphasis on family units at the expense of larger cooperative units. When this is so, it cannot be predicted categorically that projects based on larger cooperative units will not work, but there will probably be more difficulties. This happened to such an extent (in a case cited previously) that the change agent abandoned an effort to establish a communal health clinic in a Mexican village; the strong self-sufficiency of families militated against a

villagewide cooperative effort (CS 85). In another project, a diphtheria-prevention campaign in Thailand, the family work group tradition inhibited the innovation. When only about one-third of the children appeared for the inoculations, the main reason given was that they were part of laboriously arranged family work parties which the parents were reluctant to disrupt. However, it is also relevant that motivation for the inoculations was not high, since the Thai believed that the disease was caused by other forces (CS 163).

As with other traditional customs, local economic practices will be changed much more quickly when innovations of clearly beneficial nature are presented to local people. The leather processing cooperative in India (cited before) is of this nature. Strong individualism existed there. The local people were accustomed to complete ownership or employee status, but the idea of sharing responsibility in a cooperative was alien to them. However, when the project was shifted from the original goal of processing leather to making bone meal for fertilizer, and a quick profit was realized, the cooperative began to function quite well. The entire responsibility for operating the new organization was assumed by the caste members while the change agents were still on the scene (CS 44).

PROPRIETARY RIGHTS

Probably no aspect of traditional economic practices has been the subject of more study or concern by those in the development field than land tenure. It is hypothesized that land tenure has been given so much attention partly because it is a problem with which Westerners are consciously concerned. The ownership of property is one of the bases of the capitalistic system, and efforts, either direct or indirect, are made to carry Western concepts of ownership to the non-industrialized nations. Economic practices such as work schedules or methods are usually given less attention by Westerners or Western-oriented change agents. Thus, the amount of research and attention paid to land tenure may, in part, merely reflect the bias of Westerners. The importance of proprietary rights should not be minimized, but it is probably over-represented in development research. In any event it was evidenced as significant in the projects described in this report about as often as the other economic patterns.

The pattern of land ownership is undoubtedly the most influential proprietary relationship in the nonindustrial nations. Resistance to proposed innovations probably comes most often from landlords, who fear that they may suffer losses as a result. The only serious resistance in the Vicos project of highland Peru, mentioned previously, was from the landlords, who visualized a loss of cheap labor if the Indians were to become independent. After the project proved successful at Vicos, neighboring Indians attempted to duplicate the efforts of the *Vicosenos* on their haciendas. On one occasion the local landlords had the police called in and several such innovating Indians were shot (CS 112).

In the countries colonized by Spain, quite exploitative landlord-tenant relationships developed and have persisted in large measure to the present day. The Philippines are similar to many Latin-American countries in this respect. Consequently, it is not surprising that case histories involving Filipino vested interests are frequently described. A common type of resistance is that caused by the landlords' fear of loss of land. The instance in which building of a feeder road into a Filipino village was impeded by the unwillingness of landlords to provide the land necessary for the right-of-way was related previously. However, positive action by village leaders and a compromise in road design so that no individual landlord would lose much land were sufficient counterbalancing forces to save the project (CS 115).

Landlords' rights, in the Philippines and elsewhere, frequently extend beyond the simple control of the land. The landlord usually exercises a number of other economic controls over his tenants. In a Filipino village project to introduce a new type of rice cultivation, the landlords' rights had a different negative effect. Traditionally, the landlord made the decision as to what kinds of seeds his tenants would use, then procured them. The decision to accept or reject the new system was not in the hands of the individual farmers, even though

they were the persons who would carry out the practices. Most of the farmers did not adopt the new system (CS 116).

A change agent apparently needs to work with both owners and tenants—or at least not ignore either group—for the reason illustrated above, that owners usually have the right of final decision while it will be the tenants who will need to change their practices. Of course, if the change agent can manage to neutralize one group, usually through coercion, he can concentrate exclusively on the other, but this is not often possible. If coercion is not used, exclusive work with one group will tend to alienate the other, and potentially either group has the power of bringing a project to a halt. Just as concentration on work with the tenants on the Philippine rice project brought resistance from landlords, in another project in Pakistan concentration of work on the landowner group in the community development effort caused the small farmers and artisans to lose interest (CS 106).

It is understandable that technicians frequently will tend to work with the more literate and prosperous farmers, and obviously they are important. But if whole communities or populations are the targets, the means will have to be found to get beyond those with whom it is easy to communicate. When considerable class or economic differences exist, new ideas or practices do not flow automatically from the rich to the poor. The author recalls a Vietnamese-French farmer on the Bolovens Plateau of South Laos who received a great deal of technical assistance from American experts and who built an excellent farm. However, he was already well trained in horticulture, knew the advantages of change, and was also able to establish effective social relations with the American technicians. But his farm remained an oasis; practically none of the new practices were transferred to the traditional villagers surrounding his farm. The tribal farmers presumably did not think there was any connection between their methods and those of their well-to-do Vietnamese neighbor.

Insecurity of land tenure can create difficulties in cooperation since the proposed changes may be viewed as potentially instrumental for taking away land. In an urban community development project in Colombia (cited previously) the potential participants thought they would lose their land and were reluctant to cooperate (CS 12). This fear was, of course, also a result of ineffectual communication, in that the local people did not learn the real intentions of the project until later.

Very small landholdings create problems because the farmers are unwilling to risk an unknown future if it means taking some of their good land out of production, even temporarily. This was true in one East Indian village project where the proposal to plant fuel trees made little progress because the farmers were in need of immediate returns (CS 173). A similar problem was overcome in a gardening project in Puerto Rico, mainly because the innovation techniques were much better and the attitude toward outside assistance was quite positive. The farmers grew commercial tobacco and were reluctant to use any of their fields for growing vegetables. A compromise was reached when the farmers agreed to grow the vegetable plants on the edges and in the empty spaces of the tobacco fields (CS 200). To have insisted on utilizing whole fields might have jeopardized the project's outcome; presumably if the vegetables proved to be profitable, the farmers might have been willing to use entire fields later.

Probably it is when local land-tenure practices differ most from those familiar to Westerners that most difficulties are encountered with Western-type innovations. Or, it could be said that the greater the difference from Western ways, the greater the need for adaptation, since conflicts are most likely if a purely Western replacement approach is used. Although the land-tenure practices of peasant cultivators in nonindustrial countries will vary somewhat from those of Western farmers, the fact that these people are basically sedentary and do grow field crops, naturally creates some similarities with Western tenure practices. However, when the manner of gaining a livelihood is considerably different, such as among nonsedentary, tribal people, tenure practices will bear little resemblance to those familiar to a Westerner.

Two types of people still exist in considerable numbers in the nonindustrial countries where such variance in tenure is significant—the slash-and-burn cultivators and the nomadic herdsmen. As a general rule, neither have tenure systems in which individuals or even families have exclusive possession over delimited plots of land in perpetuity, or even over long periods of time. Logical reasons for this kind of tenure are within the rationale of their economic systems. This is not to say that fencing and exclusive ownership of property by individuals would not prove more productive in the long run, but it must be remembered that such a seemingly simple change as the introduction of fencing will necessarily change the entire way of life of such nomads; unless very high economic benefits are perceived, there will probably be resistance.

Such was the case in two projects among desert tribesmen in the Middle East. It is no accident that both instances were in this area and involved this kind of people, even though in countries separated by hundreds of miles, Jordan and Somalia. In both cases the change agents were American technicians who evidently viewed the projects as no more than technical, using assumptions based on American agricultural practices. There is no indication that they attempted to find out how these new practices might be merged into the traditional culture of the migratory herders. The reaction of the local people was so identical that the names of the countries can practically be interchanged and the projects described as one.

Both efforts were designed to improve grazing ranges and both involved the building of dikes and fences for the new pastures. Although land ownership existed, it was by tribe and a social mechanism was included which allowed use of the land by other tribes, with proper permission. The idea of exclusive ownership by individuals, with the land fenced off, was alien. In both cases the tribes carried their grievances to political leaders, who then interfered, holding up progress of the projects. On a more immediate practical level the tribesmen cut fences and broke open dikes that had been built through project efforts, despite the fact that in both instances the technical superiority of the innovations was fairly clearly demonstrated. It should be mentioned that the attitude of local people toward land was almost completely disregarded, even though in both cases reports by social scientists were available, pointing out these difficulties (CS 62, CS 145).

It was indicated earlier that with relatively effective communication, dependence on local leadership, and full participation by local people, range management programs can be introduced to nomadic herders, including closing off certain areas for regeneration (CS 146). It is all the more significant that this successful project occurred in the same country as one of the failures, Somalia. However, when the local people participate in all stages of planning and implementation, they automatically take into consideration their traditional system, and thus changes are not completely disruptive or surprising for them.

DISTRIBUTION PATTERNS

The final aspect of the economic system is the marketing or distribution system. Eight instances of the marketing system affecting projects were found.

Two projects were adaptations to existing marketing needs, one being a village producer's exchange system set up in West Bengal. The plan was to expand the traditional bartering system which had been to exchange rice for goods produced by artisans. The expansion was to provide the opportunity for artisans to exchange manufactured goods with one another, instead of simply using the medium of rice (CS 39). Western economists may claim that merely expanding a barter system will not carry village people very far in the direction of a true money economy. The defense can be offered that this innovation did institute a type of economic institution upon which more productive innovations might later be built. It is a good example of an adaptive type of innovation which was readily acceptable, in contrast to one which would be much more likely to be rejected by the local people.

Road-building projects based on self-help are more likely to be successful if they help to improve marketing facilities. This was the primary incentive to build a six-mile road from a Filipino village to a nearby marketing center. This particular village was dependent on cash from home-produced mosquito nets and the existing poor road made it difficult for the producers to get their products to the city. The road was built through contribution by the villagers of one-fourth the cost and all the labor (CS 121). Probably the main incentive for most local road-building efforts is to obtain access to nearby markets.

If nearby marketing facilities are poor, there is generally little incentive either for building roads or for growing cash crops, which was the situation in a tribal area of Northern Nigeria. In the installation of an irrigation system, the change agent adapted to local circumstances by encouraging the planting of native crops, rather than European vegetables and cash crops which would be hard to market. The goal was achieved and the village was under irrigation at the end of four months (CS 2). Again, there was no large-scale economic benefit, but there were two significant innovations: The local people learned to farm with irrigation and to work in the dry season. Presumably, when and if adequate market facilities developed, they could be utilized more advantageously because of the experience that had been gained.

The advantages of gradual changes have been demonstrated in Japanese agricultural development where it has been suggested that "It will take many seasons of demonstration to start a substantial movement to adapt new methods. The important thing is to start the process of change from one technique to another, from one crop to another. As other processes are introduced in subsequent years, the cumulative effect of many processes of change, however slow, will become large and will have an accelerating impact on the growth rate." [Oshima, 14, p. 87].

The integration of economic innovations into local social systems, can be quite difficult when there is dependence on external marketing systems which are not understood by the producers. Although change agents from social systems where complex economic arrangements are the norm may be capable of keeping such innovations going, when their support is withdrawn, the local people may not be able to continue to do so. Some American advisors, particularly those in the Peace Corps, are quite prone to develop systems based on selling goods either in the United States or among resident foreigners. But when their tour of duty is over, such systems usually collapse, unless there has been insistent training of the local people, compelling them to take the major share of responsibility for distributing the goods. This was the problem in the previously cited village weaving cooperative in India sponsored by the American Friends. The Friends assumed the difficult task of developing markets, and the cooperative members had few responsibilities other than producing the cloth. At the time of the study, it was believed that the cooperative would fold when the Friends left (CS 45).

Not infrequently, patterns of distribution are largely controlled by money lenders or buyers who exploit their clients, but also provide services that are not available through impersonal Western-type economic institutions. Unless the backers of a new cooperative are able to generate considerable trust among the peasant producers and/or produce benefits that are relatively immediate, the peasants are likely to choose the money lenders. Even though the villager realizes that he is being exploited, he still values the personal consideration he gets in dealings with the money lender. Moreover, the money lender is integrated into the local social system, which makes him comprehensible and approachable to the villager. The cooperative, on the other hand, is usually sponsored by outsiders from the government or another agency, and its real intentions are not clearly known by the villager, nor does he know whether the cooperative will stay for long. When cooperatives do become integrated into the local social fabric and do provide clear advantages, villagers tend to accept them (CS 59, CS 104, CS 109).

When cooperatives fail to meet these qualifications, they tend to be partially or fully rejected. In two such cases in Vietnam, the money lenders were Chinese;

the villagers chose them in place of the government sponsored cooperatives (CS 201, CS 202). Similarly, an agricultural cooperative in India was initiated, but few of the poor farmers for whom it was designed took an active part. They did not understand the intricate rules imposed, the necessity to sign papers, and the specific time limit that the cooperative imposed for paying back money or grain loaned. The money lenders were much more informal and accommodating, although, of course, more exploitative (CS 174).

Summary

The primary aspects of local economic systems of significance in the cross-cultural change process are the production and distribution systems. Although there is a natural resistance to altering old patterns, this does not inhibit change when it is clearly advantageous in an economic sense, and is so perceived by the innovation recipients. The willingness to change increases, however, in proportion to the decrease in necessary change of old patterns. A noneconomic factor which affects decisions considerably in regard to change is social status. Economic position is frequently linked with social relations, which does produce resistance, particularly in regard to proprietary rights.

There were five types of economic patterns of significance: work methods, work schedules, work groupings, proprietary rights, and distribution patterns. Work patterns and proprietary rights appeared to be the least amenable to change—the first, presumably, because work patterns involve motor habits and accustomed ways of accomplishing tasks which are not easily altered, and the second because change threatens existing social positions.

Chapter 5

BELIEFS

Men of all cultures support their actions by elaborate systems of belief. There are beliefs of what is right or wrong, what is proper or improper, what is lucky or unlucky. Logically, there is no cultural behavior for which men do not have supporting beliefs. This is true of leadership patterns, social organization, economic behavior, and other customs. For instance, all peoples have beliefs as to what kind of family is most desirable or what kinds of trade relationships are most advantageous. For the purpose of understanding the change process, it has seemed most fruitful to treat the beliefs that support a given behavior as part of the behavior itself. Thus, it is assumed that the belief which upholds a practice such as polygamy exists when the behavior itself exists.

There remain, however, significant kinds of beliefs which are considerably less closely associated with specific kinds of behavior, such as certain theological beliefs or attitudes toward self-improvement. There are, of course, actions which are promoted or inhibited by such beliefs, but insofar as change is concerned, the belief itself appears to be primary. Therefore, we have designated a set of beliefs, with the understanding that while each affects behavior, the mental attitude itself is more significant than the action it promotes or hinders.

There are two points of significance in regard to the beliefs which were isolated from these case studies. Although certain beliefs were mentioned fairly frequently (in approximately 30% of the case histories), it did not appear that these caused innovations to be rejected in most instances. One possible explanation is that, even in traditional societies, there is an inherent "rationality" among village people and the urban poor when they are presented with advantageous new ideas. Unless central values are threatened, there is usually willingness to change. This is clearest in the attitude toward change itself, particularly what we call "project negativism"—negativism toward new ideas based on previous unfavorable experiences with change projects. Such negativism was rarely reported as great enough to deter people in local communities from taking another chance if well-conceived innovations were offered. And though supernatural beliefs were reported to inhibit innovation, even they did not prevent it in a majority of instances reported in the case studies. On the other hand, it is probable that local beliefs, which may have helped cause failure of projects, frequently were not mentioned in these accounts. Knowledge of local beliefs requires a fair understanding of local cultures and projects which failed were, most likely, those for which change agents lacked such understanding.

The other aspect of local beliefs described as affecting change projects is that they were overwhelmingly negative. Of 70 different beliefs mentioned, only four were described as having exerted a positive influence on the outcomes of the projects. It is not hard to understand this quality of local beliefs. A cultural system, whatever other goals it may have, is always organized toward self-perpetuation. Change threatens this continuity, thus providing a basis for resistance. This holds true for most aspects of culture, but is probably most relevant for those in which there is the least relationship between attitude and behavior. The difference can be illustrated by comparing technological and religious beliefs. A given people may plant rice seedlings two months before

the onset of the monsoon rains, with a corresponding belief to support this practice. However, it is possible for an outsider to demonstrate that a new variety of rice needs to be planted three months before the rains. The belief can be validated or disproved relatively quickly, as the advantages of the innovation, if any, will be apparent within a growing season. On the other hand, a theological practice and belief such as the need to propitiate the rice goddess is quite difficult to demonstrate as either true or false.

This phenomenon is not limited to agricultural or developing societies. For instance, it is not by accident that nations all over the world have adopted air travel and have attempted to build up their airlines while still retaining the religions of the prelying age. The demonstrable advantage of the airplane is great, but the demonstrable advantage of a given theology is very small, for industrial as well as for agrarian nations.

The basic types of beliefs that occurred as influential in these projects are: supernatural, medical (health), and attitude toward change.

SUPERNATURAL BELIEFS

For purposes of this report, a supernatural belief is defined as a concept relied upon to explain and establish harmonious relations with supernatural power not dependent on observational "proof." From this study we find three logical subdivisions: theological, spiritual, and magical. Theological beliefs are derived from the major world religions—Buddhism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and Judaism. In the Agrarian nations of the world, there are also many minor spirits, usually remnants of tribal or animistic religions which were dominant before the advent of one of the great religions. Examples of such spirits are the "phi" of Laos and Thailand, the remnants of Inca gods among the Catholic highlanders of Peru and Bolivia, and pond or forest spirits among Christian Nigerians. Beliefs stemming from this type of religious force will be referred to here as spiritual. The third type of supernatural force is commonly called magical, basically manipulative techniques to control events in this world, but not based on elaborate conceptual schemes.

The supernatural beliefs identified in the case histories were exclusively negative in their effect on change projects, although in most instances they did not bring about rejection of the innovations. In 32 cases where such beliefs were described, only 14 ended in complete failure, or abandonment of the change efforts. Of particular interest are the kinds of projects in which beliefs were involved. Twenty-one cases (about two-thirds) were in the field of health, and the others were in agriculture, animal husbandry, literacy training, community development, and resettlement.

The simplest explanation for the connection between local beliefs and poor health is that the advantages of health projects, with the exception of Western medical therapy, are the most difficult to demonstrate. The most common type of health project in this group has been the introduction of sanitary water supplies. Demonstrating the advantages of unpolluted water presents numerous difficulties. There are quite a variety of beliefs in the world concerning water, but the principle of physical contamination as understood by Westerners is practically never encountered in village communities. In general, clear water or clear and running water is believed to be potable, since it looks clean. Where knowledge of microbes is nonexistent, it is difficult to convince people that such water can cause harm. Furthermore, local supernatural beliefs frequently support such traditional attitudes toward the cleanliness of local water.

Village people do adopt improved water supplies, despite local beliefs, but usually for the sake of greater convenience, not because they think the water is more healthful. This was true in a community development project in India. The villagers believed diseases were caused by minor spirits and did not associate dirty water with physical ailments. Although wells were introduced, the local people were interested primarily in the greater convenience of the new wells,

which shortened the distance that women had to go for water in the dry season (CS 42). Thus the local belief, although negative insofar as the change was concerned, was a minor consideration in comparison to the perceived advantage of greater convenience.

Health innovations that depart considerably from traditional beliefs and practices, and with which no subsidiary motivation can be associated, are usually very difficult to transfer. An effort was made among the Zulus to improve health practices in several ways. One of the subprojects, a tuberculosis campaign, after nine years was still only partially successful. The local belief was that the illness was caused by an "ill-wisher" who poisoned one's food, and the traditional treatment was that of a local medicine man. The change agents attempted to use "rational" persuasion by showing posters and models of the anatomy of cattle and goats to demonstrate that the stomach was not connected to the lungs (CS 48). There was no indication that the change agents conceived of the possibility of adapting the new treatment to traditional beliefs or practices.

It appears that local supernatural beliefs which are negative toward innovations can be countered most efficiently by adapting to them rather than by attempting to overcome them through "rational" explanations. An efficient means of adaptation is pointed out in an anti-dysentery campaign in village India. The villagers believed that the ailment was caused by the anger of a local deity. While the doctor and development worker gave lectures and showed movies on the cause of the disease based on "rational" explanation, they also presented the new treatment of the disease as a gift of the goddess. Before distributing the medicine, they participated in a village prayer meeting which was called to obtain the goddess' sanction. The medicine was accepted, and regular health education classes started soon after (CS 184).

If efficient communication techniques are used, along with some effort to adapt to local cultural patterns, the likelihood of inducing some change is considerably greater; however, if such efforts are in health practices, the results may still be limited. This was the case in a hygiene and maternal care project in Indonesia. It was classified by the anthropologist-analyst as a qualified success in that some practices were adopted, although the participants had to be encouraged by a reward motivation. To induce them to visit the clinics, the mothers were given vitamins and materials for baby care. Minor changes took place even though a number of practices continued which were deemed harmful by the change agents. Such practices included shaving the newborn baby's head in an unsanitary way, feeding it rice and bananas instead of breast feeding, and putting the mother on a diet which weakened her. Thus change was not remarkable despite the fact that the change agents deliberately utilized the traditional medical healers. Part of their program was to train local midwives in new practices; also, they worked consistently through village leaders (CS 56). The limited success can be explained most easily on the basis of the project type. Even with efficient techniques of innovation, projects based on disease prevention usually will not achieve dramatic results. But more efficient techniques can make the difference between abandonment of an effort and a little progress.

The other types of projects involving supernatural beliefs were far fewer than those in health; there were one to three instances of each type. Three in animal husbandry all took place in India. Probably nowhere in the world will animal husbandry efforts be affected so greatly by supernatural beliefs as in India, where beliefs about animals are almost as complex as beliefs about humans. Except for the Islamic taboo against pork consumption, in the other agrarian nations people tend to be far more omnivorous and taboos tend to be insignificant or local.

The ritual uncleanness of poultry was an influencing factor in one project (CS 43) while the Hindu reverence toward cattle influenced the other two. The attitude toward cattle is a central core concept among Hindus and probably will be very difficult to alter. It is well known that caste Hindus will not kill or eat their cattle. Thus in a program where innovation techniques were relatively

efficient, an effort to introduce improved husbandry techniques in North India was the least successful of the innovations sponsored. Although some progress was made, the breeding program suffered because the villagers would not consent to the elimination of scrub bulls; moreover, the unproductive cattle competed for the benefits of the feeding program (CS 47). Exactly the same situation was reported in the community development program of the Indian Government some eight or ten years later (CS 175). It is interesting to note here that, over a period of time, lack of improvement of development programs was frequently apparent. The Indian Government program was built on the foundation of *Pilot Project India* (CS 47). Yet the same problem continued to be reported and there is no evidence that the later change agents were aware that it had been reported earlier.

In two instances of supernatural beliefs connected with resettlement efforts in West Africa, the belief was a fear of new spirits or supernatural conditions in the area chosen for resettlement. In neither instance, however, was the fear great enough to prevent successful movement of the populations (CS 1, CS 166).

Supernatural beliefs which affect socioeconomic change projects are of three kinds: theological, spiritual, and magical. In this group of case histories they occurred as negative influences almost exclusively although they did not cause the rejection of innovations in a majority of instances. They were most closely associated with projects in health, presumably because the long-term advantage of most health innovations is difficult to demonstrate. Change agents who have been able to innovate successfully despite negative supernatural beliefs utilized subsidiary motivations, which were most commonly greater convenience, and/or adapting new health practices to old ones.

MEDICAL BELIEFS

These types of belief are defined here as concepts concerning the nature of the human body and physical ailments which do not stem from supernatural conceptions. Most of these ideas are based on seemingly plausible appearances or cause-and-effect relationships of the natural order. A good example is the belief mentioned earlier that village people in the agrarian nations regard clear, or clear and running water, as fit to drink. This belief, based on the appearance of the water, is logical unless knowledge of microorganisms exists.

As with supernatural beliefs, local medical beliefs almost always occurred as negative influences. In fact, of 16 instances where such beliefs were encountered, only one was positively oriented toward the innovation and it was a complex type of belief which lay partially outside the medical or health category. Moreover, it occurred in Taiwan, where the population is relatively more sophisticated than is usual in the agrarian nations. Most of the people were literate and on the way to becoming urbanized and industrialized. The project was a birth control effort where the local people had become aware of the fact that infant mortality had dropped and, for better health and general family improvement, had decided that smaller families would be more desirable (CS 203). The new local belief about family size naturally improved chances for adoption of contraceptive innovations.

It is significant that this family planning program was built upon motivational research—the organizers surveyed the community in advance to learn how the local people felt. Furthermore, they tailored the program to the desire of the local people to limit their families. This is an exceptional approach and it was lacking in almost all of the following projects; consequently, local medical beliefs were inhibiting influences. Even so, local people were usually pragmatic enough to ignore local beliefs if an innovation offered sufficiently important advantages. But it is doubtful that in such instances they abandon the old beliefs. Rather, they continue believing the old lore while engaging in the new practices experimentally. Usually, if the new practices provide more advantages, the old beliefs will fade along with the practices that were derived from them. Also, persuading people to adopt new practices without full belief

that they are superior to the old requires fairly sophisticated innovation techniques, usually in the area of communication.

A number of cases were found in which negative medical beliefs were involved in other contexts. In one case, at a maternity hospital in Ecuador, the medical people deliberately violated or ridiculed all folk beliefs. However, the advantages to the mothers from hospital treatment were so apparent that they came anyway (CS 19). Another project in which the advantages outweighed the negative influence of the local belief was a nutrition experiment in Guatemala, where the medical people proposed to take blood samples. Despite the belief that blood once lost could not be regenerated, the local people still cooperated—largely, it appears, to get the supplementary food that was being offered to the children (CS 33).

A typical kind of reaction to health projects which included new concepts occurred in a malaria campaign in Guam. The local people did not believe that the "wigglers" in water hatched into mosquitoes. (The author does not say what the local belief was on how mosquitoes developed, but undoubtedly there was one.) In this instance the change agent carried out a classic "rational" demonstration: He put the "wigglers" in jars, covered them with mesh cloth, and showed the local people the hatching process. The influence of such a demonstration can be doubted even though this project was fairly successful. The villagers cooperated by covering drainage pits, screening barrels, and clearing brush, as requested. However, there was also a considerable reward motivation—the government lent trucks and personnel to haul away the refuse (CS 153), a service which probably was appreciated for reasons other than health improvement.

Health innovations that have no perceived benefit to the recipients and no other attached benefits are likely to be rejected. Usually, change agents think almost exclusively of the broad national implications of a given kind of health problem, but the potential adopters are rarely influenced by such considerations, even when they understand them. They accept a given new practice because it means something to them personally. If there are no perceived benefits involved, a traditional belief may easily tip the scales to the side of rejection. This kind of situation is illustrated most clearly in population control programs in the agrarian countries. The national planners are concerned with overpopulation, and design programs accordingly; when new practices are offered, individuals base their judgment on what it will mean to them personally. Thus local beliefs and attitudes become quite relevant. This was true in the early family-planning campaign in Puerto Rico: many people believed the contraceptive techniques being offered caused cancer or chronic illness. As cited previously, the men also believed that the new devices subtracted from their pleasure, were dirty because they were commonly used with prostitutes, and finally would encourage infidelity in wives. The national program was classified a failure at the time of the study, since it produced no significant change in the birth rate (CS 140).

Venereal disease programs in Africa have suffered because of the local belief that the ailment was no more than a minor inconvenience (CS 101, CS 158). The potential recipients acted on the basis of how much the innovation would affect the tribe—which they perceived as too little to lead them to change their habits.

Local beliefs always support local practices over new practices when the people lack understanding of the new concepts. And unfortunately, these new concepts usually cannot be transmitted by means of a few talks, even with audio-visual aids. It has been mentioned that rural people in the agrarian nations usually do not understand the concept of microorganisms, therefore do not understand why they should boil drinking water. Thus they continue to depend on local beliefs concerning water, such as its "hot" or "cold" qualities. In a Peruvian community where a water boiling campaign was being promoted, a person who was sick, according to a local belief, needed to drink boiled water. But a person who drank boiled water when he was well was looked down upon. The idea that unboiled water was as harmful for well persons as for those who were sick was not a part of the local belief system, and there were no other perceived advantages for boiling water. Very few adopted the suggested practice (CS 110).

The same attitude was present in the diphtheria campaign in Thailand, mentioned previously. The villagers who were unfamiliar with Western concepts of contagion and immunization had not even identified diphtheria as a special ailment. Moreover, according to the local attitude, childhood diseases were normal. With no other motivation, the villagers saw little need for immunization (CS 163).

Local medical or health beliefs were almost exclusively negative toward proposed innovations. When there were significant perceived advantages for adopting new practices, local people tended to ignore such beliefs. When no direct advantages from the innovations were perceived and there were no subsidiary advantages from cooperation, the local people tended to reject the new ideas. It is significant that in this group of cases, not a single example was found of a change agent trying to adapt new beliefs to old beliefs.

ATTITUDE TOWARD CHANGE

This type of belief is defined as the attitude of local people toward the possibilities of improvement through self-effort. Not unexpectedly, the attitude in these reports was overwhelmingly negative. Most people in the communities described did not believe they could change their lives through their own efforts. The attitude was mentioned in 18 cases and in only two was it positive. This is not surprising, because if there was a predominantly positive attitude, the people would change their own lives and outside stimulation would not be necessary. Such negativism is undoubtedly a part of the psychological makeup of people who are not progressing or are progressing only slowly.

More significant, however, is that such negativism did not prevent people from changing when innovations with real promise were offered. Of the 16 cases where the general attitude was reported as negative, 13 still ended successfully. This seems to indicate that such beliefs are only minor hindrances, and that the poor will usually react positively if promising innovations are offered.

The two instances in which positive beliefs were described, were in Chile and Colombia. The Chilean project was in agriculture, where the change agent worked only with persons who solicited his assistance. They were the wealthier farmers, which is undoubtedly one of the reasons they had a positive attitude toward their own ability to improve their situation (CS 8). They would have been similar to the French-Vietnamese farmer in Laos who deliberately sought help from American technicians while neighboring tribal farmers did not. The tribal farmers probably had a negative attitude toward the possibility of change through such efforts, while the Vietnamese horticulturist had absorbed Western concepts of change during his training in a Belgian agricultural college.

The other instance where such a positive attitude was specifically mentioned was in a Colombian community development effort involving Peace Corps Volunteers. The village people had previously engaged in successful government programs, and had acquired a positive view of this possibility (CS 172). In a number of other cases it could be inferred that such an attitude existed, even though there were no specific statements to that effect.

The primary cause for negativism toward change in this group can be called the situational factor—the real situation for the potential adopters had been so unfavorable in the past that a belief had developed that they could not improve themselves. There were 14 such instances, but—supporting the generalization that such an attitude has not normally prevented the adoption of new ideas—only two ended in failure. One type of situational "cause" was that of peasant farmers who had operated with limited resources without any outside assistance for so long that most of their efforts had ended badly. They had become apathetic toward any efforts at changing the situation. This was true in the Vicos Project of Peru, where the Indians had been living in a socioeconomic system which yielded only a precarious existence and which crushed local initiative (CS 113). Another example was a land-reclamation project in North India where villagers had tried to restore land, only to see their efforts washed away each rainy season. Disillusionment and apathy had followed (CS 48).

Since apathy and conservatism are often closely related, local people then look with suspicion on any new idea. This was true in a resettlement project on the Uganda-Congo border (CS 166) as well as for an effort to introduce a Japanese method of rice cultivation in an Indian village (CS 173). Such attitudes of apathy are often carried from rural environments into urban slums, and frequently are reinforced there by equally difficult economic situations. This happened in an urban renewal effort in Puerto Rico. The local people were interested in improving their condition, but few felt they could do anything significant on their own. They thought of change as possible only through massive government programs (CS 142). It is significant to note that in all of these projects the changes were effected nonetheless, illustrating that these attitudes are by no means insuperable barriers. Needless to say, the innovation techniques used in all instances were relatively efficient, and this is probably one reason the situational apathy was described. Communication was thorough enough that the change agents or analysts learned of the prevalent attitudes.

The two projects in which situational apathy was described and in which the goals were not realized were characterized by extremely poor communication techniques; this seems to indicate that the beliefs themselves were not the basic, or only, "cause" for nonadoption. One project was to reintroduce grape cultivation into a village area of Jordan. Previous efforts to raise grapes had failed, and the local belief was that grapes would not grow there. However, it is significant that the change agents encountered suspicion when they tried to record the farm areas, the villagers believing that this was a pretext to take over the land (CS 68). The change agents evidently were not aware that the quickest way to arouse suspicion among peasant farmers is to begin marking off their land. Although no specific data were provided about the nature of communication, it can be surmised that it was not very effective, since the villagers did not know the real intention of the technicians.

The other project was also marked by poor communication, along with an attitude of situational apathy. Practically no communication was involved in an effort to get farmers in rural areas of the Philippines to spray their fruit trees, except for instructions given to the barrio lieutenant on how to use the donated sprayer. The farmers had no conception of the value of chemicals in controlling plant pests. Under such conditions, it is not surprising that they did not participate. Their apathy was probably a result of this kind of treatment, which they had probably received often in the past (CS 127).

A type of apathy results from dislocation of rural people and the breakup of traditional communities. Four such instances were in this group of case studies (CS 60, CS 108, CS 159, CS 171). This kind of negativism results from a lack of social cohesiveness when there has been physical displacement of masses of people with a consequent loss of tribal or village social ties, as well as a change of economic orientation. It is one form of the *anomie* of sociology. These four projects turned out successfully despite the attitude. It should be mentioned, however, that all of the change agents were fairly sophisticated in social science concepts and recognized the existence of the attitude. They took particular pains to counteract it, which may explain to a large extent the success they achieved. As with other local practices or beliefs, there may have been more cases of lack of goal achievement which were not recorded because they were unknown to the change agents and/or analysts. But these cases seem to indicate that if change agents recognize this kind of social problem and take positive steps to counteract it, it does not remain an insuperable barrier to socioeconomic change.

The final type of situational apathy is what we have called project negativism—a negative attitude toward development projects based on previous project failures, a kind of fatalism which is a product of the development era rather than a result of basically difficult conditions. Two clearly indicated examples were found, although this attitude probably is much more widespread than this number indicates.

It is perhaps understandable that this kind of influence occurs relatively less often than other influence factors stemming from local culture patterns.

By definition, it occurs only when a given group of people have had a negative experience with outside change agents. And a basic fact is that the great majority of communities in the agrarian nations have not yet been approached with technical change projects. Nevertheless, we believe this attitude is of greater significance than the proportions in this group of case studies indicate (2 instances, or 1%). Another research effort based on interviews with American technical advisors who have returned has produced a much higher proportion; however, in this effort the interviewers probed to locate such attitudes. It would appear that since this kind of negativism has not been clearly identified previously, social scientists and change agents usually have not looked for it, and thus failed to report it.

One project in which the attitude was identified was the previously cited tractor-cooperative effort in Pakistan. The villagers were initially distrustful because they were required to deposit some of their money; they had seen in similar cooperative movements in which the members had lost their money. Even so, this project was carried to a successful conclusion, due to the great patience and understanding of the change agent. In particular, he utilized lines of family trust to get the first depositors (CS 104). The other project, one of phosphate fertilizers in Nigeria, ended in failure largely because the change agent's techniques were far less efficient. In previous years the government had given fertilizer to the same farmers, but without any instructions. Not only had the local farmers failed to obtain any increase in production, but in some instances the fertilizers had harmed their crops. Thus they had developed a negative attitude toward government fertilizer projects (CS 95).

The basically negative attitude toward change in most of the agrarian countries is a reflection of the difficulties experienced by the people in these countries in attempting independently to improve their lives. However, such negativism was usually counteracted by means of efficient innovation techniques. The main "causes" were found to be situational, either local economic conditions or displacement from relatively cohesive rural communities to urban slums or new rural settlements. A type of negativism which appears to be under-represented in this group is project negativism, or unwillingness to engage in socioeconomic change projects because of previous negative experiences with similar projects.

Summary

Local beliefs reported in these case histories appear to be among the least influential of any aspect of traditional culture. Their influence may be under-represented, since information about them is not easily obtained. Thus beliefs that may have contributed to failure of projects may not have been mentioned in the reporting of those projects. Beliefs reported were usually negative toward the goals of respective projects—probably because belief systems function primarily to support the local cultural patterns and thus are resistant to new ideas. Despite the negativism of the beliefs reported, most of the cases in which they were a feature were successful; when innovations were presented in ways that promised real benefits to the local people, the beliefs did not usually prevent adoption.

The primary kinds of significant beliefs were based on supernatural concepts, traditional medical concepts, or a general attitude toward the possibility of change through self-help. Supernatural concepts were of three kinds: theological, spiritual, and magical. Medical concepts were usually ideas which the local people based on apparent cause-and-effect relationships. Attitudes toward change were of two basic types, situational and project negativism. It appears that project negativism, a product of the era of change, is under-represented in this group of cases because it has not been identified previously as a significant social factor.

Chapter 6

LOCAL PRACTICES

The three kinds of cultural patterns discussed previously—leadership, social structure, and economic—have practices associated with them. A religious leader's practices include delivering sermons, performing death rites, and counseling his people; a family group has a series of practices which enable it to feed, clothe, and educate its members; a marketing system is basically a series of patterned practices to buy and sell goods. The practices connected with these three categories were mentioned frequently enough in the reports to warrant discussion as separate groups. In addition, there were a number of other local practices that influenced change projects but did not occur often enough to warrant separate chapters. These are treated here, under the general title of *Local Practices*, though it should be noted that the previous three chapters are also based on practices.

The frequency of mention of such practices was the lowest of any type of influence the author has been able to identify. Two possible explanations are: (a) that practices such as consumption and recreation patterns actually are not as significant as other aspects of culture, such as leadership or social structure; and/or (b) that the significance of such practices is not recognized as often by outside change agents and consequently they are not mentioned as often in reports. The author believes that both explanations are applicable to some extent. Leadership and social structure are probably more central in the lives of most people than are consumption and recreation patterns; also, such practices are less likely to be known by most change agents, since knowledge in such detail requires more training and study than they can or do give.

The main types of traditional practices that were influential on projects were consumption, recreation, and bathing patterns.

There were two clear instances when the introduction of new foods was made in accordance with the customary habits of eating or preparation. This procedure evidently promoted acceptance—presumably because major behavioral changes were not required. One of the projects involved the introduction of new and better vegetable varieties to Indian villagers. Since plant products constitute the purest kind of food for orthodox Hindus, the villagers were interested in the innovation from the beginning (CS 53). In the second instance, the Vicos project of Peru, the innovation was merely to introduce improved varieties of the existing staple, potatoes, but it provided an additional advantage: not only was a food to which the local people were accustomed made available in increased amounts, but also the larger crops provided extra potatoes, which could be sold for profit (CS 113).

Where vegetables are not in the traditional diet, and there are no other perceived gains for changing local behavior, village people tend to resist replacing other crops with vegetables. This was clearly the case in an effort to introduce vegetable production among Costa Rican coffee farmers. It was indicated previously that an economic conflict existed here, when the farmers were required to divert land which had been used for coffee, their sole cash crop, to vegetable growing. Moreover, 75% of the farmers claimed they were satisfied with their existing diet and felt no need for more vegetables (CS 15).

Even when food habits are in the process of change, due to changing socioeconomic circumstances, new types of food are likely to be resisted. Change can

take place under such circumstances, but not without considerable effort on the part of the change agents. In two case histories from South Africa where food habits, as well as most other aspects of the cultures, were in considerable flux, the people resisted adopting the foods recommended by the change agents. In one of these, a community development effort in an urban area of South Africa, an important phase was to convince the local people that they should eat vegetables and other more nutritious foodstuffs. The change agents sold these items at nominal cost, but with few takers. The local people claimed that meat and maize (corn) had been adequate for their ancestors and consequently were good enough for them (CS 151). They were not actually living under the conditions of their rural ancestors, but the traditions had continued. The same problem occurred in a nutrition improvement program among tribal Zulus, who also claimed that they would continue with the diet of their ancestors. However, the change agents showed them that the wheat they were eating was not the grain of their ancestors, but had been adopted from Europeans relatively recently. The change agents were able to get the Zulus to change their diet, although it took nine years of effort (CS 150).

It is probably significant that the local people in both these instances saw no advantages in changing their diet. There was no demonstrated economic gain, while considerable behavioral change was required. Also, the taste of the new foods was probably not pleasant, simply because the foods were new. The health gain visualized by the change agents was a type of advantage not easily recognized by illiterate or semiliterate people. All nutrition projects have this built-in difficulty—translating general advantages for a whole population to a level where the individual can perceive a practical gain for himself or for his immediate family.

When there are clearly perceived personal gains for changing diets, the possibilities for change improve considerably. Village people still resist adopting new foods but their sense of practicality, usually economic, is enough to outweigh any but the strongest taboos. Thus, in the irrigation project at Comilla, East Pakistan, the villagers changed from rice to wheat as payment for their work. There was a great deal of grumbling at first at the suggestion of accepting one-half of the payment in wheat, but this lasted only as long as the amount of wheat they were receiving was about the same as the amount of rice. When the wheat rate was increased so that they got twice as much wheat as the rice allowance, it was accepted willingly, even though some claimed they would die if they had to subsist on wheat (CS 105).

When the author uses the phrase "any but the strongest taboos," it means that there is a relativity in the biases of people. Thus, it is unlikely that these Muslim workers would have accepted pork in place of beef as payment even if they had received twice as much. To eat pork would require a major shift in supernatural beliefs, since the religion forbids its use. No such emotionally charged attitude toward wheat existed; it was merely a grain to which they were not accustomed.

Innovations that improve the preparation of food, and are modeled on existing techniques, tend to be received more favorably than those that involve the introduction of new foods. In such instances it is usually necessary to adopt some new behavioral patterns although most of the traditional methods can be retained. A type of cooking stove has been developed in India in which village women burn cow dung and compost gas instead of the traditional fuel, which is only the dung. A special type of tank is constructed in which dung and plant waste products are deposited. The gas generated from the decomposition process is then piped into the household stove. The primary advantage is that a quick, hot fire with very little smoke is produced. Moreover, the laborious task of making dung fuel cakes is eliminated and the compost from the tank can be used for fertilizer. And with all these advantages, the housewife still uses the traditional fuel and cooks in basically the same kind of stove she has always used. The reaction to this innovation reported from a village in Gujarat was that 49 of the 64 families installed such plants through their own efforts, though with loans

from the government. The remaining 15 families had applied for loans at the time the study was made. Such 100% positive reaction can be expected when innovations are adaptive to local practices and also provide numerous practical benefits. It might be mentioned that intragroup communication, or gossip by the women, spread the idea. Brides who were to leave their home villages would press for such a stove in their new homes (CS 180). A significant comparison can be made with the project to improve nutrition in South Africa, during which the people complained that they did not have the proper vessels for cooking the vegetables being promoted by the change agent (CS 150). Adopting this new idea would have no perceptible advantages and they would have to alter their cooking practices.

Local patterns of recreation or pleasure seeking were described as influencing the change process in six instances, in this group of cases. In three, the change agents deliberately attempted to utilize the existing recreational patterns to assist in the adoption of the innovations. In a self-help school building project in Colombia, the change agent, who was quite knowledgeable in regard to local cultural patterns, organized "civic weeks" including entertainment, games of chance, and contests, which were used to advertise the project as well as to raise funds (CS 11). Basically, she was utilizing the tradition of the fiesta in a positive way.

Change agents often criticize the large expenditures made by village people for festivals, particularly in Latin America. This attitude may be valid in terms of the "Protestant ethic" of the industrialized Western countries, but the fact remains that such festival complexes do exist elsewhere and do have important functions in their cultures; it is also certain that local people will not abandon such complexes unless some reasonable alternative is provided. The strategic alternative to condemning festivals is, therefore, to utilize them. There is considerable evidence, particularly from Colombia, that this can be done successfully. In interviews with Peace Corps Volunteers, in connection with another research project, it was found that use of local festivals as a means of advertising and fund raising for community projects in Colombia was a common practice, and in almost all instances the development goals were realized. The author believes the same strategy can be used outside Latin America.

Another type of traditional recreational practice was utilized in a project for women's clubs in Southern Uganda. The primary goal was to teach home economics, but in order to attract members to the clubs, the change agents decided to provide some entertainment. Most of it was native singing and dancing, performed by the members, which became the most popular part of the clubs' activities (CS 165). The same technique was used in an Indian community development project, where weekly discussion of village improvement schemes was combined with traditional recreational activities (CS 186).

Certain pleasure seeking activities may be of kinds to which change agents cannot or will not adapt because of moral or other considerations. The excessive consumption of alcohol or narcotics are activities of this nature, as are some sexual practices. Whatever the attitude of the change agent, merely condemning such practices is not, as a rule, a strategy that will cause the practitioners to give them up.

Of course, missionaries have long depended on the technique of moral condemnation to persuade non-Western people to give up certain practices, and it must be admitted that they have brought about changes. However, most successful Christian missionization has taken place in situations where the missionaries were supported by secular power groups, most notably colonial governments, which undoubtedly influenced local people. Also, a great amount of mission effort has taken very long periods of time. It can be said that sheer persistence made up in some part for the lack of perceptible advantages to local people. Secular socioeconomic change agents are rarely willing to spend as much time as do missionaries to bring about change in behavior.

Probably the only generally workable strategy is to provide alternate pleasure-providing activities, if that is possible. It is clear that simply ignoring such practices decreases the probability of change. The two venereal disease campaigns in East Africa that failed have been mentioned in other contexts. Here, only the negative influence of the pleasure-seeking behavior involved need be mentioned. The sexual customs of the Ba-Ila tribe in Northern Rhodesia were reported as extremely permissive, even by African standards. Adultery was commonplace. During beer-drinking festivals and funerals, whole villages would exchange wives. The males worked off-season in urban areas, where they had sexual relations with prostitutes; their return to the villages resulted in reintroducing infection which was then spread by their promiscuous wives (CS 101). A similar case was in Tanganyika (CS 158). Although this kind of occurrence undoubtedly takes place in many parts of the world, it is particularly common in sub-Saharan Africa, where sexual activities are comparatively free. The most conspicuous difference in social relations in Africa compared to other areas of the nonindustrialized world is the role of women. In most North African, Asian, and even Latin American countries, the woman's role is fairly restricted. Only in sub-Saharan Africa, and in some of the Western industrialized countries, is the woman almost as free to have extra-marital sexual experiences as the man.

But even where the traditional role of woman restricts her activities, she does find pleasurable experiences which, if not adapted to, can also stand in the way of innovation. This occurred in an Indian village project to introduce latrines. The woman's role was quite restricted, limiting her social intercourse, which inhibited her desire to use family latrines near the house. Women valued highly one activity of the day, the evening trip to the village pond area; bathing and elimination needs were satisfied there but, just as importantly, the women could linger and gossip with one another. By paying no attention to this pleasurable experience of women, the change agents fostered a resistance to the latrines which helped to cause failure of the project (CS 40).

Bathing practices constitute another type of recreational activity frequently valued by village people, because bathing time usually is also a time for socializing. The author found two projects in sub-Saharan Africa where improved bathing facilities were by-products of the primary goal, but still promoted acceptance. There is no evidence in either case that the change agents thought of the improved bathing facilities as providing a positive motivation for the village people. It simply happened that when new water resources were created, the villagers gravitated to them for bathing and sociability (CS 2, CS 28).

In an irrigation project in Peru, the Indian recipients showed great resistance and hardly used the new canals for cultivation, but they readily recognized the advantage of the new water supply for bathing, washing clothes, and for obtaining domestic water (CS 199). The author observed the same reaction in a large irrigation project in South Laos where the effort was ultimately abandoned because the villagers never used the canals for irrigation. The change agent was irritated because the villagers were using his new canals for bathing rather than irrigation. It should be stressed, however, that little effort had been expended to teach the villagers how to use the new facilities for agricultural purposes. They had merely used the new water supply for a purpose which had meaning to them.

It is interesting to note that in all these instances, the local people used the canals for bathing and domestic water on their own initiative, while ignoring the primary use expected by the technicians. It appears that the motivation for obtaining domestic water, while secondary insofar as irrigation technicians are concerned, could be deliberately utilized for inducing acceptance, which might help to guide the local people toward the primary use, irrigation. If no training is provided in irrigation use, there is little likelihood of transfer of interests to the primary use.

The use of irrigation canals for bathing is not necessarily a first choice of village people. Usually, the circumstances under which they do use such water resources in this way is when they perceive it to be the best choice available.

Thus, in a community development project in Puerto Rico the effort was based on trying to avoid using the irrigation canals, which the local people recognized as dirty and full of insecticides. However, this project differed from those mentioned above since it was based on an ascertained felt need. The local people had previously used a public bathhouse, but the water had been cut off and the bathhouse had fallen into disrepair. When the change agent visited the barrio and explained the community development possibilities, the local people indicated a desire to do something about the bathing problem. When the local mayor promised a new, clean water supply, the village people furnished the labor to rebuild the bathhouse and assumed responsibility for maintaining it (CS 138). This was the sole project involved with bathing practices based on adaptation to the local cultural patterns rather than the needs felt by the change agents; it is no accident that it was the sole project to achieve its goals fully.

Summary

Local practices of significance to the change process that were identified in these case histories were of three types: consumption, recreation, and bathing patterns. Although they do not seem to be of primary importance, it is likely that they are under-represented in these case histories. To adapt to local practices requires a fair knowledge of the local cultural patterns as well as their potential significance in the change process. It is significant that a large proportion of the case histories which describe local practices as having importance were written by either anthropologists or sociologists (CS 53, CS 113, CS 150, CS 151, CS 180, CS 81, CS 40, CS 199). The others, for the most part, were described by people of the same culture as the recipients, or change agents who had been in the area for a long time.

Consumption patterns occurred as a weak resistance factor, being important when the perceived gain for changing habits was small. Traditional recreational patterns were significant in that change agents could utilize them to promote the adoption process, in particular, the fiesta complex. Some pleasure-seeking practices appear to be particularly difficult to change since acceptable alternatives are not easy to produce. Bathing patterns were found to be particularly important in irrigation projects when the complexities of irrigation agriculture were not embodied in training programs. The local people used the irrigation facilities for domestic water use, adapting them to a use which had meaning to them. It is suggested that the motivation for improved bathing facilities can be built into irrigation projects deliberately, as a secondary positive force to gain acceptance of projects.

Chapter 7

FELT NEEDS

Motivational forces have long been recognized as a critical part of the process of inducing change in local communities. At the same time, it has been recognized that the question of why a person or social group does accept a new way of doing things is not easy to answer. All peoples have explanations for why they act in a given way, but a large proportion of these explanations are rationalizations. The plain fact is that many people are not aware of the chief bases for their actions. A habitual pattern of behavior may be practiced without the person knowing why he does it other than in a rationalizing sense.

For instance, the social scientist can ask a group of suburbanites why they tend their lawns so assiduously and attempt to eliminate dandelions and other "weeds." There will be various responses. On the highest rationalizing level, one suburbanite may say, "Unkept lawns don't look nice and dandelions are among the ugliest weeds that grow in them." Another may say, "The neighbors will complain if I don't do it," or "It makes the property look run down," or "I just like things to be neat."

Of course, what "looks nice" is culturally determined, and a well-cut and well-tended lawn is a conspicuous type of "nice" residential feature, being associated with relatively recent Western middle-class urbanism and suburbanism. Other peoples in the world show no particular interest in well-tended lawns. In fact, in many parts of the world people do not include space for a lawn in relation to their residences. They have patios or walled-in courtyards which either have no plants at all, or have small areas in which to grow vegetables, spices, fruit trees, ornamental shrubs, or flowers. Whatever they have, they do not normally include lawns in attempting to achieve a "nice" residence.

The lawn has been developed in the United States as an integral part of the residence, and social pressure is applied to compel people to cultivate them. The motivation for spending a great deal of time on lawns may well be as much a desire for social acceptance as any deeply felt belief that green lawns are "nice." Even the classification of certain plants as noxious weeds is culturally determined. Dandelions are not only very hardy, they are even "nice-looking" plants. They are quite symmetrical, the flower is decorative, they survive both hot and cold, wet and dry weather. But they must be attacked by a suburbanite since they have been classified as weeds. Most of those occupied with the task of destroying dandelions do not remember that the dandelion was cultivated as an edible green in colonial gardens, and is still used as an edible vegetable by some older and poorer Americans who have retained the knowledge that it can be eaten.

How does one ever know what motivation makes a man cut his lawn? In an absolutely empirical sense one cannot know. For motivation is only a state of mind, and the best that can be done is to describe the kind of behavior produced and then offer the most plausible explanation of its cause. Clearly this is very difficult but, despite the problems, it can and should be done, certainly in regard to induced change. It is not possible to conceive of trying to bring people of other cultures to accept innovations without some understanding of what motivations will cause them to act. But most important, insofar as this study is concerned, is that change agents and social scientists who have described the cases comprising this sample have been consistently concerned with the motivation

of the participants. The task has been to attempt to conceptualize the various types of motivational factors in terms of their common elements so that logical groups could be established, and thus be understood more easily.

The first set of motivational factors to be discussed is that of felt needs, or needs recognized by the potential adopters for a new idea or technique as a consequence of their own wants and values. These needs can be the same as those believed to be relevant by change agents, but not necessarily so. If felt needs do not exist for a given project, a major motivational problem is created--the necessity of generating positive motivation; this must be accomplished if participation or adoption is to take place.

The mention of presence or absence of felt needs occurred more frequently in these case histories than any other motivational force, or, for that matter, more than any influence variable except techniques of communication and types of participation obtained from local people. Also, in most cases, the presence or absence of felt needs correlated with success or failure of the projects. We conclude that it is the most significant motivational force for inducing change and one of the five primary influences in the change process.

Needs can be classified into four major types:

- Solicited - a need of which the project recipients are aware to the extent that they solicit assistance from the change agent or local authorities to fulfill it.
- Demonstrated - a need of which the project recipients have demonstrated their interest in having attempted to solve the problem by means of their own efforts without outside assistance.
- Ascertained - a need which, although already existing, is only latent within the local social group and is ascertained and clarified through mutual consultation between the change agent and the recipients.
- Generated - a need created through deliberate efforts of the change agent.

SOLICITED FELT NEEDS

Projects which were based on solicitations by local people had a very good chance for successful completion. In fact, in all but one of the 43 cases where this was reported, the goals were, in the main, achieved. This means that a high level of positive motivation existed. Of course, it is not known from most of these reports how many solicited felt needs there were which the change agents did not accept or act upon. It is safe to assume that there were some, since on occasion people in local communities certainly will desire innovations that are beyond their capacity to implement or maintain; in such cases change agents normally refuse to assist in the efforts. It can only be deduced from these data that in those instances when local people and change agents agreed to cooperate on projects based on solicited felt needs, there was high frequency of relative success.

One of the case histories in which solicited felt needs were reported (partially described earlier) was the self-help post office in Ghana for which the villagers petitioned the government's assistance (CS 27). Another instance was a project to establish communal vegetable gardens in a Puerto Rican barrio. A group of 12 men became interested in using a large piece of fallow land owned by the local school and asked the development agent for help. This was arranged, and about 3,050 pounds of vegetables were produced the first year (CS 137).

An excellent example of utilizing a solicited felt need by directing it into a practical channel was reported from Uganda. The local people approached a district officer who was passing through and requested that drilling rigs be sent to make wells in their villages. They had heard that such rigs were operating in the area. The district officer informed them that the rigs were not scheduled for that particular district for some time, but that if they wanted to construct dams on a self-help basis he would help them. From the onset he informed them that they would have to do all the work although he would provide

technical advice. Enthusiasm ebbed when it became evident that the work would have to be done by the community, but picked up again, and eventually the idea caught the imagination of the local people. For one dam, 3,000 people reportedly turned out for the first day's digging. Within several months three dams were finished and one more was due to be finished shortly, although one was faltering because of lack of participation (CS 168).

There are many ways by which local people find out about development possibilities and then solicit assistance from whomever they identify as the change agent. A rather unusual information channel is reported from a community development effort in an Indian village. The Rotary Club of a nearby city decided to "adopt" a village and help improve it. Their plan was reported in the local press and a village committee, hearing of the proposal, sent a delegate to request that their village be "adopted." The villagers had no concrete proposal at this time, but when the change agent conferred with them, he found that they wanted four improvements: building a road and a drainage system, and improving wells and schools. These projects were completed first, after which agricultural improvements were initiated and a cooperative was formed (CS 36). The technique of attempting to satisfy a felt need first and then directing the participants toward goals which are not so obviously advantageous, is undoubtedly sound strategy. There is, thus, a positive motivational base on which to build the first project, which should be maintained or increased by the success, and which can be exploited for later, more difficult endeavors.

The single clear instance found in these reports in which a project failed, even though it was based on a solicited felt need, was a swine-introduction project in a Filipino village. The barrio council heard of the swine program and initiated a written request. The pigs which were provided turned out to be inferior to the local varieties and the villagers were trying to get rid of them when the analysis was made. In a sense the villagers not only did not have their need satisfied but were penalized for participating, since they had to maintain the new pigs (CS 128).

Although solicited felt needs appear to provide a strong motivational base on which to build a self-help change project, there is perhaps one difficulty. Local people may solicit assistance not so much because they are interested in the new ideas or techniques, but because they desire the goods being offered by the change agents as part of the package. They may discontinue participation and projects when and if the rewards are withdrawn.

DEMONSTRATED FELT NEEDS

The felt need found least frequently was the demonstrated type, where local people had attempted previously to solve the problems without outside help. This would appear to provide the strongest indication of interest in a project, considerably stronger than solicited need, which in most instances also has a reward stimulus for the petitioners. When local people hear of a development agency operating in their area, as did the Uganda and Filipino villagers mentioned above, and believe they might obtain a grant of materials, they petition the authorities. There is always suspicion that if the goods were not tied in with the project, the local people would not be interested in trying the proposed innovations. However, when people have already demonstrated a willingness to try to solve their problems through their own efforts, it is good indication that the reward motivation of material grants is not necessarily primary, even though it may still exist. In such cases, it would appear that all that is necessary is the technical know-how which was lacking in the local people's efforts. While this is probably true in general, the sociocultural verities are still important enough so that projects can fail even with a combination of demonstrated felt need and a technically good innovation.

Demonstrated felt needs were identified in 11 projects in this group and ten were carried to successful conclusions. Some typical examples follow, all of which had failed in previous efforts because technical know-how was lacking. A more

efficient insecticide was introduced into a Costa Rican village where villagers were already trying to combat the pests but with poor results (CS 14). Self-help efforts to reclaim eroded land were instituted in a village complex in India where villagers had previously tried small reclamation projects on their own, only to have everything washed away during the rainy season (CS 48). A foot-bridge was constructed in a village in the Philippines where the men had been building footbridges every year, only to have their work washed away due to the weak construction (CS 122).

The only innovation for which a demonstrated felt need existed, but which still failed to be integrated into the local community, serves as a good example of the insufficiency of a technical solution alone. This was a well project in South Laos which the author observed, in which a need was demonstrated by the efforts of the local people to dig wells themselves in the same area where the rigs were operating. A temporary technical solution was provided to a limited number of villages through the provision of drilling rigs and outside technicians. However, the problem of integrating the wells into the local social units was ignored completely and when the pumps broke, the villagers either made no attempt, or were unable to repair them. One well after another was abandoned (CS 80). Probably what was needed for lasting improvement was the establishment of a pattern for maintenance and responsibility in the local communities.

Demonstrated felt needs are hypothesized as being the soundest basis on which to build a change project, since where people have attempted to solve their problems through their own efforts, there is the highest probability of genuine interest in their solution. In general, with demonstrated felt needs, little more is needed for successful innovation than the transference of technical know-how.

ASCERTAINED FELT NEEDS

This type of felt need has been defined as already existing when the change agent arrives and being ascertained through mutual consultation. This is not the same situation as the change agent conducting a survey and then deciding what is needed. Ascertained needs are frequently learned through surveys, when local people inform the change agents of what they want. However, if a project is started merely because an advisor or change agent has toured local villages, and decides on the basis of what he observes that a given type of project is needed, then by the above criteria he is not operating on the basis of a felt need. Those who are familiar with the history of development efforts are aware that this is probably the method by which projects are more frequently decided upon.

In a typical instance, a public health advisor visits villages, observes the swollen bellies of children, isolates the basic cause as dietary deficiency, and then embarks on a program to promote vegetable gardening to improve the diet. Or an animal husbandry expert observes the low quality of the local cattle and then embarks on a program of introducing improved varieties. So far as the sociocultural variables are concerned, this kind of procedure has many built-in difficulties, the primary one being that it ignores the problem of motivating the potential adopters. It is significant, insofar as the topic under discussion is concerned, that in such instances the change agent is operating on the basis not of a need felt by the local people but of a need he deems important.

In 32 cases in this group it can be inferred that ascertained felt needs existed, and of these, 29 achieved successful outcomes in the transference of a new idea or technique. A number of the cases have already been mentioned in regard to other influence factors. There was the project in Guam where the primary goal of the change agent was to assist in improving local health, although he concentrated almost exclusively on rat control as soon as he learned that the local people were quite concerned with this problem. The need he recognized was better health, although the need for the local people was to decrease the financial loss from rat damage (CS 30). Thus he utilized a local positive motivation which probably could not have been done if he had chosen another health problem

for which there was no local felt need. In the village exchange cooperative project in India, a system was set up for artisans to barter among themselves the goods that would not be easily salable on the open market. No goods for this exchange system were included unless there was an expressed demand for them by the local people in advance (CS 39). Another project with an ascertained felt need was one of the literacy campaigns in Nigeria where the members of the Ijaw tribe were keenly aware of their disadvantage in not being able to read and write. They accepted the literacy campaign enthusiastically (CS 96).

In the foregoing examples the recipients were aware, in a general way, that they had needs which were partially solved by the projects that were instituted, and thus their response was favorable. However, as with other forms of felt need, ascertained felt needs do not automatically produce successful projects. Although this is undoubtedly one of the best kinds of motivational base on which to build, the lack of efficient innovation techniques by the change agent or an unexpected characteristic of the local culture can still cause such a project to fail.

It is well to remember that a cultural system is a functioning whole and that one part can easily affect another; moreover, these interrelationships are not by any means necessarily apparent to the members of the culture. Thus, three projects in this group with ascertained felt needs failed, two in Laos failing because of inefficient innovation techniques. One was in community development (CS 77), and the other in agriculture, where the project was very clearly a product of inefficient communication. The change agent used a technical approach almost exclusively, and to transfer the know-how he relied on the simple "outstretched hands" theory of change—that if a technical improvement is produced, the potential recipients will readily accept it. This was the coffee-improvement project in South Laos where the old varieties of coffee were dying from a plant disease and the former producers were suffering economically. Even though the technician produced disease-resistant varieties, he had so little communication with the local farmers that only a few received the new plants, and those who did, received practically no instruction or followup. The project was abandoned (CS 79). In this borderline case, it is not clear whether the need was ascertained or generated. The change agent obviously hardly considered motivation, but since the local people who were approached did accept the plants initially and since they could have helped solve an existing problem, we have classified it as an ascertained need.

A project where the local social structure inhibited fulfillment of the goal occurred in Mexico. Both the upper and lower classes expressed a need for a community center, but the change agents tended to identify themselves with the upper group, alienating the "have-nots" who lost interest in the project. Since the primary goal was to teach reading, writing, arithmetic, and home economics to adults, the project had little meaning once the lower class people, who needed these skills most, had abandoned it (CS 87).

Ascertained felt needs provide a positive motivational base which in general appears to be fairly reliable, but that they are truly needs felt by the local population is not as clear as in the case of demonstrated felt needs. Although a change agent can obtain agreement that a local problem needs solution, he cannot be certain that this step does not derive at least partly from other motivations. As with solicited felt needs, the local participants may be interested primarily in the reward of material goods to be received.

GENERATED NEEDS

Although the presence of felt needs contributed very significantly to the success of these change projects, when such needs were absent the influence was less critical in causing the innovations to be rejected. Forty-four cases were found in which no felt need was apparent and, of these, 17 still proved successful. This means that a need for the innovation was generated in these projects. Of course, it must be admitted that there is a thin line between a

generated need and an ascertained felt need, and it may be that a number of those classified in the generated need category are fairly close to being ascertained felt needs.

For instance, it is difficult to know whether there was a latent need for some kind of organization for women in the case of a women's club project in Kenya. The local people had never heard of women's clubs of the type that were being introduced, but still cooperated fully when the innovation was promoted (CS 73). A latent need might also have existed in one of the projects to introduce new seed varieties in village India, even though the villagers had expressed no discontent with the old types (CS 51). In a very broad sense, they were evidently somewhat discontented with their economic condition, and when superior seeds produced better crops, a need was met. However, it is still true that the idea came strictly from the change agent and was based on his opinions rather than on theirs. Therefore, when an innovation is a product of the change agent's assessment of local needs rather than of the needs expressed by the recipients, it will be regarded as lacking any felt need.

Our data seem to indicate that generated needs can be used for introducing change, but when this is done, some general problems in the local societies must be met. Probably the main reason that change takes place far less often than when felt needs exist is that the starting motivational basis is not strong: generating a need for an innovation requires more understanding of the local society.

In the 27 instances where failure was correlated with the lack of any felt need, all but three of the projects were in either public health or agriculture, and practically all of them were started strictly as ideas of the change agents. In many of the projects the potential recipients indicated at an early date that they considered the innovations useless. It is not hard to understand why the efforts failed in such cases. More difficult is the question of why the change agents pushed ahead with such a poor motivational base. It appears that this was due mainly to the inability of the technical specialist to visualize the human problems of change. Also, most change agents are influenced more strongly by the policies of their sponsoring agencies than by the reactions of the local people. Their rewards in promotion and/or salary come from their own agencies and not from the people they are trying to influence to accept innovations. Thus they tend to follow overall policy decisions regardless of local reactions.

Some instances of such cases are the following. In a previously cited project to intensify home vegetable gardening in Costa Rica, a survey indicated that 75% of the people were satisfied with their existing diet. Even so, the change agent pushed on by cultivating a demonstration garden. To add to his handicaps he chose a sterile site and the demonstration proved negative. The initial disinterest of the villagers was reinforced (CS 15). In this instance, it is possible that if the demonstration had proved successful, a need might have been generated, but the combination was fatal. A successfully demonstrated project of this kind occurred in India. There, also, the villagers expressed no discontent with the old varieties, but when successful demonstrations were made in half fields with the adjacent halves planted with the old varieties, the local farmers were convinced of the need for change and began using the new varieties (CS 51).

Three latrine projects were started without any felt need existing in the local populations and all ended in failure (CS 40, CS 41, CS 134). Village projects in India, to improve midwifery techniques, to inaugurate cleanup campaigns in village lanes, and to build soakage and compost pits met with the same results (CS 192, CS 194, CS 195). The same was true with the water-boiling project in Peru (CS 110), the venereal disease campaign in Tanganyika (CS 158), and the diphtheria campaign in Thailand (CS 163). Public health efforts of this type are practically never based on felt needs, since Western disease concepts normally are lacking in the developing countries.

The projects where needs were generated and innovations adopted were mostly of two types. Innovations either were sold on the basis of demonstrations which indicated their usefulness to the local people, or subsidiary motivations were utilized to gain acceptance. For instance, in the women's club project in Kenya, the motivation of social status was utilized by presenting the clubs as marks of prestige to the tribal villagers (CS 71). The same factors were used in the organization of youth clubs in another tribal region of Kenya. But besides the status motivation, a motivation for perpetuating desirable aspects of traditional culture was also utilized, which pleased the elders. Instruction in the clubs included teaching the youths the local tribal history (CS 73).

Successful projects for producing safe water sources also depended frequently on subsidiary motivation. In most of these efforts the local people had no interest in more sanitary water, but frequently there was a desire for more dependable, less labor-consuming means of obtaining water. The well project by the American Friends in India is a typical instance. The idea was conceived by the change agents, but the villagers soon recognized the advantage of having more convenient wells, and most of the cost would be borne by the government. Fortunately also, the project was initiated in the dry season when the need was quite obvious (CS 42). Another project of this type in Lebanon was introduced without any desire expressed by the local villagers. They saw no reason to change from the traditional water system and were also afraid that the iron pipe of the well would spoil the taste of the water. However, a demonstration of the practicability of a pump, as well as efficient utilization of local leadership and beliefs, assisted in countering the disinterest. In particular, the change agent quoted the Koran to prove that cleanliness was required of the faithful, and the new well would facilitate this (CS 82).

The final two projects to be cited where no felt need existed but which succeeded nevertheless were agricultural cooperatives. Both depended primarily on successful demonstrations to persuade the recipients to accept them. Moreover, both had real economic practical benefits and there was efficient communication by the change agent and full participation by the recipients. In the previously described tomato cooperative in Jamaica, the idea was formulated by the local schoolmaster when he learned that there were good market possibilities for this crop in Canada. Despite initial skepticism by the farmers, with a member of the local agricultural society he developed the project and got the farmers deeply involved. The farmers took over the operation of their own cooperative organization before the end of the project (CS 61). The other cooperative, also previously described, was to introduce tractors in East Pakistan. Not only did the recipients lack any felt need for tractors, but most of them had never seen one. The change agent, however, demonstrated their usefulness repeatedly and was able to develop an organization for renting them. The increased yield produced by the tractor plowing was enough to sell the idea ultimately (CS 104).

Although projects implemented on the basis of existing felt needs appear to have close correlation with success, those without such needs are not as closely correlated with failure of innovation. Evidently needs can be generated for new ideas or techniques, mainly by relying on demonstrations or by utilizing subsidiary motivations.

Summary

It is hypothesized that an existing felt need by the potential adopters of an innovation is one of the strongest motivational forces upon which a change project can be built. Such a need has an advantage over a generated need in that its benefits are recognized without the necessity of an elaborate selling campaign. Three types have been identified: solicited, demonstrated, and ascertained. Though *solicited* has occurred most frequently, it is probable that *demonstrated* is the most valid type on which to base a project. A demonstrated felt need indicates that the potential recipients have great interest in the

problem, since they are trying to solve it themselves. Solicited felt needs have a disadvantage in that the potential recipients may be primarily interested in the rewards of material goods that are frequently provided.

In general, when felt needs existed, the projects were successful; the exceptions were when the change agents failed in some crucial innovation strategy such as establishing maintenance patterns or communicating the details of the new idea in sufficient detail. Despite the fact that projects based on felt needs were more likely to succeed, those based on generated needs succeeded if a real practical benefit was demonstrated. In some types of projects, particularly in public health, subsidiary motivations had to be utilized in order to obtain acceptance, since their demonstrability was very low.

Chapter 8

PERCEIVED PRACTICAL BENEFITS

A motivational force which is readily accepted as valid by Westerners is perceived advantage. Westerners, particularly Americans, normally are considered pragmatists who are ready to act when a clear-cut practical benefit will result. In contrast, many Westerners in development work appear to believe that one of their principal liabilities in introducing change is that they are dealing with people who are not pragmatic and are not interested in practical benefits.

On the basis of this group of case histories, the author believes that this discrepancy is due, not so much to a difference of interest in practicality, as to a difference of perception of what is practical. What the change agent sees as practical is often not seen that way by the potential recipients of his innovation. As a case in point, a common project problem is introducing a safe water supply to peasant communities. From the point of view of the Western medical specialist, the primary practical advantage of a concrete well is to enable the local people to avoid the intestinal parasites and other ailments that result from drinking contaminated water. Within the Westerner's frame of reference, this is a valid belief. However, it should be remembered that he has a considerable body of knowledge about disease transmission which the village people lack. It is difficult, if not impossible, for village people to view the new water supply as providing any practical health benefit. Fortunately, with such projects there is practically always the secondary benefit (from the Westerner's point of view) that a new sanitary water source is also a more dependable, labor-saving means of obtaining water. For the recipients, this motivation will tend to be primary. Their cultural frame of reference permits them to appreciate the labor-saving elements while it does not permit them to appreciate the disease-reducing qualities. They are happy to use the new well even while continuing to regard the problems of health as having no connection with water supply. What this indicates is that, if the cultural reference is taken into consideration, the recipients are just as practical as the change agents.

This is brought out most clearly in projects which produce economic advantages for the recipients. In these cases, the practical benefit motivation is much clearer to the recipients, and the two frames of reference are not so divergent. When a new crop or method of fertilizing is introduced which does indeed provide a greater cash or subsistence benefit to the adopters, it is normally accepted. There are qualifications as to acceptance, such as an unwillingness to drastically alter existing behavioral patterns or an insufficient understanding of the techniques and consequent improper use of them, but these do not result from lack of recognition of practical benefit. If the innovation in such an instance is introduced by being fully demonstrated and explained, so that the practical benefits are clearly indicated, it would usually be accepted.

The practicality of the man in the village, or of the slum dweller, is also indicated by his almost universal desire for literacy, a skill which permits him to defend himself against the literate moneychanger, or to get a better job, or to understand more fully the actions of the government official.

The author's belief that the innovation recipient in the agrarian countries is more often motivated by practical benefit than by any other consideration might seem to be splitting hairs, but he believes it is crucial. If the common man in the agrarian nations is motivated by "other-worldly" interests rather than affairs of a mundane nature, then one kind of approach to bring about

change would be required. It might be necessary to attempt to break down his traditional beliefs before any meaningful change could be undertaken. On the other hand, if it is recognized that he is already really quite practical in his outlook but that his frame of reference is different, another approach would be suitable. One could largely forget about his belief system and philosophy, and concentrate on providing innovations which do have a practical benefit from his point of view, or on molding those deemed useful so they would fit into his frame of reference.

The motivation of practical benefit was described in 110 of the case histories, or 54%. The most significant comparison is that made with other forms of motivation. The existence of felt needs is not really comparable with the other motivational influences, since it indicates simply that a need does or does not exist, rather than indicating the basis for the need. Therefore, the most valid comparison is with the influences grouped under "other motivation" (Chapter 9); there are two principal motivational bases: competitive tendencies among the recipients, and their hopes for a reward or subsidy by participating in a change project. The total number of occurrences of influences constituting "other motivation" has been 85, or 41.2%, which is about two-thirds the proportion of practical benefit.

In the largest sense, of course, most of the motivations in the "other benefit" category also bestow a practical benefit on the participants. Thus when a villager participates in a women's or youth club project because other villagers or villages are doing so, the participant presumably gains a social benefit which will be useful in his relations with his fellows. The same would be true of the villager who agrees to participate in an animal husbandry project because, by so doing, he will receive a large new pig. In his mind, the pig would provide a benefit, even if it were nothing more than food for the next fiesta. In other words, he may be far less interested in improving the quality of his animals than in getting this immediate reward.

The main difference between practical benefit motivation and the other categories appears to be the degree of similarity of the change agent's goals with those of the recipients. Thus a practical benefit derived from learning to read and write, such as in a literacy campaign, is in general the same for the recipient as for the change agent, while the status benefit derived by the recipient from having a privy is not the same for the change agent, who views the privy as a means of improved sanitation. But even if motivations derived from these other benefits are not considered as practical, it is significant that it is the direct practical benefit motivation which occurs most frequently.

The four types of perceived practical benefit motivation which we have found significant are:

Economic	Educational
Medical	Convenience

ECONOMIC BENEFIT

The practicality of the recipients in these cases is strongly emphasized by the fact that the innovations to which they reacted most often were those with financial advantages. This should be reassuring to economic development planners, because normally they have the same goal. It must be emphasized, however, that what is meant is economic advantages perceived by the local people. Economic advantages perceived by the planners or change agents but not by the local people do not draw such a positive response. This kind of discrepancy was exemplified in the irrigation project of South Laos, where the technician was clearly aware of the economic advantages that would result from using the new canals; the local people, however, without experience in irrigation, did not perceive the advantages and consequently failed to use the canals enough to learn the benefits that could result (CS 51).

It is not surprising that immediate advantages were more forceful in bringing action than those based on long-term gains. There were 36 instances in

which immediate advantages only occurred as motivational forces, in comparison with eight where the motivation was for extended gain only. In 14, both long-term and immediate gain motivations were present. In only two of the 50 where the immediate benefit was apparent to the recipients was the innovation rejected.

The largest single kind of immediate economic advantage was in agricultural improvement. The recipients in such cases were presented with changes in practice which provided cash benefits within a short period of time. Such instances are illustrated in the following cases. A project in a Nigerian village area, to introduce a new breed of crossbred chickens along with new feeding and housing methods, was accepted enthusiastically when it became apparent that the new varieties weighed 40% more than old breeds, and when full grown, sold for almost twice as much at the local market (CS 90). The primary incentive to the farmers in a project in Rwanda to cultivate coffee as a cash crop, by rehabilitating abandoned groves, was the financial gain obtained in the first year. Their only cash crop, at the time the innovation was introduced, was bananas, for which there was a very limited market. Coffee brought in more money than they had previously earned from the sale of any cultivated products (CS 143).

Among the kinds of practical benefit that appeared consistently were those involved with cooperatives. Village people responded quickly when there was a real, fairly immediate cash return for investment. The village exchange system in India was of this type. Artisans could barter among themselves the goods which, because of its rough quality, would not be salable on the open market. The principal purpose was to provide a means whereby impoverished producers, who had little cash for market purchases, would become each other's consumers. The net result was that increased consumption was made possible for participants, without cash outlays (CS 39). A project which succeeded to a large extent because of the increased savings provided to the members was the previously cited credit union organized among the poor in Puno, Peru. In this instance, the interest charged on loans was considerably less than that charged by local usurers, and the interest paid on investment funds was significantly more than that paid by the local banks (CS 109).

Other kinds of economic benefit also spurred participants to take part in projects. A literacy campaign among Dyaks in Sarawak drew plenty of willing participants who wanted to learn to read, count, and do simple arithmetic, principally so that they would not be cheated in money transactions. A rubber boom was taking place and the many new commercial ventures served to add to the desire for literacy (CS 144). An urban low-cost housing development in Puerto Rico provided a number of financial advantages to the recipients. The people who participated did not need a large down payment, and because the organizer bought construction material on a large scale, the costs were brought down appreciably (CS 142). The organization of women's clubs in Kenya, mentioned earlier, obtained part of its impetus from the fact that the women saved considerable amounts of money by making their own garments (CS 70).

Of 64 projects where an economic benefit was described, six failed to be accepted by the recipients. The critical factor in the failure appears mostly to have been lack of understanding of local cultural patterns by the change agents, or their inability to counteract the conflicts of interest precipitated by the projects. A cooperative designed to reduce costs for rice farmers in Vietnam very quickly encountered the vested interests of Chinese merchants. At the time of the analysis it was still struggling along, but only because the change agency was continuing to put substantial funds into the co-op. Its members readily recognized the advantages of borrowing money at low rates. However, the local Chinese grain dealers offered serious competition to the operation and after four years they still controlled 98% of the rice exchange. The rice farmers could not afford to pay the relatively high storage costs of the co-op in order to wait until prices would be higher. Therefore, they continued to deal with the Chinese (CS 201).

Another project failed despite a visible economic benefit to the participants; it was viewed as no more than a simple technical improvement by the change

agents. The sociocultural realities which governed the lives of the local people were virtually ignored. This was in the effort to build dikes in a desert area of Jordan to catch runoff water and create new pasture land. The technical aspects were taken care of sufficiently in that dikes were built and the area became green with grass. In the first fall trek of the Bedouins after the construction of the dikes, approximately 5,000 camels were allowed to graze in the area. Unfortunately, there were land claims among the tribesmen which were unknown to the change agents, and the desert code that the tribesmen be consulted before their area could be planted was completely ignored. The Bedouins cut the fences and broke the dikes. Despite this difference of attitude, there is evidence that they recognized the practical benefit of the improvement (CS 62). Obviously, this technical improvement could have been integrated with the local customs if the change agents had been aware of such a necessity. Permission could have been obtained according to tribal boundaries, and fences probably could have been eliminated from the project's requirements. However, this would have required treating the local cultural patterns as an equally valid aspect of the project, which the technical specialists were either not prepared, or not interested in doing.

In six instances no perceived economic benefits were involved. Obviously, the change agents planned the projects to have such benefits but the planning reflected the frequent discrepancy in viewpoint between outside change agents and local recipients. All six were in agriculture or animal husbandry and all failed. It is easy to understand why people will not participate in a project when they believe they are not really gaining anything through their efforts, but it is also useful to note how far apart the ideas of change agents and innovation recipients can be. In all these instances the change agent at least initially visualized the project as providing an advantage to the rural farmers. One case was mentioned before to indicate bureaucratic inflexibility. The community development agent in the Philippines would not permit the villagers to dispose of the inferior swine he had provided, after having promised them a superior variety (CS 126). Another animal husbandry project which was abandoned had a different complex of factors. In his Indian village effort (previously cited), the participants could not perceive any advantage in view of all the extra care and expense required to raise the new breed of chickens. In particular, special expensive feeds were required (CS 43). A Westerner knows that a scientific method of animal breeding produces much more profit, but such techniques require considerable knowledge as well as abandoning traditional animal husbandry techniques. The village peasant usually lacks the knowledge of scientific breeding and he is reluctant to abandon traditional methods until he is absolutely assured that the innovation really will produce considerable gain.

A final project of this nature to be cited was the effort to introduce irrigation farming among Peruvian villagers. The change agents did not study the local economic system, and the disruption of traditional procedures appeared to outweigh the advantages of the innovation to the recipients. In particular, they did not want to give up part of their pasture land for canals. In addition, the canals drained the remaining pasture lands, which would thus require more effort for maintenance. Moreover, the villagers were not interested in abandoning their herding practices (CS 199).

MEDICAL BENEFIT

The second most frequent type of perceived practical benefit in this group was in projects that promised to increase the physical well-being of the recipients. Such projects were far less frequent than those with direct economic goals, largely because the main effort in development is economic, so economically oriented programs and projects are the most common.

Perhaps the single most significant deduction that can be made in regard to health projects is that here, again, their practicality has been indicated

by the recipients. If innovations really provided perceptible health improvements, the local people were positively motivated to accept them. There were 12 projects in this group with directly perceived health benefits, and all but one were accepted by the recipients.

At the charity maternity hospital in Ecuador, previously cited, the women were so anxious about the dangers of childbirth that they even accepted the violation of folk beliefs, as soon as they became aware that the treatments really did provide health benefits (CS 19). In another project, in Egypt, the main effort was to promote health education, especially to teach mothers new health habits through home visits. Several hundred houses were disinfected and plastered or whitewashed, and a number of latrine holes were dug. Unfortunately, the authors of the report did not specify whether the latrines were used by the local people. The villagers did provide the physical labor necessary to do the whitewashing, plastering, and insecticide spraying, which they evidently viewed as providing some practical benefit. However, the most significant statistic was in the use of the local health clinics, where, as a result of the campaign, visits jumped from 1,306 to 6,191 within a few months (CS 21).

The only instance where a perceived practical benefit in a health project failed to be accepted was in the venereal disease campaign in Northern Rhodesia, previously cited. However, the practical benefit perceived by the recipients was not very strong, not nearly as strong as that perceived by the change agents. While the outside change agents viewed the situation as a matter of saving the Ba-Ila Tribe, since venereal disease had reduced the birth rate to a dangerously low level, the natives regarded the ailment as no more than a minor inconvenience. Ninety-five percent of the population appreciated the medical advantages enough to come in voluntarily for treatment, but when they found it so effective on a visible level, they threw caution to the winds with the attitude of "if I get infected, so what?" As soon as the campaign was over, the VD rate began to rise again toward its old level (CS 101). The natives had recognized a practical benefit, but within their frame of reference it was only the observable cure of the obvious symptoms.

There were five instances of medical projects in which there were no perceived benefits, all of which illustrate general phenomena of significance in local-level innovation. In one project, no practical benefit was recognized by the recipients, primarily because of the way it was presented to them. It had a complex of factors obverse to the medical education case in the Egyptian village described earlier. The difference was almost exclusively in the nature of the communication techniques and the ignoring of traditional customs. In the Bulgarian village where the effort took place, the nurse simply called people through the mayor for health lectures, which constituted the main activity of the project. Only two or three women showed up, and they came only because of obligations to the mayor. Even they did not put the new health principles into practice, since, as one put it, "We couldn't buy all that stuff she wanted us to buy even if we wanted to do everything she said." Another comment by a local woman was, "She can't tell me anything I don't know; I've already had more babies than she'll ever have." Evidently there was no perceived benefit to be derived from the lectures, although possibly there might have been, had the nurse adapted her project to local conditions more effectively. A particular point to note is that the traditional meeting place for women was in their homes, but the nurse decided that the lectures should take place in formal circumstances in the schoolhouse (CS 6). It is significant that this effort was identical to that in the Egyptian village just mentioned, except that in the latter, the change agents regarded local cultural patterns as significant, to which they adapted their project. Most importantly, they carried on their health training by means of home visits, with the result that the women felt at ease (CS 21).

Another medical project which failed and in which there was no perceived practical benefit is a classic type which has been discussed in other contexts; this is latrine building in non-Western villages. It is a kind of effort which

Americans in particular seem to have a compulsion to engage in, probably because of their great interest in sanitation. It has already been noted that usage of latrines is very rarely accepted by rural villagers, primarily because they lack the basic knowledge of disease transmission which the Westerner has absorbed. In the cited Indian village there was not only the usual lack of awareness that using latrines might help in controlling sickness, but also there were positive inconveniences. The women would have to carry extra water for flushing, would miss the gossip sessions made possible under the old system of their communal evening expeditions, and the men would have had to return from their fields to use the privies (CS 40).

Although the acceptance of latrine projects poses particular difficulties among village folk, it is not impossible. However, almost invariably when latrines are accepted, it is for reasons other than perceived health benefits, as in the oft cited case from village India. In that instance some 120 privies were built and, after two years, over 90 were reported in use. There still was no understanding of the health benefits, but women were using them because of the privacy afforded. A new road had been built and the change agent noticed that the lights of passing trucks were illuminating the women, squatting nightly in their traditional place. He publicized the need for protecting the women's privacy and offered privies as a solution, appealing to the men's traditional role as protectors of the females (CS 179).

EDUCATIONAL BENEFITS

A very strong practical benefit motivation exists in non-Western countries for education. Both for adults and for children, formal educational training is perceived on all levels as a very worthwhile goal. Although the benefits obtained may vary, it is universally agreed that an education provides a real practical benefit.

Perhaps one of the reasons why there is so little resistance to educational innovations is that they are not an obvious threat to traditional ways, even though in the long run mass education may transform village societies more than any other kind of change. For the usual recipient, there is no obvious conflict with old ways when a literacy campaign is initiated or new school facilities for the young are constructed. Educational innovations are more like simple additions to traditional culture patterns, rather than replacements. A villager does not have to give up any part of his traditional culture to begin a literacy class, or to help get his children into school. There is no appearance of tampering with old ways.

Often this is not the case with economic changes, which are more often perceived as replacements. The man who takes a new breed of animal is under pressure to change his old husbandry practices; and the man who puts money into a cooperative is taking a chance with his hard-earned cash, perhaps establishing a type of relationship in which he has had no previous experience—working on a cooperative basis with nonrelatives. The same generalization would be true of medical innovations. The woman who puts herself in the hands of a medical doctor in a maternity clinic is not only replacing the traditional practices of midwifery, she is putting her health and even her life at stake in an unfamiliar environment.

In this group of case histories 14 instances of perceived educational benefit motivation were described. There were, of course, far more projects in which educational efforts were incorporated, but only those in which the motivational factor was described as significant have been counted. The author believes that the same kind of reaction occurred generally in other cases, but this can only be an assumption, because there was no mention of the motivational component.

Three of the 14 projects failed to be accepted according to the terms on which they were presented, but not because recognition of an educational benefit was lacking. In one community development project in Laos, because sufficient supervision was lacking, much of the effort and assistance was channeled by the

recipients into the construction of Buddhist structures. The project was terminated by the change agents. The educational motivation was clearly present, since more schools than pagodas were built, despite the desire for the Buddhist religious buildings (CS 77). Moreover, in the second phase of this effort, where religious structures were effectively ruled out, schools were selected and built by village on an even larger scale (CS 78). Another project was the previously cited community development effort in rural Mexico which came to naught primarily because of a split between the well-do-do class and the poor in the management of the project. The educational benefits of literacy, arithmetic, and home economics were recognized by the poor, but this motivation was not strong enough to counter their irritation over not being allowed to help plan and implement the policies of the new community center (CS 87).

A quite similar complex occurred in an Indian village scheme, where the community was also split by factionalism to such an extent that almost all community action came to a standstill. The educational advantages of the proposed reading room, literacy classes, and radio-listening group were recognized by the villagers, but these benefits were not tempting enough to make them overlook their feuds. However, the one part of the project that did survive was the literacy class for *harijans* (untouchables). This kind of participation did not require village unity (CS 183).

Village people have consistently shown interest in having their children educated; besides working on actual school buildings, they have been motivated to improve transportation facilities to get their children to school. Previously mentioned, a feeder road was built on a self-help basis in a Philippine barrio and a bridge was built in a Puerto Rican village to get the children to school during the rainy season (CS 115, CS 136).

Adult literacy campaigns usually have contained obvious practical benefit motivations for participants. It has been mentioned before that the literacy campaign in Sarawak was stimulated primarily by the need to be able to read, write, and count, in order to avoid being cheated in business transactions (CS 144). A literacy campaign in Indonesia was built on the desire of literates to check their own tax payment records and to read political tracts. Women were interested because they wished to avoid being deceived by their husbands in financial affairs (CS 54). A campaign in Nigeria was fairly popular in teaching literacy in the local language, but the strongest desire was to learn English, because it was the language used for urban shopping and was also the mark of being educated (CS 96). In a campaign in Kenya during World War II, the women were especially interested in learning to read and write so they could read the letters of their husbands, many of whom were in military service (CS 69). In general, these examples of the desire for adult literacy stem from wishes of village people to enter more fully into the world outside their villages for economic and other reasons.

CONVENIENCE

A general motivation which seems to impel village people to take action is simple convenience. Although undoubtedly it is very rare that a change agent will propose a new idea simply because it will make life easier for the recipients, apparently this motivation often makes them participate. Thirteen projects were found in which there appeared to be little motivation other than convenience. In eight projects there was both convenience and perceived financial advantage for the recipients and in these cases it was not possible to decide which was the predominant motivation.

The most common kind of convenience that brought about positive participation of local people involved improved water resources, either wells or canals which had been built primarily for irrigation. These were viewed by the local people as a more convenient place where they could get household water, or bathe, or wash clothes. Such purposes were served by a well program in Thailand. While the sponsors were interested in lowering the incidence of filth-borne diseases

by installing good wells, the villagers wanted them only because they would not have to walk several hundred yards or several miles in the dry season to get water from ditches or ponds (CS 162). The same motivation was present with well projects in Ecuador, India, and Laos (CS 18, CS 42, CS 81, CS 196).

This difference in motivation has probably been most unexpected when it has occurred in relation to irrigation canals, which in all cases were constructed with a single purpose in mind by the change agents--providing a better water supply for cultivation. Probably the reason Western technical specialists fail to recognize the subsidiary benefits to village folk is that the specialists come from societies where irrigation water is kept separate from that used for direct consumption. Since most rural villagers in agrarian countries are influenced relatively little by considerations of sanitation, and since they almost always lack a good water supply at least part of the year, they quickly see the advantages of such canals for uses which are meaningful to them--washing or obtaining domestic water supplies.

In many places where irrigation has never been practiced before, the use of the water for this purpose is considered as secondary by the local people. In a project (previously cited) to carry out a small irrigation scheme in Nigeria, the villagers were interested enough and sufficiently persuaded by their pastor to provide the labor necessary to build the dam, even though they did not fully understand what it was for until the irrigation canals were functioning. However, there was an initial positive reaction as soon as the dam raised the water level, because it greatly improved the washing and bathing facilities for the village (CS 2). A similar complex (also cited before) occurred in a Gold Coast irrigation project where the purpose of the change agents was to promote irrigated rice cultivation. Although the villagers followed through in adopting this innovation, a major consideration for them was the more convenient source of water from the newly created lake, for obtaining domestic water and for washing. In time, the dam area served as a center of sociability for the entire village (CS 28).

One project was completely abandoned by the change agent because of the villagers' exclusive interest in the irrigation canals as sources of domestic water supply. This was the project in South Laos where the irrigation complex was built with almost no involvement of the ultimate recipients in planning or construction. There was no tradition of using irrigation for the cultivation of rice in this region. When the technician became convinced that the local people would use his facility for no purpose other than bathing or getting domestic water, and, moreover, would make no effort to maintain the canals as he had planned, he abandoned the whole effort (CS 81). The village people of this area did appreciate improved water resources, and in fact made strenuous efforts to get them on their own; however, without any education in irrigation practices, their motivation, almost exclusively, was to get an adequate domestic water supply. In the same area, the author visited several villages where the local people had tried to build dams to hold stream water through the dry season, or catchment reservoirs to hold run-off water. At one site, the men, women, and children were laboriously grubbing in the hardest clay with the crudest of village implements and carrying it in basket loads, in their effort to build a catchment wall.

An obvious strategy for change in a situation like this is to get the local people involved in a project which would provide benefits perceptible to them as well as to the change agent. Since village people in such circumstances are likely to value water resources principally as sources of easily obtainable water, such facilities could be included in irrigation projects. To insist that new resources be used only for irrigation when the recipients have a pressing need for drinking and bathing facilities only increases the possibility of lack of interest.

It should be stressed that projects with a motivation combining convenience and economic benefit were common. For instance, there was the electrical

cooperative established in a rural village in Costa Rica. The participants managed to get a simple plant installed to generate electricity to provide lighting (CS 16).

The author has observed such a system in operation in a rural community in Costa Rica and noted that the basic advantage of the lights was simply to provide illumination for reading, performing household chores, or visiting after dark. The electricity was distributed by bulb and the user was charged a flat rate just for having the connection, no matter how much he used it. The power plant was turned on at dusk and left on until about 10 P.M.; the normal practice for each household was to leave its bulb on for the entire time. In this village, the power plant was not strong enough to sustain other electrical equipment. The direct economic benefit thus was not great, but if a stronger generator were to be installed, there would be more.

In many community development programs concerned with improving living conditions in villages or slum quarters, there are long-term economic benefits for many activities and yet convenience is also present. For instance, in the urban renewal project in Cali, Colombia, where road improvements were made, rain water channels cleared, a bridge built, and a rubbish collection campaign organized, the improvements also carried considerable convenience benefits (CS 12). Road systems are another type of project in which village people participate because of the greater convenience, as well as economic and other advantages provided (CS 52).

Inconvenience as a motivation for not cooperating has been mentioned in regard to many projects. Usually when it occurs and no other positive motivation is present, local people do not cooperate. This is illustrated in most of the health programs previously cited for which no practical health benefit was perceived by the local people.

Convenience, the means of performing a traditional task with less effort, is a motivation rarely if ever used by change agents; however, it appears to be important to adopters, particularly in those projects where the economic or health benefits perceived by the change agents are not so perceived by the local people. Inconvenience is a negative motivational force, which if not offset by stronger positive motivations, tends to be sufficient to cause rejection of a new idea or technique.

Summary

The principal motivational force which inspires people to participate in change projects is perceived practical benefit. The difference in view between change agents and recipients, which occurs so frequently in regard to such motivation, is that their frames of reference are different. What appears to the change agents to have a practical benefit frequently does not appear this way to potential recipients, and frequently, because of the cultural framework in which they live, the proposed innovations actually do not provide benefits.

Landless laborers can see little advantage in an innovation which helps them to improve the land, when the landlord will obtain most or all of the benefit. The same is true of public health projects where local people do not have Western concepts of disease transmission and consequently perceive no benefit in working on latrine or other sanitation projects. The type of project where the change agent and recipient are most often in agreement is that which provides practical economic advantages to the recipients. This is most commonly the motivation for action, reflecting the real necessities of the poor in the agrarian countries, also the clear recognition they have of their problems. Other practical motivations which bring positive reactions from recipients are where medical and educational benefits are involved; both benefits are clearly recognized as needed.

Finally, there is a factor which change agents who are concerned with the problems of national development rarely consider, but which frequently inspires action on the part of the local populations; this is the simple

perceived benefit of greater convenience. Thus, while the change agent normally proposes well projects for improved sanitation, and irrigation canals for improved agriculture, the recipients often participate simply because they appreciate a more dependable source of domestic water or a better place to bathe or wash their clothes. But this again reflects their practicality. People who never have a constant, dependable water source for household use cannot easily become involved in large irrigation projects, using water freely on a grand scale for agricultural purposes, while they must trudge thousands of yards or several miles just to get enough for drinking or cooking purposes.

Chapter 9

OTHER MOTIVATION

The remaining types of motivation, described infrequently in comparison with perceived practical benefits, are treated here in one chapter for convenience. Actually there are three basic types which have no relationship to one another except that they do not fit into the definition of practical benefit used in this study. These are competition among recipients, both individual and group, reward or punishment for participating in a project, and the novelty attraction or repulsion of a new idea.

It has already been indicated that in the broadest sense, all forms of positive motivation can be construed as providing a practical benefit to recipients, but the kinds in this chapter are not primary as far as the change agent is concerned. Thus, he rarely introduces an innovation because it will provide a social benefit to the participants. Literacy, from his point of view, is an attribute that makes it easier to communicate with a population. That knowing how to read or write might also provide the literacy student with greater prestige among his fellows is usually an irrelevant or secondary consideration to the literacy specialist.

The same generalization would be true in regard to rewards or subsidies. The change agent does not provide a feast after the accomplishment of a self-help project, or give cigarettes to individuals to get them to take pills because he wants them to have more food or cigarettes. He does so only because he believes it will help to achieve the goals with which he is really concerned—getting a reservoir built or introducing a new form of medicine. However, the social benefit or the small gifts that the recipient receives for participation are undoubtedly considered practical benefits by him.

COMPETITION

Competition is a force which undoubtedly exists in all human groups, as indeed it does with all forms of life. Individuals and groups of individuals are always competing with one another for survival or for achieving the desired things in life. And since innovations always cause realignments in the previous way of life of a people, it is understandable that the force of competition should be brought to bear on their acceptance. The basic fact which makes competition so relevant to innovation is that when a new idea or technique which provides some advantage to the adopter is introduced, the non-adopters immediately are put at a disadvantage. The same would be true of group competition. If one village group becomes literate while the surrounding groups remain illiterate, and literacy is a means of gaining advantages in the market place, the literate village group is in a more advantageous bargaining position. Theoretically, they could eventually drive the illiterates out of the market. As a consequence, neither individuals nor groups can look on with equanimity as their neighbors improve themselves through the adoption of new ideas or techniques which give them advantages.

In the reports studied by the author there were 25 instances of individual competition and 39 based on group membership. In several cases both kinds were mentioned.

Individual competition in the change process is defined here as the tendency for individuals to accept innovations for the improvement of their position in

relation to their fellows, or to reject such innovations because of fear that their position would be worsened by acceptance. The advantage or disadvantage thus would normally be social.

Individual competition, as a motivation for acceptance, was highly significant in most literacy campaigns. In one such campaign in northern Nigeria, the change agent believed that the greatest single factor in promoting the desire for literacy was the social prestige enjoyed by a literate in a Muslim community. He traced his belief back to the tradition of giving the honorary title of *mallam*, or scholar, to a literate person, especially to one with the ability to write with a graceful hand (CS 98). Also described was the previously cited literacy campaign among the Ijaw of southern Nigeria where the illiterates were in a minority, and keenly felt their disadvantage in being unable to read and write. That individual competition was highly significant is indicated by the desire of all students to be in a higher class; one of the consequent difficulties was that they kept promoting themselves (CS 96).

Individual competition or status emulation has also been particularly significant in health projects. This is not too surprising, since the advantages of most public health ideas cannot be demonstrated easily. If a village person is to help build and use sanitary wells or privies, or donate his blood for a blood bank, there must be either a subsidiary practical benefit or another kind of indirect motivation to get him to participate. Frequently it has developed that village people have participated because they believed that to do so made them appear more sophisticated, or like city people. In one of the public health projects in Thailand, two motivations were identified as producing participation, but neither was for reasons of better health. One was the practical benefit of having a more convenient water source and the other was the status the villager achieved in having a well or privy (CS 162). This kind of status achievement is usually related to urbanism. Villagers who have had many urban contacts or who want to appear "citified" tend to accept innovations that provide that appearance. In another health project in village Thailand, acceptance was high among those who had numerous urban contacts (CS 164).

Most preventive health innovations probably will have to be supported primarily with this kind of motivation. To depend on the possibility of persuading adults to adopt new practices based on Western health concepts is a risky procedure. This is not so with innovations where efficacy is more easily demonstrated, such as those in agriculture. It is significant that of the 25 cases in which individual competition was described as a factor, only two were in agriculture. The implication is that rural farmers will more rarely accept a new farming practice just to keep up with their neighbors.

It must be emphasized, however, that even though individual competition may be the only basic motivation that can be counted on for bringing about participation in preventive medical projects, it is still far weaker than a motivation involving direct practical benefit. Latrine projects provide the best example. Although a minimal amount of participation may be obtained by utilizing the status value of the privy, this may still be insufficient to assure its continued use. One of the latrine projects in village India was continued long enough so that 26 privy bases were bought, but a year later only six had been installed and the idea of using them had not been generally transferred. The primary reason for villagers accepting them in the first place was because they believed such acceptance showed that a man was progressive and intelligent. The change agents played up the status emulation idea to the extent of putting up a blackboard in a conspicuous place in the village, listing the names of purchasers, as well as the names of those who had promised to purchase latrines but had not done so. However, this was not sufficient to transfer the idea. The change agents felt that the most they had finally accomplished was to expose the villagers to the idea of latrines (CS 41). An almost identical motivational process occurred in the water-boiling project in Peru. The only individuals, a very small group, who began to boil their water were middle class people who were emulating the middle class nurse and doctor (CS 110).

A health project in which the change agents clearly recognized the value of utilizing status emulation was in a particularly difficult type of effort—organizing a blood bank. This Western concept encounters many difficulties when exported, not the least of which is that, while there may be some perceived advantage from getting a blood transfusion, there is little or none for donating blood. This was clearly a problem to the Nigerians in this effort, as cited previously. Blood transfusion was a new, strange kind of treatment and the people viewed with positive alarm the idea of giving up some of their own healthy blood without any perceived benefit. In general, the change agents in this instance did an efficient job in establishing communications with prospective participants. But very important was the fact that they concentrated on the potential prestige emulation of donors. They managed to get prominent officials to donate blood and had a film made of the event, which was shown widely. The campaign was successful enough so that 10,000 donors ultimately gave blood (CS 94).

The motivation of wanting to be modern or to keep up with the times, thus encouraging competitive efforts of individuals, has occurred on several projects that involved organizing new social or home improvement clubs in Africa. Of course, it should be noted that this kind of innovation is similar to literacy in that it interferes relatively little with the traditional cultural patterns. Participation in the organization or activities of a woman's club has little effect on the economic requirements of village life while it adds a new kind of recreation. In one such club in Kenya, one of the principal motivations of the women members was their weakness for clothes and their desire to be well dressed. The change agent was critical of this motivation, but without it, his project might have aroused little local interest. He reported that whenever one of the members had a small amount of extra cash, more often than not she would use it to purchase a new dress or other wearing apparel (CS 71). A similar kind of effort in Uganda was supported with the same kind of motivation, but to it were added the competitive tendencies of the local chiefs. The movement became so popular with the women that individual chiefs felt they were behind the times if their village did not have such a club (CS 165).

The negative form of competition is the fear of losing status by participating in a development project. This occurred less often than positive competitive motivations, yet it was frequently a relevant factor. One kind, adult fear of appearing ignorant in the eyes of one's fellows, was noted in two literacy campaigns. In both campaigns the fear of losing status evidently was not as strong as the desire to learn to read and write. In one project in Grenada, West Indies, the change agent found some villagers reluctant to join classes because by doing so, it would show other people that they could not read and write. (In fact, a common practice there was for illiterates to carry fountain pens in their shirt pockets.) Nevertheless, the experimental program was successful (CS 29). Another incident of such status seeking, involving illiterate Bolivian Indians, was reported to the author recently. These village people frequently carry newspapers to impress others, even when they cannot read. A literacy program in Uganda also ran into the difficulty that adults were ashamed to openly admit their illiteracy by attending classes. Although it was not too successful among the local Buganda tribespeople, the classes were filled with non-Buganda migrant laborers, who presumably did not suffer so much from status loss because they were not in their home villages (CS 169).

A final kind of status marker which inhibited an innovation project is one which seems particularly significant in Latin America and may become more relevant in many parts of the world in the next few decades. This is the status bestowed on the scantily educated rural poor for having many children. In Puerto Rico, to have many children was considered a sign of male virility (the case was mentioned previously), which is a part of the Latin-American concept of *machismo*. Even the husband's ability to support many children was a socially accepted prestige indicator. As a consequence, the males had little interest in the contraceptive devices offered in a nationwide population control program (CS 140).

In the same sense that individuals are usually jockeying for status in most societies, using the symbols which those societies classify as significant, so also are competitive tendencies exerted by groups, and for roughly the same reason—any group which obtains an advantageous change is frequently viewed as a threat by those groups which lack it. In such circumstances, groups lacking the advantage can either attempt to get it for themselves, or oppose it, which would constitute a basis for a positive or negative influence for the acceptance of an innovation. Group competition has been described most often as a negative influence, but by no means always a critical one; that is, jealousies between factions or villages negatively affected the course of projects, although did not necessarily bring them to a halt. In fact, projects in which group rivalries were a factor succeeded almost as often as they failed. Where group friction was correlated with rejection, it was in projects that were badly handled in other ways by the change agents. This is not to say that local factionalism is never sufficient to ruin change projects, but the probability is that in many such land reform - community development situations, poor innovation techniques have been as much to blame as the factionalism reported to exist among the recipients.

In these cases, seven unsuccessful projects were found in which group competition was described as a negative influence, but in which innovation techniques also were uniformly inefficient. In three there were no positive influences at all (CS 106, CS 145, CS 191) and in the other four only one or two positive influences were noted. In the Bolivian land reform - community development program the only positive influence was participation by Indians in a few projects where their interests were clearly served (CS 3). In a Mexican community development project (previously noted), the only positive influence was some perceived practical benefit to the upper class, but consequent exclusion of the poor was the main reason that the project was rejected by the community in general (CS 87). In a home economics campaign in Syria, where a village was split by factionalism, the only positive innovation technique was the flexibility, even though limited, of the change agent (CS 155).

In only one clear-cut instance did group competition seem to be the primary deciding factor for the failure of the project. This was in one of a group of cases that were consciously presented as "success stories" by the analysts. For contrast they included this one failure. All the cases concerned community development in village India. The apparent cause of failure in this instance was the overriding factionalism that prevented any useful community cooperation. Unfortunately, the change agent identified himself with one of the six feuding factions, which alienated the other five. However, the village was so torn by rivalries that it is doubtful that communal progress could have been made, even if the change agent had remained neutral (CS 153).

Despite the negative effect of group competition on the projects described above, this influence was not too critical. Almost as many projects succeeded as failed when negative group competition occurred. In the efforts where the innovation techniques were efficient, the problem of negative group competition was overcome, as would be expected. One of the best examples of the positive utilization of group competition is described in a community development project in Palau, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. Although the population was split into several factions with varying loyalties, and prejudices, the change agents were able to play upon the rivalries of clubs, teams, families, and districts for constructive competition. Prizes and trophies were offered as inducements, and in general the desire for preeminence among Micronesians was played upon (CS 108). This case seems to indicate that a social characteristic usually considered negative can produce a positive effect if the change agents attempt to utilize it instead of opposing it.

REWARD-PUNISHMENT

Individuals will often participate in a new effort either because they receive something which they value through the change agency, or because they will be

punished by the same source if they do not participate. The element of punishment has been present, certainly in the past, in many if not most efforts to promote national development among village people. The customary traditional relationship between national officials and the poor of their countries has been of an authoritarian nature. Although this pattern undoubtedly still obtains in many of these countries, the philosophy of development outside the Marxist countries since World War II has stressed voluntary participation by local people. For this reason, in the projects which comprise this group, reward was far more frequently the motivation for obtaining participation than was punishment. The change agents provided various inducements to obtain the recipients' cooperation.

It is assumed that the goods and services provided in economic assistance will normally be construed as rewards by local recipients. Likewise, whenever materials for building self-help schoolhouses are provided, or when medical practitioners treat the sick, a reward motivation is involved. The tokens often provided by change agents for participation in projects (certificates, diplomas, or small gifts), for coming to meetings or clinics also constitute rewards.

There were 35 instances where rewards were indicated as significant in eliciting the participation of recipients, and 28 of these were in projects with successful outcomes. Two projects which failed despite small rewards were health cases described before—one of the latrine projects in India and the venereal disease effort in Northern Rhodesia (CS 41, 101). In these instances the rewards were small—certificates of participation presented to the villagers. Other motivations were almost nonexistent. Although the prizes and gifts undoubtedly helped to bring the local people into the projects, they were probably insufficient to provide a solid motivational basis. Four of the other cases were described by the same social scientist for two village areas in India; in these, the rewards were more substantial, in the form of material grants from the central government. Other positive motivations were lacking, however, since the various projects had emanated from the central planning offices irrespective of the felt needs of the villagers. Moreover, communication between the change agents and the recipients was very poor (CS 174, CS 191, CS 192, CS 195). A quite similar complex of factors occurred in the Vietnam fishing cooperative (CS 201). It seems likely that this kind of project will continue only as long as substantial material inducements are coming from the change agents.

In fact, in the projects which were carried to successful conclusions, the reward motivation appeared to be secondary; usually a perceived practical benefit was the primary incentive, and frequently it was based on a felt need. For example, in a self-help dam-building project in Uganda, the change agents provided feasts after the dams were finished. However, the project was built on a solicited felt need and practical benefit motivation. The people had come to the change agent and had asked for help (CS 168).

The token rewards that were provided were mainly of two types, small gifts or prizes for participation, and various kinds of certificates of accomplishment. In a health project in Uganda, the change agents gave a cigarette for swallowing a pill (CS 167). In one of the women's club projects in the same country, participating women received needles, thread, and cotton (CS 165). In the community development project in Palau, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, participants were awarded prizes and trophies (CS 108). More rarely entertainment was offered to attract attendance. In a Nigerian literacy project, films were provided. Silver cups also were given for the most progressive village of the year (CS 97). In general, rewards appear to have been a minor inducement to obtain participation, and were always coupled with a sounder type of motivation when success was achieved.

In a few projects, the combination of reward and status competition was successful in producing the necessary participation. There was a situation of this kind in the blood bank campaign organized in Ibadan, Nigeria. The rewards were free beer and soft drinks to make the donors' visits more agreeable, as well as a small Red Cross badge and certificate provided after the donation.

As mentioned previously, the principal other motivation in this project was prestige emulation (CS 94).

It is apparent that rewards would not cause nonparticipation on a project. But this was not the case with the obverse of reward, punishment. Punishment or coercion can work both ways: positively if the recipients believe they will lose more by resisting than by cooperating, and negatively if they decide that resistance would be more advantageous. Punishment does not fit into the general philosophy of modern Western-inspired innovation techniques. The roots of authoritarianism run deep in most of the non-Western countries and will not be very easily eliminated. Moreover, Western organizations also use coercion in many forms; when voluntary cooperation does not produce the desired results, authorities resort to regulations and ordinances, which, of course, are always backed by the threat of force or sanctions. A well-documented change project showing this kind of strategy was the Navajo stock-reduction effort of the 1930s. Although the Bureau of Indian Affairs attempted to persuade the Indians to voluntarily reduce the numbers of their flocks, when this did not work a variety of threats and harassment was used to obtain compliance [Littell, 15]. Thus, in spite of the general principle of modern development that people should participate of their own free will, other means are resorted to at times.

Seven instances were found in which coercion or sanctions were used to help bring about successful participation. Two were instances of ordinances passed by local governments. In a malaria control project in Mauritius, there was a difficulty in that entire families left their residences during the sugar crop months and usually were unwilling to leave the key with a neighbor. An ordinance was passed making it an offense to refuse admittance to a sprayer, and it was enforced twice (CS 84). The project to register the handicapped for a training program in Ghana encountered considerable difficulties because of the suspicion generated in local communities about the purpose of the registration, not an uncommon attitude among village people. By involving local leaders and establishing fairly efficient communication channels, the fears were partially allayed. However, a mild form of coercion was also applied (CS 25). A variant form of sanction was found in a literacy campaign in Kenya. The potential participants were Methodists and the church passed a rule that all future candidates for baptism would have to pass a reading test. This was not the only motivation, but undoubtedly it was partially instrumental in bringing participation (CS 69). A final type is one that is probably the most effective--when local groups attempt to control their own members. The project, in a Filipino village, was to enclose village animals so they would not damage crops. The local village council passed an ordinance and any transgressor was brought before it to be lectured and/or punished (CS 135).

Reward and punishment are, of course, two sides of the same coin. This means that a change agent can offer an inducement for compliance or threaten sanctions if such compliance is not forthcoming. This occurred in several projects, and one of the clearest examples was in a community development program in India. The not unusual problem stemmed from factional quarrelling. The change agent induced a potential reward motivation by promising both faction leaders agricultural loans when the ongoing, self-help project would be completed. For potential punishment he threatened the son of one leader (the head of the village council) that the government would reclaim funds from him personally if the buildings were not completed on time. This project was successfully completed with the help of both factions (CS 182).

In three cases, coercion was ineffective. One involved the introduction of fertilizers in Nigerian village farms. Although the government distributed the fertilizer free, "volunteers" were obtained through an order of the District Head, a man who used general authoritarian measures to accomplish other tasks. The local people were generally disaffected toward the central government, as well as being alienated by the change agent and unconvinced of the utility of the innovation; the new coercive measures thus hardened their resolve not to

participate (CS 95). Another project in which force was ineffective was the venereal disease campaign in Northern Rhodesia (cited before). Again the chiefs applied coercion to induce their subjects to seek treatment, but without affecting their belief that the ailment was not really serious. As soon as the campaign was over the local people dropped any further precautions and the disease rate rose again (CS 101).

NOVELTY

The final category in this group, while interesting, is undoubtedly the least influential of all motivational forces. It is the novelty aspect of an innovation, attraction or repulsion with regard to a new thing or idea simply because it is so different from what the recipients are accustomed to. Although the most frequent kind of novelty reaction was negative, the best indication of its relative unimportance is that in only two of 13 instances was the project a failure. In other words, despite initial fear or distrust, the recipients were usually persuaded to accept the innovation.

There is sometimes a relationship between novelty motivation and reward. People are impressed by a new thing, and when it is offered free or subsidized, they are stimulated by the reward motivation. In the poultry project in Laos, participation by villagers was attributed almost entirely to the fact that the local people were impressed by the size of the Leghorns and Rhode Island Reds. This is undoubtedly a major factor in all kinds of animal husbandry projects, as well as agricultural projects where impressive new varieties are introduced. When the change agents in the Laos project offered the chickens free, the villagers reacted to the possibilities of reward. However, as noted earlier, problems in keeping these birds alive and productive were hardly visualized by either the villagers or the change agents, and the project was ultimately abandoned (CS 76).

A striking contrast to this project is one which ended successfully even though it started off with the same kind of motivation; it was carried through with much better communication and participation. In Nigeria, a novelty effect was produced first by taking a representative section of the villagers to tour the government poultry stations, where they were impressed with the size as well as the management of the birds. As soon as the new cocks were introduced, the superiority of the crossbreed was so obvious that people in nearby villages started to buy them. Many of the same problems that occurred in the Laotian situation were repeated, but communication with the villagers and their participation was so much better that they adjusted to the problems. Extension agents helped the villagers throughout the effort, and when many cocks died because of the cold in the shaded villages during the rainy season, the villagers purchased replacements at full cost. They even built special chicken houses to guard the new birds from depredations by hawks (CS 90).

The unfamiliar occurred as frightening far more frequently than it appeared as attractive, usually because it seemed to threaten the existing way of life in some serious manner. Although such a negative motivation was usually not important enough to stop a project, it did assume serious proportions in at least three of 12 instances. Very often this reaction was the product of imperfect communications and consequent misunderstanding on the part of the potential recipients as to exactly what the project was about. When serious efforts were made by the change agents to explain the purpose of the innovation, such fears were usually dispelled. In all but one of these cases the projects went on to successful conclusions despite the fears created in the beginning. Two projects involved taking blood, a type of effort which often frightens villagers. A nutritional experimental program in Guatemala involved taking blood samples from villagers, who, like many Latin-American villagers (as noted previously), believed that blood once lost could not be regenerated. Furthermore, the project included nutritional experiments which frightened the villagers so much that a rumor was generated that the purpose was to fatten the children

to be sent away and eaten. The change agents patiently sought out the problem, however, and were able to neutralize the fears (CS 33). A similar negative novelty reaction has been described in reference to the blood-donor campaign in Nigeria. Again, patient explanations, along with demonstrations by leaders that blood donations were not harmful, helped to allay the local fears (CS 94). In the third project, a resettlement campaign in Angola, a negative novelty reaction was quite significant. The whole idea of moving from the highland farms to the valley to form a new community was so revolutionary that initial resistance was overwhelming. Patient explanations and demonstrations that people would not die if they were at the lower level were sufficient, ultimately, to persuade the local people to move (CS 1).

The other instances of negative novelty reactions were more in the nature of disturbances to the change process rather than threats to the projects as a whole. New health practices have often been resisted simply because they differed so greatly from the traditional methods of curing. People who are accustomed to depend on their own herbal cures or traditional "medical practitioners" initially look with distrust at novel methods of treatment.

Hospital treatment is particularly strange, especially when all traditional practices are prohibited in the new environment. In the maternity hospital project in Ecuador cited earlier, the hospital violated all folk beliefs such as the necessity for burying the afterbirth, keeping the mother in bed for two weeks, and observing a 40-day period in which she should not bathe, cut her fingernails, or be exposed to fresh air. However, the clear evidence that mothers fared better in the hospital was enough to convince the locals of the value of the clinic (CS 19).

It is appropriate here to mention the technique employed by the Communist Chinese to solve this problem. They set up rural health clinics staffed with both local practitioners and doctors trained in Western medicine. In each clinic there was a door for the local healer and one for the M.D. In actual fact the two doctors worked together, through consultation, so that treatment by either was about the same. It is significant that by having the two practitioners together, a conflict between the old and the new was avoided [Worth, 16].

There have been negative novelty reactions based on unfamiliar foods, machines, or the general fear that the future would be threatened by upsetting the present. In a home economics project in South Africa, which was generally successful, the people did resist new types of vegetables. It has been mentioned that they claimed their ancestors had lived well enough on meat and maize and that furthermore they did not have the proper kinds of cooking pots for the new dishes proposed by the change agents (CS 151). An instance in which an unfamiliar device caused minor difficulties was the well project in Lebanon where the villagers had never seen a pump before, and said they were afraid the iron pipe would spoil the taste of the water (CS 82).

Two good examples of fears generated by an unknown future were the community development project in Nigeria and the Vicos project of highland Peru. As is typical of this kind of reaction, rumors were generated which promoted resistance. In the Nigerian project, whenever the recipients wanted to oppose an innovation, they would say that they were afraid they might lose their land. A rumor was spread to that effect and a number of villagers dropped out in the beginning (CS 97). In the Vicos experiment the Indians initially feared the changes as presenting them with an unknown future. The rumor was spread that "the *gringos* were fattening the Indians to boil them down for oil for American machinery" (CS 113). A very interesting novelty reaction was involved in the public health innovation in Indonesia. There was initial lack of interest, which is common in sanitation efforts, and later, rumors regarding the innovations were generated. One was a rumor that the orally administered antihookworm drug which was being offered had proselytizing powers that would make the consumers switch from Islam to Christianity (CS 56).

The main point to remember about the negative novelty reactions is that all but two failed to bring about an abandonment of the whole project. In other words, they were effectively counteracted. It should be mentioned that the very fact that the existence of these reactions was learned means that the change agents had better understanding in many projects. There might be a fair number of failures in the cases studied in which negative novelty reactions were the primary difficulty, but the change agents did not learn of their existence.

Summary

There are three subsidiary motivation types relevant in the change process: competition, reward-punishment, and novelty. All of these together appear to be significantly less important than perceived practical benefit, but they can influence the acceptance of innovations in a secondary fashion. Competition is the most significant and is composed of two varieties--individual or status emulation, and group competition based on social groups larger than families. Individual competition occurs most frequently as a positive influence, where persons view an innovation as a means of achieving higher social status. It has been found to be significant, particularly when innovations do not contain any easily demonstrable practical benefit, such as in preventive health measures. Group competition has been found to be significant, both as a positive and negative force--positive when social groups of village size or less feel compelled to accept innovations so that neighboring villages do not obtain more advantages, and negative when social groups, usually factions, are unable to cooperate because of excessive competitive tendencies.

Reward as an inducement for accepting an innovation has been found to be significant only as a secondary force, useful to get people started or to induce them to attend meetings, but insufficient to keep up continuous interest if other motivations are lacking. Punishment for not complying has also been found to be secondary, since in most instances the recipients have means for avoiding the kinds of punishment change agents are able to build into a project.

The final category, novelty, appeared to be the weakest of motivational forces in either a positive or a negative sense. Although the unfamiliar can either attract village people or make them uneasy, these kinds of reactions can usually be counteracted by means of efficient communication or innovation techniques if there is also a practical benefit motivation involved.

Chapter 10

IMAGE CHARACTERISTICS

All human acts stem from many sources, but for our purpose two appear to be paramount. In the first place, individuals do what they do because they are individuals with personal characteristics that make them different from all other individuals. Thus, although there are many captains in the Army, there is probably no single captain who is 39 years old, was born in a family with three sisters and two brothers, whose mother died when he was 34 years old, whose father was a successful medical doctor, and so forth. There are a multitude of events in the lives of each individual, and each addition makes duplication with another person that much less likely. So everyone has in this sense unique personal characteristics.

However, despite his uniqueness, the Army captain shares many kinds of behavior with other Army captains. The reason is that he has a set of socially approved roles. He must treat officers of a higher rank with certain patterns of prescribed deference while he can expect the same kind of deference from those with ranks below his. He can mix freely without deference either way with those of equal rank. When he leaves his work situation he still has a number of roles for which there are socially approved ways of acting. As an American husband, he will generally treat his wife in an egalitarian manner, showing little deference and receiving little. As an American father, he has still another social role which differs from that toward his wife or his military colleagues. He is expected to share the problems of his children, support them, encourage them, and not be too authoritarian. Of course, these are descriptions of model social behavior of middle class Americans. The relationship between two people is much more complex than can be indicated in a phrase or two, but it is enough to show that individuals have social roles. Although the occupational roles of an Army captain are more clear-cut than those for people in civilian life, the businessman, the professor, and the minister also have socially approved roles for the different activities in their daily lives. This concept of social roles is applicable to people of all kinds of societies. In fact, it would be possible to describe any social group as a system of interlocking roles, which relate each person to all others in ways approved by the society.

The individual and social role characteristics that have been discussed are significant not only within societies, but also whenever people of different societies come into contact. For this reason, they are relevant for discussion in the situation described in this chapter. No change agent can walk into a local community without carrying along a number of social roles which will influence the reaction of the local people. And some of his behavior, as well as reactions to it, will result from his individual personal characteristics.

The primary social roles of consideration that influence the change process are based on the age of the change agent, and his being a "technical expert" and a member of an outside organization. Generally, a role of considerable significance in group behavior is a result of the individual's sex, since masculine behavior differs markedly from feminine behavior in almost all societies, and expectations also vary. However, simply because the great majority of change agents in local communities of the nonindustrial nations are male, this difference in reaction is not highly pertinent in our discussion.

Before discussion of the different influences of these roles in the change process, it should be emphasized that the critical element is not what the change agent is, but rather what he appears to be to the people he is trying to influence. It is a question of the image created or the role perceived by the local people. A given change agent might be highly competent in his technical specialty, but because of inability to adapt his competence to local circumstances, he might be regarded as technically incompetent by the people he is trying to influence. No matter how much he knows about growing crops at an agricultural station or in another country, if his demonstration plot in the local village fails because of a difference in soil type, he is likely to be regarded as technically incompetent, and a negative reaction can result. The same can be said of the organizational affiliation of the change agent. An indigenous military organization might be concerned currently with assisting village people in economic or social improvement schemes, but at an earlier date the military may have been exploitative or even punitive in their dealings with villagers. Consequently, the villagers may carry over the earlier image, and be reluctant to cooperate. The image may change and cooperation may take place, but in either event the reaction is to the image and not to the actual role.

PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS

The first role characteristic to be discussed is that of the individual personal characteristics of the change agent. Since these are important in any job assignment in an individual's home country, it should come as no surprise that they are important in job assignments overseas. This has been recognized by most action agencies in the development field. Such agencies generally attempt to improve their programs by trying to select those people with the presumed most desirable personality characteristics and then improve them through training. Probably no American action agency has gone further in this direction than the Peace Corps, which particularly emphasizes selection procedures. Such concern is especially justified when change agents are alien to the culture of the people they are trying to influence, particularly in view of the fact that the American or other foreigner is usually considered to be a local ambassador of sorts, as well as an "advisor." However, even when change agents are citizens of the countries where they are working, personal characteristics can be important, since most are representatives of the government, working to get the commitment of local people to that government.

Of all behavior characteristics of a change agent, those deriving from his individual personality probably can be altered least. These are the results of all his past life experiences and are not as malleable as are specific innovation strategies, such as working through local leadership or establishing effective communication. A person who is quiet and reserved in his dealings with others cannot be transformed easily into an outgoing, aggressive type. On the other hand, working through the local leaders may simply be a concept that the change agent lacks, which, with a minimum amount of training or orientation, he might be able to incorporate into his strategies for inducing change. It is theoretically much easier to change this kind of behavior than to change the basic personality of the individual. The basic personality type thus is important as a criterion for selecting change agents; some minimum change in personality is probably possible.

Personal characteristics of agents as influences on the change process were identified in 42 case histories, and in all but three instances the personality effect was the same as the project outcome; projects were usually successful when the change agent's image was favorable and unsuccessful when the change agent failed to establish harmonious relationships with the local people.

Individual personality characteristics primarily influence the change process in one area which social scientists have called establishment of

rapport. Basically, this is the ability to establish effective relationships, significant in all human interaction but particularly in cross-cultural situations. It is the means by which an outsider obtains minimum acceptance by the people in local communities; his success in achieving it depends mainly on his individual personality characteristics. Several good examples of this kind of influence were found in accounts of village development projects in India (CS 177, CS 186, CS 188). Another instance was a previously cited attempt to introduce to villagers a Persian wheel for irrigation by means of self-help techniques. The change agent, a block development officer, was reported to be quite empathetic toward villagers; he took part in local song fests, even to the extent of composing Hindu hymns in classical form to illuminate current problems of the villagers in a manner congenial to them. He was very patient, allowing the villagers to expose the overriding local problem, which was a factional split caused by a bitter headman who had been voted out of office a short time before. The change agent continued to make daily visits to the former headman until he was able to persuade him to cooperate. The Persian wheel was built and a number of subsidiary projects were undertaken. The image of the change agent who assisted this project resulted from his respect for local traditions and his patience through persistence of effort. It was also to his advantage that he was from the same local region and could speak and sing in the local dialect (CS 176).

The establishment of good rapport with people in local communities is by no means all that is necessary to induce change, but it is a useful precondition. No matter how well the change agent may be able to get along with the local people, whatever he is offering may not promise anything of value to them if their system of beliefs differs greatly from his. While being influenced positively by the change agent insofar as rapport is concerned, the locals may still fail to cooperate because they do not understand his project aims or believe that they are advantageous.

In the cases studied, this was the situation most often in efforts to introduce improved health practices. The difficulty arises from the fact that the poor of urban districts, and village people, rarely share the health beliefs of outside change agents, and therefore cannot see the utility of undertaking new and difficult tasks. One of the clearest instances of this kind of difficulty was found in the account of the project described previously to induce the housewives of a Peruvian town to boil their water. The change agent, a nurse, had established very good rapport with the local women, who valued their relationship with her. She spoke the dialect, was from the local area, was technically competent, and patiently visited the women on many occasions, trying to persuade them to undertake this new activity. The primary difficulty resulted from the fact that the local women were not convinced that unboiled water was contaminated, a fact not easy to demonstrate to people who have had little education. Added to this difficulty, the new practice would require a considerable amount of extra time, fuel, and space in the small local homes. The very positive personal image the local people had of the change agent was not enough to counteract the difficulties imposed by all these new tasks, to which was added the lack of belief that the activity would actually help to improve health. Very few undertook the new activity (CS 110).

A contrast to the Peruvian water-boiling situation is provided in a school building project in Colombia where the change agent was an older woman with long experience in the area, who spoke the local dialect and was quite successful in establishing effective relationships with the local people. Her project of constructing school buildings through self-help techniques was quite successful (CS 11). The contrast lies mainly in the nature of the innovations themselves. Education, and consequently schools are highly desired by the poor in underdeveloped countries all over the world since the advantages can be perceived quite clearly. On the other hand, the advantages of most health innovations are difficult to demonstrate to people who have had little exposure

to Western health concepts. Thus, apart from the positive image created in both instances, in the one instance the local people could visualize education as a means of getting a government or white-collar job, while in the other the process of boiling water appeared to be simply a laborious task with no apparent payoff.

AGE

In most human relationships there are status considerations which influence interaction. Normally, certain forms of deference are paid to those in higher status positions and deference is expected from those of lower status. The same phenomenon occurs when a change agent presents himself to members of a local community. While there are certain status relationships among villagers or urban poor, based on such factors as kinship, economic position, and knowledge of traditional or religious lore, one status consideration will stand out above all others—that based on age. In agrarian societies, the experience of age is given great deference, often at the expense of other kinds of knowledge or experience. In simpler terms, by virtue of his greater years the older person is considered to be wiser.

When an outsider comes into such a community, most of the existing status markers cannot be applied, simply because he is not a part of the community. However, his approximate age can readily be ascertained, to provide some kind of index for behavior toward him. If he is considerably younger than the local leaders, his age will be a disadvantage. Most of the change agents who operate on a local level tend to be younger, since they are usually recent technical school or college graduates. This would also be true of the American Peace Corps Volunteer, the American soldier concerned with civic action projects, the local soldier, or the agricultural extension agent. Each of them has had specialized training, but this is difficult for the local leaders to evaluate.

If the change agent is trying to gain acceptance for new agricultural practices, for example, the local farmers may well believe that their long experience in practical agriculture far outweighs the book knowledge the extension agent claims. This was a contributory factor to the failure of change agents to introduce an improved system of rice cultivation in the Philippines. A majority of the farmers contacted did not adopt the new system despite its proved superiority in other areas. The agricultural extension agents were never able to create positive images. In spite of being Filipinos, they were educated and socially distant from the villagers. And most important, they were younger than the farmers they were trying to influence. The local elders did not believe that the technical training of the extension agents outweighed their much greater experience in growing rice (CS 116). Other difficulties arose from the methods used by these change agents, but the age bias undoubtedly contributed to the lack of cooperation.

In a recent field research situation in which the author was engaged, the significance of age in dealing with village people was made quite clear. The effort was to study the process of innovation among village farmers in Nigeria, and a number of interviewers were required to conduct interviews with village leaders. It was discovered very early in the effort that men in their early twenties had considerable difficulty gaining sufficient acceptance from village elders; men in their thirties and forties were able to function most efficiently in this respect. All the interviewers had equivalent educational qualifications, being graduates from teachers colleges, and were approximately the same type of person as the change agents described in the village situation of the Philippines. The main difference was that the age factor, as well as individual personality characteristics, was given deliberate consideration in the selection of the Nigerian interviewers, while the Filipino change agents were chosen for their technical training alone. It should be stressed also that gathering information is probably not as difficult as getting people to undertake new practices.

One of the clearest descriptions of the influence of age is supplied by a case history of an urban community development effort in South Africa. The author, a young European woman, stated, "My youth, sex, and single status considerably weakened my authority in the eyes of the older members. They had not yet come to value the acquisition of skills or expertise as giving authority. To them age and married status were still deeply rooted symbols of authority. Each of these—youth, female, single status—meant lack of experience" (CS 151). Marital status is, of course, normally equated with advanced years. The disabilities of role are not insuperable, however, which is indicated by the fact that this change agent was still able to accomplish the task of setting up a family welfare center, and to institute quite a number of projects for improving home life. She overcame her difficulties mainly by adapting her program to local conditions and relying on the five local African assistants to make most of the contacts with local people. Probably her personality characteristics were also in her favor.

TECHNICAL COMPETENCE

Practically all change agents that enter local communities to help bring about change have been trained to some degree in one or several technical specialties, such as home economics, agriculture, engineering, or preventive health. The individual change agent shows interest in the area of his specialty and local people soon learn to expect certain kinds of behavior from different kinds of "experts." If local people have had no previous contact with change agents, they soon learn that the one in their midst is a health officer advocating vaccinations, or an agricultural specialist advocating new food crops, or a road-building specialist trying to get them to work on access roads. Such technical competence would seem the most basic requirement for the person concerned with introducing change. However, while it is true that a new practice cannot be introduced to a group unless the agent responsible knows something about the new practice, this appears to be a low-order problem in the total change process. Failure to get local projects accomplished is much more often the result of difficulties in communication and problems arising from conflict with local cultural patterns than the result of technical incompetence.

The explanation is not hard to find. Technical experience has long been accepted as one of the two basic requirements for economic change, the other being direct economic inputs in the form of grants or loans of money or goods. Thus, the bulk of the personnel, apart from those responsible for economic grants or loans, have been persons with technical specialties. In the major international development agencies such as AID and the UN, most such change agents have had considerable experience in their technical specialty in their own countries. With few exceptions the one characteristic demanded by these agencies has been that the individual be a technical "expert." It is no coincidence that training programs prior to overseas assignment have usually included little or no instruction in the fields of technical specialty; those involved have not needed such training. The same would be true of civic action advisors of the American military. Doctors or engineers assigned to such duties would already be highly trained in these technical fields.

This situation is not quite as true of volunteer agencies such as the Peace Corps or the International Voluntary Services, where a higher percentage of the personnel are liberal arts college graduates. In the training programs of the Peace Corps there is considerable emphasis on technical training, presumably to compensate for technical deficiency. Even so, it is probable that technical incompetence occurs more often as a difficulty with such groups than with the senior advisors. It is significant that Peace Corps Volunteers are the largest users of VITA (Volunteers for Technical Assistance), an organization of technical specialists in the United States that attempts to provide technical solutions for development problems through correspondence (personal communication). It is clear that the younger people of volunteer organizations have less technical competence than their senior counterparts. However, even the general background

knowledge and the limited technical training provided for such volunteers would, in the eyes of most villagers, constitute expertise.

Most local change agents have normally received technical training of some kind—in health, education, agriculture, or engineering. In contrast to the emphasis that has been placed on technical training in both national and international programs, low priority has been given to background or training in the techniques of transferring new ideas. In the past, the general assumption has been that if some expertise that is known to be technically superior is presented to local people, they will adopt it. The problems of how the idea is presented, the communication variable, or whether it is adaptable to the local social system have rarely been considered. The single broad exception to this generalization is the community development method, where techniques of introduction and methods of organizing social groups have been stressed over technical approaches.

Due to this concentration on technical expertise at the expense of expertise in the techniques of innovation, it is not too surprising that technical incompetence is relatively rarely the major problem of introducing a new idea. Nor is it surprising that when such technical incompetence is the primary difficulty, it is among the kinds of change agents who lack adequate background in the technical field in which they are working.

This difference is illustrated in the experiences of two American development advisors whose efforts were witnessed by the author. A young Peace Corps Volunteer in a Central-American country was attempting to improve general socio-economic conditions in a village where he was assigned. He was able to get one project he chose, a garbage disposal system, into operation, although a number of technical problems remained unsolved, all due to his complete lack of experience in this kind of activity. He was able to persuade the municipal authorities to underwrite the expenses of setting up a system of garbage cans made from 55-gallon drums, to pay for a collector, and to dig a garbage dump pit. The Volunteer had the garbage pit dug in an open, level area, expecting to burn the refuse. However, the garbage stayed so wet that it could not be burned, and it merely piled up. He then built a roof over the pile in an effort to keep it dry, which helped to a limited extent. Still another technical problem faced him, the size of the pit. It was just too small for the needs of the village and was full within a few months. When the author talked to him, he was preparing to try to get the villagers to build a new pit. All of his problems were a result of having had no experience in setting up garbage disposal systems. On the other hand, it can be said that he was fairly efficient in techniques of innovation, for he was able to get considerable cooperation from the villagers despite his lack of technical expertise.

In contrast, there is the situation of a person who was well prepared from the standpoint of technical competency, but who lacked even a basic awareness of communication skills and innovation techniques. This American "expert," an agronomist with many years of experience in the United States and abroad, was working in a Southeast Asian country to introduce disease-resistant varieties of coffee to local villagers. He started with an undertaking that is very common among technical specialists in agriculture; he developed an experiment station where he began cultivating several resistant varieties of coffee plants to find out which would be most suitable for the local conditions. This was successfully accomplished in less than two years, at which time he started to distribute the new plants. However, this was done in the most perfunctory manner; he simply gave the new plants to farmers designated by his counterpart. There was no educational process to assist the farmers to grow the new crop more efficiently; no responsibility was required from them other than to accept the plants; and no effective communication channels were established whereby the farmers could consult the technician if needed. The agronomist did not speak the local language, and hardly visited the farmers after they had received the plants. Before he left the country, after approximately three years, he had given up the whole project (CS 79). From this incident, it is obvious that an improved variety could not be introduced to

the local people unless the agricultural expertise was available. But it is equally obvious that this was only half the problem, the other half being the process of introducing and adapting the new practice to the local conditions.

Because most of the case histories we studied involved change agents with a fair degree of technical competence, this particular variable did not occur often as an influence and in all instances (28 of the total 203) except one, when competence or incompetence was mentioned, the outcome was either favorable or unfavorable. In other words, technical competence was significant when it occurred at all, but it did not occur often. The simplest explanation that can be offered is that, while a new practice or idea can hardly be transferred if the change agent is not familiar with it, the process of adapting and transferring it is equally necessary; and since in the past most emphasis has been placed on the necessity for transference techniques, the most frequent deficiency has been in innovation techniques.

ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATIONS

Practically all change agents enter local communities as members of an outside organization, which automatically affects both their image and their role. Usually, an American is either a member of the Agency for International Development, the Army, the Peace Corps, or a private development organization such as the Rockefeller or Ford Foundations. A local change agent may be an agricultural extension officer, a community development officer, or a member of the national Army, but in almost all cases he is a representative of the central government. If the change agent is from a foreign development agency, he is viewed most frequently as a power figure, an image which is enlarged if his position permits him to produce material goods in abundance. If he is a representative of his own government, he may be viewed as less powerful, although still having a significant position in the local hierarchy. The change agent cannot change his affiliation, but he will be able either to emphasize or to de-emphasize it, insofar as that image is either favorable or unfavorable. Certainly, many technical advisors are concerned with more than mere socioeconomic change; many, if not most, are concerned with leaving behind a good image of their organization and thus would not want to de-emphasize their affiliation. However, the influence is present, and if the successful outcome of a given project is a matter of consideration, it must be taken into account.

Insofar as the case histories studied are concerned, this influence was relatively minor, and was found in only 13 of the 203 cases. A positive image of the organization assisted projects considerably toward successful outcomes. This was the case in the previously described effort to establish a credit union among Indian villagers in highland Peru. The project was sponsored by a Catholic priest whose mission was highly regarded by the local people. This was by no means the only influence; in particular, there were very efficient communication techniques as well as a clearly perceived practical benefit for participation in the union. The credit union charged 1% interest on loans while local usurers charged 25% (US 109). The organization was so successful that it expanded to other communities throughout Peru and has continued to operate up to the present time [8]. It cannot be stated that the organizational affiliation was the principal determinant of success, but it can be hypothesized that it was at least instrumental for initial acceptance.

A particularly interesting instance of positive organizational affiliation was noted in an effort in a Dominican village to improve nutrition and home life. The point of interest was that the change agent was a government school teacher. In general, teachers are in a favorable position to bring change in a community except when they overstep the bounds of their technical competence. Most villagers and urban poor are desirous of education for their children and thus hold the teacher in fairly high regard. In this instance, the teacher was careful about giving technical advice, and obtained a professional agricultural agent to demonstrate new gardening techniques. The teacher's main

activity was to help organize "action committees" and disseminate information. It was estimated that as a result of this campaign, 75% of the population significantly changed their food habits (CS 17). The point that teachers are usually respected, although not necessarily in areas beyond their technical knowledge, is illustrated by a similar case in the Philippines, with one difference. The teachers attempted to introduce agricultural innovations directly. Although generally respected by the villagers, the teachers were not regarded by the farmers as knowledgeable in agriculture, a judgment which was probably basically correct. The project was abandoned within a few months due to lack of cooperation by the farmers (CS 132).

Organizational affiliations can clearly be negative in their influence, to the extent of being the primary cause for lack of participation by local people. Such a project was one by American advisors to introduce improved home hygiene practices in Syrian villages. The organization, the American government, at this time had a poor image due to the Israeli-Arab conflict. The villagers felt animosity toward any American-sponsored project, since they believed the United States was supporting Israel in the conflict. The project was abandoned after four years due to insufficient participation by the local people (CS 156).

Summary

In all human relationships, the participants have certain roles and consequent images which influence their interaction. These derive from two sources, individual personal characteristics and socially approved roles. In the interaction of change agents and those they are trying to influence, such roles also are significant. We have been able to identify four major role characteristics that bear on the change process: individual personal characteristics, age, technical competence, and organizational affiliations. A fifth has been noted but not discussed because of its relative infrequency, the sex of the change agent. As a result of each of these roles, change agents act in certain ways and certain kinds of behavior are expected from them by people in local communities. Most important for understanding the interaction process is not the actual role played by the change agent, but what is perceived by the local people. In other words, it is not so important whether a man is technically competent but rather whether he is so regarded by those he is trying to influence.

The individual personal characteristics of the change agent are significant primarily because they enable him to establish effective rapport or empathy with the local people. The age of the change agent becomes significant as a status marker since most other criteria for establishing his status position are not relevant, since he is not a member of the local social group. In general, younger men are at a disadvantage in dealing with traditional village leaders, who are usually leaders principally because they are elders. The technical competence of the change agent is significant because no new idea can be transferred unless the necessary technical knowledge of the idea is controlled by the change agent. However, as an overall influence on the change process, technical competence has not occurred as highly significant because change agencies have placed great emphasis on this quality, at the expense of knowledge of innovation techniques. Organizational affiliations are influential since change agents do not enter local communities as individuals alone but rather as representatives of larger organizations, either national or foreign. The image of that organization will affect the reaction of the local people to the individual representative.

It is hypothesized that role characteristics are of secondary importance in the change process in comparison to innovation techniques such as communication channels established, or adapting innovations to local cultures. In general, except for personal characteristics, the role characteristics primarily influence the initial reaction of the local people, but later reactions will be much more greatly influenced by the specific innovation strategies and the perception of advantages of the proposed innovations by the local people.

Chapter 11

COMMUNICATION

Communication, as the term is used here, is defined as the interchange of information between the change agent and the recipients of innovations in the planning and implementation of projects. The primary responsibility for establishing such communication channels rests with the change agent, since he is attempting to induce change.

That the pattern of communication is of prime importance will come as no surprise to those interested in the change process. Communication, almost by definition, is a prerequisite for all other forms of interaction. No new ideas or techniques can be transferred from an individual or a group to another group unless channels are established for passing the necessary information. Indeed, communication channels are the instruments for utilizing the other innovation strategies. The change agent can scarcely adapt his innovation to local cultural patterns or obtain the necessary participation if he cannot communicate effectively with the local people.

It should be emphasized that communication channels are very important in any change situation, but particularly in cross-cultural circumstances. Recipients of new ideas can hardly act in expected ways if they do not receive the necessary information, even when there are few cultural differences between them and the change agents; but when the cultural differences increase, the difficulties of information transfer become even greater. This is the situation even when the differences between groups are only subcultural. Numerous observers have noted that a considerable number of the worst racial problems in northern cities of the United States in recent years were largely the result of a lack of effective communication channels between the Negro minorities and the city authorities. The administrators frequently did not know what the attitudes of the depressed Negro citizens were, and when violent outbursts occurred, no effective communication channels existed which could be quickly used. It is interesting to note that the previously accepted leaders of the Negro minorities were also unable to communicate effectively with the poorer Negroes.

Yet despite the absence of effective communication channels, the Negro poor and the more privileged administrators and middle class citizens, both Negro and white, share the basic American cultural patterns. In a true cross-cultural change situation, the values and beliefs of the change agents and recipient people can be at great variance. In other words, the change agent in a unicultural situation basically needs only to convince or demonstrate to the potential recipients that the adoption of his ideas would provide some advantage. He can generally count on the same values and motivations, despite differences in education and income level. For example, the rural extension agent in the United States can rely on the direct profit motive almost exclusively when he attempts to introduce a new variety of cattle to local farmers. If it is clearly profitable, he can expect few difficulties in convincing farmers that a few high-grade cattle would be more advantageous than a larger number of lower quality animals. Basically, the attitude toward livestock is the same for the change agent as for the local farmers. It is obvious that the extension agent would not attempt to introduce dog breeding to the farmers as a source of human food. Again, he shares the cultural belief with the farmers that dogs are not proper food animals. This sharing of beliefs and values minimizes the difficulties of communicating new ideas.

The communication requirements for an extension agent working in another culture may be considerably more complex, due to the lack of an equivalent number of shared beliefs. For instance, the immediate profit motive may not be paramount in non-Western cattle herding societies. This has been found to be the case in East and South Africa, where herders have been reluctant to reduce the size of their herds because the number of animals is more important for prestige purposes than their quality. Furthermore, the cattle are involved in both the kinship relationships and supernatural beliefs (as noted previously) of the tribespeople (CS 145, CS 147).

It might be thought that local change agents would not encounter this kind of problem, since they share the beliefs of people in local communities, at least to some degree. And although it is probable that they do have fewer problems, the same kind of difficulty is still encountered. The main reason is that most such local change agents have been trained directly or indirectly in Western technical specialties and have consciously or unconsciously absorbed Western biases. Again, within the field of animal husbandry, it is interesting to note that nowhere in the non-industrial nations has there been an officially sponsored project to upgrade dog breeding for human consumption (at least the author has never heard of such an effort). This has not occurred despite the fact that nutritionally, dog meat would be as valuable as pork or goat meat, and despite the fact that considerable numbers of people, particularly in Southeast Asia and Africa, are known to eat dog meat. The simplest explanation that can be offered is that the local animal husbandry specialists operate within a framework of Western biases. Since local change agents usually attempt to foster innovations that are acceptable within a framework of Western values, while avoiding those that diverge considerably from Western practices, they too have greater problems of communication than they would if they attempted to stay within the framework of local values.

The communication variables which were found to occur most often are:

- Use of the local language
- Formal (group meetings)
- Mass media (audiovisual techniques)
- Demonstration of innovations
- Interpersonal (face-to-face interchange)
- Intragroup

USE OF THE LOCAL LANGUAGE

The use of the local language was mentioned in 57 instances of the 203 case histories and can thus be inferred to have been influential. The use of the language appeared to be highly related to project success in that in 45 of the instances where the language was mentioned, the outcomes were relatively successful.

Use of the local language is most often a problem when the change agents are foreigners. Decisions have to be made by both the individuals involved and the sponsoring agencies of change programs whether or not to include training in the local language. And since time available for training is always limited, the decision about including language training is usually balanced against the believed value of training in other areas. Insofar as language training is included, there seems to be a relationship between belief in the importance of technical competence as contrasted to belief in the importance of human factors training. That is, agencies which follow the belief that technical competence is the primary necessary ingredient de-emphasize language training and those which stress human factors give more emphasis to the need for knowing the local languages.

In terms of American agencies, the two clearest contrasts are probably the Agency for International Development and the Peace Corps. Very few technical assistance "experts" in AID have had significant amounts of language training in the past and even fewer have actually learned to use local languages. The case

of the agronomist working in coffee production in Laos, handicapped in lacking use of the local language, is probably typical of AID technicians (CS 79). In fact, during a tour of over two years in that country, the author was the only direct-hire AID employee who could use Lao conversationally. Several young men of the International Voluntary Services had learned Lao, but these people were equivalents of Peace Corps Volunteers, even though they were supported indirectly through AID. Several people spoke French, but most had learned this language prior to their assignment with AID. It is significant that the author was serving as a community development advisor, not as a technical specialist. Peace Corps Volunteers, on the other hand, always get intensive training in local languages and although fluency is not often attained in the more exotic languages of Africa and Asia, there is probably no group of Americans overseas in which such a high proportion speak local languages. It is significant that technical expertise is of a much lower order among Peace Corps Volunteers than among AID personnel.

Speaking the local language is not a frequent problem among national change agents but it does occur in many countries, simply because of the multiplicity of languages. Thus, we do find change agents in highland Bolivia who cannot speak the local language, Aymara, but as educated Bolivians, they speak Spanish (CS 3). Change agents from South India, working in the northern, Hindi-speaking area, will find their Telegu or Malayalam of little use. In Nigeria, Ibo-speaking agricultural extension agents were working in the Ibibio area where they were unable to converse with any local villagers who did not speak English. Thus, as a communication variable, use of the local language can be relevant to national as well as foreign change agents.

Use of the local language is somewhat different from the other communication variables in that it is one degree removed from the change process, from inducing action among local people. Communication techniques such as formal presentations or interpersonal contact are direct methods for transferring ideas, while using the local language is a facility for implementing these direct methods. Direct communication techniques are essential for the transference of an idea, while the method by which this is done permits latitude. Thus, while some kind of direct communication technique—formal, interpersonal, mass media, or demonstration—is absolutely required, speaking the local language is not absolutely necessary. It is possible to transfer ideas through interpreters or even by nonverbal means.

When an outsider learns to use a local language, it indicates that he is interested in communicating with the potential recipients, and thereby he is in a more favorable position both to learn more of their culture, which is useful, and to establish rapport more efficiently. When he knows nothing of the local idiom, his ability to establish rapport or to adapt his ideas to the local culture is, of course, severely limited. This was the case with the agronomist on the coffee project in southern Laos. He established little rapport and did nothing to adapt his innovation to the local culture (CS 79). An identical situation existed in the effort of the Spanish-speaking Bolivian, cited before, to improve living conditions and agricultural production among Bolivian Indians. There were two levels of change agents, the United Nations officials and Bolivian nationals hired to work for them. The UN officials were on one-year tours and had little incentive to learn Aymara, while the nationals they hired were urban people from outside the area, who spoke only Spanish. Communication was consequently very poor and the Indians developed considerable suspicion of the UN officials and the Bolivians working for them. Although there were some smaller projects which were partially successful, the aimed-for improved agricultural production was never reached and the project was ultimately closed (CS 3).

The instance just cited is not meant to indicate that lack of language facility is the sole cause for failure to reach project goals. It means only that communication is less effective. The recipients frequently do not learn what the aims of the change agent are. The fact that the goals would probably

be beneficial to the local people is therefore not relevant insofar as understanding the process of interaction is concerned. If interaction does not take place, the goals will not be realized. In this particular instance, both the Bolivian government and the United Nations agencies involved were genuinely committed to improving the standard of living of the Indians. But the Indians, who had been exploited by outsiders for hundreds of years previously, were not convinced of the objective, and lack of direct interchange in the local language undoubtedly contributed to their belief that the outsiders were like previous exploiters. Other innovation techniques, notably adapting the innovation to the local culture and flexibility of implementation, would be more likely to be effective if direct communication in the local language were possible.

Direct communication channels are not necessarily open simply because a change agent speaks the local language. Theoretically, these techniques can be utilized more easily if the language is spoken, since it obviates the problems of obtaining and using an intermediary or interpreter. However, even local change agents, who usually speak the common language, frequently fail to establish direct communication channels, which basically negates the advantage they have from being able to speak directly to the members of local communities. This kind of problem is indicated in an effort to convince village farmers in Nigeria to adopt phosphate fertilizers. The agricultural extension agent was from the local area and consequently spoke the local language. He was, moreover, highly enthusiastic about improving the farming practices and was technically well trained (a college graduate). However, his effort to establish direct communication channels involved gathering the farmers in groups and lecturing to them on the virtues of using fertilizer. In all instances, he talked to the farmers, but he never gave them a chance to respond with their ideas so he never learned that they had many reservations. One was based on the fact that the government had distributed free fertilizer in the past with no instructions for use; as a result the farmers had often misused it, and not only did they fail to get increased yields, but in some cases they even harmed their crops. Thus they had a negative attitude toward fertilizer use even before the project started. Moreover, they were generally suspicious of government-sponsored projects, on the basis of previous unpleasant experiences. Very few farmers purchased fertilizer (CS 95). These kinds of suspicions and consequent problems might have been partially avoided if more efficient direct communication channels, particularly for feedback, had been established. But with the information flow strictly on a formal, one-way direction, not even the language facility of the change agent was of value.

Language facility, like many innovation variables, will not necessarily compensate for innovations which, by their nature, are intrinsically difficult to transfer. Some kinds of innovations being exported to the nonindustrial nations have advantages that are very difficult to demonstrate in a limited period of time. The previously mentioned water-boiling effort in Peru was of this type; the fact that the change agent established a positive image for herself, spoke the local language, and even established fairly effective direct communication channels was insufficient to counterbalance the fact that the local people simply could not see the connection between better health and drinking boiled water (CS 110). Preventive medical innovations tend to be of this order more than any others.

A change agent who speaks the local language has the advantage of establishing effective relationships and learning more of the local culture more easily than one who works through an interpreter. However, this facility does not ensure innovation if other innovation techniques are deficient. In general, it appears that use of the local language is a secondary influence for actually bringing about adoption of new ideas or practices.

FORMAL COMMUNICATION

This type of communication is defined as the transmission of information through formal group meetings, in neighborhood or village councils, or other

meeting places. This is one of the methods referred to previously as direct communication channels. As one of the more obvious ways of contacting groups of people, it is utilized heavily in industrial Western countries, as well as in the nonindustrial nations. Basically, nothing is needed other than the ability to gather people and someone who can deliver the message. Such communication in the form of speech-making has been widely used in the nonindustrial nations, particularly from government representatives to members of local communities. Its value in influencing behavior among villagers has been questioned. One anthropologist has described the situation in which Indian villagers listen respectfully to what is told them, but without being convinced; after the speaker leaves, in discussions among themselves they decide whether or not to heed the advice given in the formal presentation [Dube, 22].

Of course, simply making the local people aware of a project accomplishes something. But it is probably true that villagers rarely decide to undertake a new activity on the basis of nothing more than formal presentations. The principal difficulty with formal communication is that it rarely contains means for feedback. The speaker can, of course, ask for questions, from which he can presumably obtain some idea of the reactions of his listeners. But college professors know how difficult it is to get feedback from undergraduates in formal classroom situations. The difficulty increases as the status differential becomes greater. Villagers and the urban poor in the nonindustrial nations are on the lowest status level in their countries and the difference between them and government officials is usually great. Thus the opportunities for spontaneous communication feedback are not promising.

Formal communication techniques were cited in 101 of these reports, or approximately 50 percent, and the correlation with outcome was fairly high. In only six instances was the project outcome opposite to the influence. However, it must be mentioned that in most projects, several different forms of communication were used besides the formal and there is no way of knowing which exerted the most influence.

When communication channels are almost exclusively in one direction, people in local communities may cooperate for reasons other than those advanced by the change agents. In particular they may cooperate to satisfy the wishes of government officers, either from fear of punishment for not doing so, or in the hope that they can obtain future favors from such officers. The difficulty with this kind of cooperation is that when the pressure from the government change agents is removed, there is little likelihood that the new practices will be continued. Such an occurrence was well documented by S.C. Dube [17] in reference to the community development program in India. In two villages of north India which he studied, communication was characterized as being almost exclusively from the top of the status ladder to the bottom rung, from government officers to village recipients. The methods of reaching the local people were primarily formal or audiovisual and were described as technically good. In one village, in addition to meetings, speeches, and visits by VIPs, there were posters, movies, pamphlets, sightseeing tours, and fairs. But all methods were characterized as unidirectional. What the villagers thought of the variety of innovations presented to them was very imperfectly known. Most of the innovations were tried, although some to a very limited degree and some for quite different reasons than those expected by the change agents. Two of the motivations which were explicitly mentioned for adoption of new practices were to please the officials or to give the family prestige. A few innovations which produced immediate economic advantages were readily adopted; however, those which would have provided long-term benefits but which required considerable risks were not continued. Had feedback channels been open, some of the difficulties of risk-taking might have been learned, with a consequent possibility of modifying the project direction. To bring this about, more than formal and mass media communication was needed.

When innovations are brought to the point where their advantages are demonstrated, and the advantages are obvious, the disabilities arising from no more than formal communication may be overcome. A previously cited project in a Nigerian village to get a small irrigation scheme into operation illustrates this principle. The scheme was explained to the village council which approved it, although according to the person reporting the project, it is doubtful that the council understood what was to happen. (The situation was similar to the Indian example; there was cooperation with the government officers for reasons other than understanding the project aims.) The dam and the first irrigation channel were built by the ministry of agriculture and the advantages soon were apparent. In particular, the washing and bathing facilities of villagers were greatly improved. It was also fortunate that the approval of the local pastor was obtained before the project began, and when the water rose, his baptisms were easier to perform. The other channels were built by the villagers, who, after instruction, began to grow their local crops under irrigation (CS 2).

Innovations in preventive medicine, it has been mentioned, are almost always difficult to introduce, no matter which techniques are used by the change agents, because the advantages are most difficult to demonstrate to individuals in local communities. Even in projects where communications have been elaborate, and have included formal meetings, understanding is not usually created and needs for these new practices are not generated. Projects to introduce sanitary latrines very frequently run into this kind of difficulty. This is illustrated by an effort of the American Friends in a North Indian village. Efforts to communicate the new idea were quite varied, including general village meetings and small group discussions as well as a wide variety of audiovisual techniques. As a result of a year's campaign, some 26 latrines were purchased, but only six were installed (CS 40, CS 41). It is interesting to note that several other innovations that were attempted with the same villagers achieved considerably more success. Almost all which were adopted, however, had clearly perceived economic or convenience benefits. Wells with pumps were quickly accepted (CS 42).

MASS MEDIA COMMUNICATION

This form of communication is defined as the transmission of information regarding innovations by means of printed matter, pictures, charts, loud-speaker systems, films, and other mass-contact aids which have been developed in the industrial nations for influencing public opinion. Insofar as inducing change on a local level in nonindustrial nations is concerned, mass media or audiovisual communication has the same advantages and disadvantages that formal communication has. Large numbers of people can be contacted at comparatively small expense, although opportunities for feedback are practically nonexistent. By their very nature, audiovisual communication techniques are unidirectional. Messages are transmitted, but how they are actually received and understood can only be learned through other communication channels.

An added difficulty of audiovisual communication in the local communities of the nonindustrial nations is the relative lack of familiarity with the various media used. Since most village people are illiterate, printed matter is of limited value. Even the lack of familiarity with the mechanics of certain techniques can cause misperception. There is a widespread tale circulated among international development people which, even though it may be exaggerated, probably does contain a germ of fact. It tells of a change agent in public health showing slides to a group of villagers to illustrate the harmful effects of contamination by flies. The slides showed flies on human excrement, flies on food, and enlargements of the insect itself to indicate how the bacteria were carried. His audience watched attentively. At the end of the talk, the public health "expert" asked if there were any questions. There was reluctance to speak out, but finally an old man raised his hand. When asked for his

comment, he said, "We liked seeing your pictures very much. However, here in our country, the flies are quite small and when they come around, we just swat them."

The old man, and presumably others in the audience, perceived the full-size closeups of the flies as representing their actual size! It is not implied here that most mass media messages are so wildly misperceived, but lesser misperceptions of the same kind probably do occur frequently in audiences of local people in the nonindustrial nations, simply because of unfamiliarity with the mechanical properties of the presentations.

The use of audiovisual techniques was cited in 49 of these reports, 46 of which were classified as generally successful projects. Thus, it seems safe to infer that these techniques do have a positive value. However, projects are rare in which no communication channels are used other than mass media. Consequently, it is difficult to assess the relative worth of the different techniques in a given project. All that can be said is that in such instances, the mass media techniques probably contributed to adoption. The few that failed to gain acceptance, despite mass media communication, as well as other kinds, were all efforts in public health, and the primary difficulty has already been mentioned--the advantages were difficult to demonstrate regardless of the type of communication used.

It is apparent that an innovation which is intrinsically difficult to transfer will be more likely to need feedback than one which is relatively easy to introduce. If there is little resistance, there is little need to know the specific reactions of the potential adopters; but when, due to the nature of the innovation, the potential resistance is high, feedback will provide the chief means by which projects can be modified and possibly brought to successful conclusions. Consequently, unidirectional communication flows would theoretically be particularly ineffective in public health projects.

Such a project (not cited before) was a campaign to combat a cholera epidemic in a rural Chinese market community, where the main initial communication was a series of posters put up in the town to indicate the need for inoculations. However, at the time of inoculations, the nurses went into the streets and personally begged people to take shots. A later study indicated that a majority of people knew of the medical facilities available, but had not been convinced either by the posters or by the personal entreaties of the nurses that their traditional techniques of propitiating the local deities were not enough to stave off illness (CS 10). The relationship between the illness of cholera and inoculations is not, of course, readily apparent, and the idea that posters and personal entreaties would counterbalance the cultural beliefs developed through decades and centuries is quite simplistic. That Chinese villagers will accept modern Western medicines when they are presented in ways which do not create conflict with their traditions is indicated by the success of the village clinic system under the Communists [16]. It must be borne in mind that resistance to vaccinations and inoculations persisted in the United States well into the twentieth century, despite indoctrination in schools and elsewhere for decades, and despite the fact that there have been few alternative beliefs to explain such illnesses to Americans.

Another project, similar to the Chinese cholera campaign, although with more intensive communication, was the venereal disease campaign in Tanganyika cited before. There were formal group meetings as well as interpersonal contact, and hundreds of copies of a pamphlet on VD were printed and distributed. However, the local tribespeople did not regard the disease as more serious than a common cold and what they learned from the change agents was not sufficient to change their minds (CS 158).

DEMONSTRATION OF INNOVATIONS

This form of communication is defined as the technique of showing, in a pragmatic fashion, the advantages of the new idea or practice as a means of

persuading the local people to adopt it. Demonstration used in this sense should not be confused with illustration, which does not normally include any clear indication of the advantage of the new idea. For instance, merely showing farmers the technique of planting in rows is not a demonstration according to the definition given here. A positive demonstration would be possible only when the crop had matured and a significantly larger yield had been produced. This effect has been called in agricultural extension "result demonstration," that is, the end results will have been demonstrated.

There were 51 instances in these reports in which positive demonstrations took place and in 48, most of the project goals were achieved. Thus it appears that this form of communication is quite effective.

It should be noted that demonstration differs from the use of mass media techniques. Audiovisual communication is practically always illustrative only; such media purport to show reality in films, written material, or tape recordings. But to an audience which is unaccustomed to them, audiovisual materials cannot really provide "proofs," or show results of new practices. A venereal disease campaign such as the one just discussed illustrates this difficulty. The posters that are usually presented in this kind of project illustrate the manner in which diseases are transmitted and often show persons ravaged by the disease in contrast to healthy persons. However, when a villager or poor townsman sees such posters, where is the "proof" that the invisible creatures illustrated are the cause of the disease or that the healthy person shown was actually made healthy by the specified cure? It is not incidental that VD eradication and other public health projects end in failure more often than any other projects (CS 101, CS 158).

Curative or therapeutic health projects are quite different in terms of reactions by local communities—for the reason that cause and effect relationships, "proofs," are far more apparent. It has been noted by a number of people that penicillin treatment, particularly for yaws eradication, has been widely accepted in the nonindustrial countries. The primary reason seems to be the quick response to the treatment, as with one injection the symptoms are greatly reduced, if not eliminated. Such an occurrence was described for a project in Colombia and Ecuador, where in spite of conflict with the local medical belief, the almost immediate response to penicillin treatment caused widespread acceptance. The same degree of acceptance in Eastern Nigeria was reported to the author. Result demonstrations can be provided in curative medical programs in a manner that is impossible with long-term or indirect public health measures.

It is no accident that the bulk of demonstrations found in these reports were in agricultural improvement efforts. This can be explained on two counts. First, result demonstrations have constituted a technique that was developed in agricultural extension work long before the period of intensive technical aid to the nonindustrial countries. The technique was carried to these countries by agricultural technicians as part of their professional baggage. Not only did Western technicians use demonstrations directly as part of their innovation strategies, but also, in countries where they helped in training and organizing extension services, they included training in demonstration techniques. Second, demonstration techniques are more applicable to agricultural innovations than to any other kind. Comparatively, it is much easier to demonstrate to a potential adopter the advantages of a new type of seed, practice of animal husbandry, or agricultural tool, than it is to "demonstrate" a new health, educational, or organizational practice. In most instances of agricultural innovations, the "proof" is apparent within one growing season.

In the great majority of cases included here, where result demonstrations proved effective, the new practice or idea was adopted. In one previously described project involving a program to bring irrigation agriculture to a Nigerian village, a demonstration effect was evidently instrumental in bringing about adoption of the new method. In that instance, the agricultural ministry constructed the first irrigation channel to show the farmers what it would do for them. As an added measure, the village farmers were taken on a tour of

the area extension farm and shown the irrigated area there. The entire area around the village was then put into irrigation crops through the labor of the farmers (CS 2). It should be mentioned that in general, result demonstrations are usually effective only at the site of the projected innovations. Demonstrations at agricultural stations usually are not convincing to village farmers because the situation is quite different from that of their own farms. In the Nigerian irrigation instance, it is probable that the convincing result demonstration was the one that took place in the village.

Very typical as a form of agricultural demonstration which helped bring about adoption was the introduction of improved seed varieties in an Indian village. Despite the fact that the villagers expressed no discontent with the old varieties, and despite their suspicion of the change agent, when the new seeds were planted in half fields alongside half fields of the old seeds, the positive superiority of the harvest induced quick acceptance (CS 51). This case also illustrates the relative unimportance of the image of the change agent when practical benefits are perceived by the recipients.

Demonstration techniques, in agricultural or other kinds of projects, need not be restricted to the mere production of the new item but can be utilized for all aspects of its utilization, to the stage where the economic benefits have been fully realized by the local people. The successful overall utilization of this strategy is illustrated by the previously cited project to introduce tomato cultivation as a cash crop in a local Jamaican community. When the idea was first presented to the local people by the schoolmaster - change agent, they were frankly skeptical and refused to plant the seeds. The change agent personally went to the farmers and talked to them individually; in the first year he was able to persuade 28 people to accept the seeds, even though all did not use them. At the same time he obtained the services of an agricultural extension agent, who showed the people step by step how to cultivate, fertilize, spray, pick, and pack the crop. A ready export market was found by shipping the tomatoes to Canada. The first crop was large and sold at a good profit. The following year, 40 cultivators organized a cooperative, and within 12 years, 15,000 growers were involved (CS 61). Thus there was demonstration of the advantages of all the new practices from the production to the marketing stages.

The change process is complex and it is rare that any single strategy or influence is sufficient to bring successful adoption. Some influences are stronger than others, but even the stronger influences usually need to be supplemented in order to bring about changes in behavior. The strategy of demonstration is theoretically strong, but alone, it too is usually insufficient to bring about meaningful change. The effort to introduce phosphate fertilizer among farmers in a Nigerian village, described earlier, met with little success. Lack of feedback communication channels was coupled with a negative attitude on the part of the farmers, due to past poor results from using fertilizer. It is significant that the change agent did conduct successful demonstrations on farmers' land on which a 30% increase in crops was reported. However, he did not follow up the demonstrations and exploit their propaganda value. He returned to the capital after the demonstrations and did not come back to take orders for the next year's fertilizer until well after the harvest season, when the old ideas regarding fertilizer use had become reestablished. Moreover, the change agent had emphasized the European nature of the fertilizer which reinforced the belief of the local people that it was satisfactory for Europeans but would not work in their fields (CS 95). Of course, the demonstrations should have disproved this idea, but alone, they were not enough to counteract the negativism present from previous experience.

INTERPERSONAL INTERCHANGE

This form of communication is defined as the transmission of ideas by means of face-to-face interaction between the change agent and the potential adopters

of new ideas, usually in paired or small-group situations. The type that is used most commonly is the home visit. It is obvious that such interpersonal interchange differs significantly from both formal and mass media communication and to a lesser extent from demonstration. Personal communication has advantage and disadvantages that are just the opposite of those of other means of communicating. The primary advantage is that face-to-face communication can be more intensive and of a type that is most commonly used for idea transfer in other social situations. Although interpersonal interchange is the most common means of communication in all societies, it is probably even more significant in peasant communities of the nonindustrial nations, simply because other means of communication are much rarer. Relatively few audiovisual or mass media communication channels are open to the peasant villager or even to the urban poor in the nonindustrial nations. The amount of illiteracy alone largely cuts down on the possibility of using the printed word as a significant communication channel. Communication channels such as films or television are only rarely accessible to the usual villager of the nonindustrial nations. Lacking these other communication stimuli, such villagers must necessarily depend far more on interpersonal sources of information than is the case with people of the industrialized nations.

Another distinct advantage of interpersonal interchange is that feedback channels can exist most easily through such communication. It was indicated earlier that feedback, or information on reactions from potential adopters, is next to impossible when communication is of either the formal or the mass media type. While it is possible for there to be a single direction of information flow when there is face-to-face communication, the probability of reaction communication from adopters is much greater.

The primary disadvantage of interpersonal interchange in the change process is that considerably fewer people can be contacted with a given effort than could be reached with mass media or formal communication techniques. The decision on whether to rely on personal contact is usually made on the basis of costs and available personnel. In these reports, such personal communication was used in 81 instances and in only two were the projects unsuccessful. The correlation with outcome thus seems high, although it must be remembered that other communication techniques were also used in most projects.

The significance of interpersonal interchange is well illustrated in a comparison of three projects, two in Somalia and one in Jordan, which have been cited before in other contexts. The goal in all instances was to improve the grazing conditions for people engaged in herding in arid lands. The goals were not realized in two of the efforts: In the Jordanian project the efforts were abandoned, and in one of the two in Somalia, the project caused precisely what it was meant to prevent—overgrazing. In both instances the potential beneficiaries of the innovation actively opposed the intentions of the change agents. At night they cut the fences and dikes which had been erected to close off certain areas for pasture improvement (CS 62, CS 145).

The other project in Somalia obtained quite a different reaction from the local people. After two years of efforts, village societies were organized; they drew up their own rules for preservation of grazing lands and made their own decisions to close off certain areas of land for purposes of regeneration. The local people also hauled stones, planted trees, and built roads to assist the conservation effort. The idea became so popular that neighboring communities started forming societies for the same purpose (CS 146). Thus the idea spread on its own.


It should be mentioned that in all three projects the practical advantages of the conservation effort were demonstrated to the local people, who could see that improved grazing conditions were produced by the new methods. What, therefore, caused the significantly different reaction? Although there were other influences, one fact stands out clearly. In the two projects that failed to reach the desired goals, communication with the local people was

the poorest possible; there is no indication of any interpersonal interchange between the technical advisors and the potential adopters, and feedback just did not exist. In fact, the reasons why the local people were cutting dikes and fences were learned in both instances only when anthropologists were sent in on "troubleshooting" investigations. It also appears that even when the advisors in Jordan had the anthropologists' report, they ignored it. The communication in the Somalia project was so poor that the adopters had a mistaken idea of what the goals were. They thought it was a government well-digging project, designed to provide them with water in the dry season rather than a range-management program. The goal in Jordan also was not understood.

The channels and degree of communication in the Somalia effort which did achieve its goals were quite opposite from the other two efforts cited. Formal classes were held for officials and the public, and a short film made on the project's results was shown. However, probably most significant were the numerous discussions held with chiefs, headmen, religious leaders, and the potential adopters in general. Intensive tours of the area were made for this purpose. Presumably the same problems of local land control existed here as in the unsuccessful Somalia project. But there was a difference. Since communication channels were open, the change agents were able to adjust to the problems.

INTRAGROUP COMMUNICATION

While a change agent may establish certain channels of communication to transfer his ideas to potential adopters, the interaction process does not stop at this point. When any significant event occurs in a local community, the members of that community invariably begin a process of communication among themselves. As they consider the event, spontaneously they begin to talk about it. Such informal conversation or gossip is a powerful force in the process of decision making, which, unfortunately for the outcome of many change projects in the past, has often been overlooked. The differences between these communication channels can best be represented by a simple diagram.



Almost all change agents are aware, in a general way, that the people they are trying to influence talk about the new events being brought into their lives. But this awareness is usually on a low level and seldom is it believed that deliberate action is required to influence the behavior of the potential adopters. The most clear-cut type of recognition and utilization of intragroup communication is that between children and their parents. In anticipation of intragroup communication, change agents attempt to pass information on to students with the expectation that they will take the knowledge back to their parents or other family members. More often, however, intragroup communication takes place without any conscious preplanning by the change agents. It just happens, because local people talk to each other about the proposed changes and the agents do not recognize any responsibility to try to guide such talk. In fact, the existence of negative communication, or critical rumors, usually

comes as a surprise to the change agent. Typically, he is amazed at the garbled version of his intentions if he hears about it at all. Probably in most instances where projects fail to reach the set goals, the change agents do not learn of the rumors that probably have been generated.

Gossip in local communities is not a kind of behavior to which an outsider can easily become privy. Gossip is private communication, and unless the outsider has some degree of acceptance by the local people, they are not likely to include him in such conversations. Moreover, it is not the kind of information that can be obtained easily through customary sociological techniques such as questionnaires. Most questionnaire information is obtained by means of deliberate "rational" queries with the expected responses being deliberate and "rational." Regardless of any other conditions the informant has the opportunity to evaluate the question before answering and to provide a response which not only will satisfy the questioner, but also will not involve the informant in any unpleasant consequences. Most well planned survey research attempts to get around these difficulties by promising the informant anonymity, and assuring him that there will be no repercussions as a result of his answers. This procedure undoubtedly helps, but the basic characteristics of gossip—its private nature and its spontaneity—will still differ considerably from questionnaire data. Probably the only reliable method of getting information on gossip is participant observation, on the condition that the outsider is accepted by the group and can join in its gossip sessions.

Perhaps another reason that change agents have so often ignored the influence of gossip in the past is its omnipresence. Wherever people gather there is gossip. Most kinds of behavior do not continue as constantly. For instance, all people have certain supernatural belief systems and ritual behavior to express those beliefs. However, such systems and behavior vary from one culture to another and it is theorized that this very difference brings recognition from outsiders.

Practically all Western advisors are aware that Asians are Hindus, or Buddhists or Muslims, and quite frequently they explain behavior of the believers as being a result of such beliefs and practices. In other words, the belief systems, even if quite imperfectly understood, do provide a kind of reality to the Western mind. In contrast, it is not at all common to hear such advisors say that gossip or rumor—longer among the local people is the source of their difficulties. This kind of behavior does not constitute the same kind of reality. The only explanation this author can suggest is that all peoples take belief systems seriously, and when the belief systems of another group are considerably different, the contrast increases the awareness; informal, intragroup communication, on the other hand, is merely considered as a constant background occurrence of little significance. The situation is somewhat comparable to the existence of air in the natural world. Air is everywhere on the earth's surface and unless something drastic such as smoke pollution takes place, it is safe to ignore its existence. Similarly, when people come together, normally there is gossip, and because of its constancy it is usually ignored. However, the author believes that while the existence of undirected talk among local groups is a constant, what the individuals say is not, and that this kind of behavior is probably more important than is generally believed.

In all case histories studied where the existence of gossip with positive nature was recorded, 20 in all, the projects tended to be successful. However, in practically all of these there was relatively efficient communication between the change agents and the adopters, and the innovations had clearly perceived practical advantages to the adopters. The probability is that when there are innovations of perceived practical benefit and the communication channels are relatively open, such gossip will be positive. In other words, the gossip itself is a result of the positive nature of these two other variables, rather than an independent causal factor.

A good example is found in a public health program conducted in Guam, previously cited. The primary effort was a rat control project in a local village

of 1,000 inhabitants. The change agent first discovered that rat infestation was an important problem in the minds of the local people, particularly because rats were responsible for a considerable economic loss. The change agent therefore decided to concentrate on the rat problem exclusively, even though his broad goal was to assist in reducing intestinal parasitism. First he obtained the approval of the village commissioner, then at a monthly village meeting he explained the project to the prospective participants. After they indicated willingness to participate, he arranged for a team of specialists to help in health education. The team's sanitary engineer visited each home personally, explaining, demonstrating, and giving advice. Also, a series of informal talks and discussions were given at the local school to help the children understand the project. As a result of this fairly intensive communication, the local people who became interested talked up the project to their friends, and the school children carried some of the ideas home to their parents. The author of the project report claimed the "bamboo telegraph" was so efficient that whenever a conference was held with the village commissioner, the entire village knew exactly what had transpired shortly afterward. At the project's termination it was claimed that of the total of 110 premises inspected, only eight showed no definite improvement, some 1,500 rats had been killed, and hospital records indicated a drop in gastroenteritis (CS 30).

In another project described previously, intragroup communication was instrumental in helping to achieve the goals set by the change agent. This was the effort to promote modern home practices in southern Uganda through the establishment of women's clubs. The change agent's first step was to hold a meeting of interested people, including men, in a local home, school, or community hall. She would talk on the proposal and answer all questions, after which the women could decide whether they wanted a club. When a club was established, regular teaching sessions, particularly in sewing, were begun. There were perceived practical benefits, both in the clothing the women were able to make for themselves and in the small rewards they received, such as needles and thread. They paid the equivalent of 10 cents per week for membership and bought their own cloth. An additional motivation was the status obtained by being a member and from having a club in a community. The local chiefs came to feel they were behind the times if they did not have such a club in their district. This came about primarily as a result of the gossip of the women, substantiated by showing off their new dresses. Consequently, within a four-year period, 40 such clubs with 30 to 50 members each were organized (CS 165).

Except for a few projects where information was given to students with the hope that they would transmit it to their parents, only one was found in which the change agents consciously depended on gossip as a means of introducing an innovation. Not surprisingly, the change agents were communications specialists. This was a pilot project in family planning in Taiwan. The change agents used a wide variety of communication techniques at first, but then depended on female gossip to carry the knowledge beyond the families that were contacted directly. An evaluation study later revealed that about 20% of the women who accepted contraceptives had never been directly contacted by the change agents, but had learned about the innovation through gossip (CS 203).

Most of the projects during which harmful rumors were reported, seven in number, succeeded despite the malicious gossip. In only one of the seven were the rumors correlated with project failure. However, most of these rumors occurred in the initial stages of the projects' implementation and the effects were neutralized by improved communication. Probably in most instances where rumors were instrumental in halting projects, the change agents never learned of their existence.

Almost all the rumors were a result of insufficient communication for the local people to learn the goals of the projects clearly, added to their basic skepticism toward powerful outsiders. It is hypothesized that rumors rarely start if there is efficient communication input and feedback. If local people

feel sufficient confidence in their relationships with outsiders to express their opinions on proposed changes, they need not depend exclusively on the generation of explanations with one another. Unfortunately, such feedback channels frequently do not exist; when they do not, rumors can be expected. Rumors will probably tend to be malicious, or harmful to the projects' goals, in proportion to the perceived threat of the outside influences.

Some harmful rumors that were found in these case histories sound far-fetched, but they give an indication of what local people think when they are first approached with a novel idea, only partly communicated, and perceived as potentially dangerous. This is exemplified in the hookworm treatment campaign in Ceylon. Information was initially collected on the incidence of the disease, a process that made the villagers uneasy. They were afraid that the information was being collected for tax or military draft purposes. When free treatment was offered, it was in the form of capsules. The rumor was generated and spread that the capsules contained little bombs which would explode after being swallowed. Many accepted treatment later, even so, due principally to the establishment of better communication and the utilization of local leaders to sanction the idea (CS 7). In regard to this rumor type, it is probably most significant that peasant villagers are usually very suspicious of information collectors unless relatively durable contacts are established.

Another series of harmful rumors emerged in a community development project in Cali, Colombia, and here again there was inefficient communication of the project's goals as well as a perceived threat to the local way of life. The potential participants were squatters in urban slums who lacked confidence in municipal authorities since their community had been neglected for years. Because they had no legal title to their land, they feared that the suggestions to build a bridge, road, and drainage canals were no more than preparations to convert their neighborhood into a residential zone for the wealthy. Furthermore, they formed the impression that the change agency, CINVA,¹ was a North American company intent on buying the land. In particular, their fears grew when CINVA began to conduct a survey of the local environment. However, these fears were allayed by persistent efforts to inform them that the real goal was improvement of their conditions, and by adroit utilization of local leaders to sanction the project. Ultimately the physical improvements were carried out on a self-help basis through locally organized committees (CS 12).

Other rumors which occurred in projects have been partially described before. There was the campaign to register handicapped people for a public assistance program in Ghana during which a rumor was generated that the purpose was to round up and dispose of beggars and destitutes and to lock up handicapped children (CS 25). A particularly vivid rumor emerged in the early phase of the potato improvement project at Vicos in highland Peru. The Indians initially saw this project as threatening their traditional ways and presenting them with an unknown future. A rumor was generated that the Indians were being fattened so the *gringos* could boil them down and use the oil for American machinery (CS 113). In this project, as in most others where rumors occurred, there were elements of the population that opposed the innovation because it threatened their vested interests, and it is natural to speculate that such dissidents produced these stories. This may be true in most cases of this kind, but the relevant fact is that the potential participants were disposed to believe the accounts enough to continue spreading them.

A surprisingly similar rumor was generated in a nutrition project in Guatemala, cited earlier. The change agents were attempting to introduce supplementary foods for school children on an experimental basis, but as a part of the effort, certain tests were made. Taking blood samples was

¹Centro Interamericana de Viviendo y Planeamiento, a division of the Organization of American States.

particularly frightening, since the villagers believed that blood once lost could not be regenerated. A rumor was spread that the purpose of the project was to fatten the children in order to send them away to be eaten (CS 33). Another rumor, in a project which has been described previously, was in connection with the land rehabilitation project among Bedouins in Jordan. Although the purpose of the change agents was to improve grazing conditions for the nomadic tribesmen, the Bedouin code was broken when dikes and fences were constructed without permission from the users. A rumor emerged that the U.S. change agents, in collusion with the Jordanian Government, were building the dikes and growing grass to settle refugees from Palestine in the area (CS 62). Similarity in the reaction of the local people in this project and those in the urban community development in Colombia is obvious. In both instances there was a perceived threat of land loss.

In all the cases referred to except the last (the land rehabilitation project in Jordan) the goals were, in the main, achieved, and in all instances this was accomplished by improving communication with the potential adopters and/or working through local leaders. The Jordan land rehabilitation project differs from the others in that the rumor, as well as other reactions by the local people, were learned only after the project had been terminated. It has been mentioned that when an anthropologist was sent in to find out what the problem was, he reported the rumor, as well as other details of local reaction. It is probable that a large proportion of projects which are abandoned because of negative local reaction do have associated rumors, which are not learned in most instances. Projects such as the one in Jordan, where social scientists are called in for analysis, are rarities.

Summary

Techniques of communication, it is hypothesized, have a highly critical influence on the innovation process. The reason is that no change can come from outside unless new ideas are transmitted. Other innovation strategies cannot be used if the new ideas are not transmitted. It is further hypothesized that communication in cross-cultural change is more complex than it is in unicultural situations, because of lack of a common frame of reference between the change agents and the potential adopters.

Six basic forms of communication have been indicated as relevant in the cross-cultural change process. The first type, use of the local language, differs from the others in the sense that it is one degree removed from the actual transmittal of ideas. It is a method of utilizing the other primary communication techniques but is not actually required. While one of the other types must be used if information is to be transferred, theoretically an interpreter can bring this about. The most that can be said about use of the local language is that other communication channels will probably be utilized more effectively if the local language is spoken.

Two of the direct communication techniques, formal and audiovisual methods, are impersonal and aimed at mass audiences. Both suffer the disadvantage of not being able to provide intensive communication even though more people can be reached at a given cost. Both, probably, are suitable mainly for creating an awareness of new ideas but, alone, are not suitable for convincing local people to adopt new ideas. Demonstration of innovations has the advantage of providing "proofs" of the advantage of a new idea which presumably will help to convince local people to adopt the innovations. Interpersonal interchange provides the most intensive communication, although admittedly it requires the maximum amount of effort on the part of change agents. Its value lies in the fact that it is the most common type of trusted information source among villagers and urban poor in nonindustrial lands; further, it provides the only reliable means of obtaining feedback, probably one of the most critical elements of communication in cross-cultural situations.

Intragroup communication seems to indicate the degree of information flow between change agents and potential adopters, positive gossip reflecting understanding and acceptance of the change agents' goals and rumors indicating lack of such understanding and awareness. In addition, gossip can be used consciously to help spread such knowledge.

Chapter 12

PARTICIPATION

Since the definition of the change process used here is one in which a new idea or technique is transferred from one culture to another by voluntary means, participation by the recipients is clearly a crucial ingredient. In fact, the participation of the local people is similar to communication in its significance. Just as it is not possible to transfer a new idea to a group of people without establishing some communication channels for informing them what that idea is, so is it not possible to expect a new form of behavior by local people without their having made some effort to learn it. There is almost always a time period, usually of months or years, during which change agents attempt to transfer the necessary information and obtain participation by the local people, and at the end of which, it is hoped, the local people will adopt the practice or idea as their own. If the change process is viewed in this way, participation by local people during the implementation or trial stage is a critically necessary variable.

It must be stressed however, that participation during the implementation period, while necessary for final adoption and integration, does not automatically assure such an outcome. Local people may initially agree that a given innovation is worth working for and participate in its implementation, but later find that it is too difficult, or does not really provide the advantages they thought it would, or produces conflicts with traditional beliefs or practices. Consequently, they may discontinue participation in the implementation process.

Participation in the trial stage of transferring a new idea can be of various types and the different types imply different degrees of commitment. Degrees of participation vary from the contribution of labor or goods by the local people to nothing more than passive compliance. Obviously, it is most desirable to attempt to get participation which will be most likely to produce ultimate adoption. And since the change agent is primarily responsible in obtaining the kind of participation needed, it is useful to consider the relative influence of the different types. The author has identified three major types of participation: labor and/or material contributions, organizational, and passive.

LABOR AND MATERIAL CONTRIBUTIONS

The most usual kind of participation sought by change agents is labor, because most communities that are approached with development ideas are poor and labor is the most easily obtained commodity. Also, the contribution of labor, as well as material contributions by the local people, provides the most obvious indication of commitment. A total of 113 cases were identified in which labor and/or material goods were contributed toward project goals.

The fact that material contributions are made by local people somewhat less frequently than contributions of labor results partially from the practice whereby most change agencies provide some materials to participants as a means of assisting the change process. In fact, the commonest local stereotype of assistance agencies may be that they are providers of goods. Under such circumstances, villagers or urban poor would consider the provision of new ideas or techniques of secondary importance. And even in those projects where the local people make material contributions, these are often of a minor or token nature. For instance, in the previously cited latrine project in India where

ultimately there was little adoption, each participant's total contribution was the purchase of a toilet base, estimated at a subsidized cost to the villagers of 84 cents (CS 41). Even in those projects where participants' contributions are substantial, ordinarily they are at least matched by contributions of money or material by the assistance agency concerned. A typical example was the community development program in Laos during the years 1960-61. The main type of self-help activity undertaken by villagers was the construction of schools, for which the local people were required to provide sand, gravel, wood, and the necessary labor. The assistance agency provided cement, roofing material, and hardware (CS 78). There are very few projects of planned change supported or sponsored by governments of the nonindustrialized nations for which no material goods are provided by the change agencies involved.

In the majority of the cases studied where there were significant contributions of labor and/or material by local people, the projects, as might be expected, reached relatively successful conclusions. Of the 113 instances cited above, only three ended in failure. The implication of course, is that people do not abandon projects lightly where they have invested significant amounts of their own labor or wealth.

The community development project in Laos just mentioned was of this nature. Several hundred schools, roads, bridges, and markets were built on a self-help basis within a period of one year. Also, acceptance was facilitated by the fact that all projects were based on felt needs of the local inhabitants. The members of each community selected the type of construction activity they wanted. The only restrictions imposed were that it should be feasible to accomplish each project on a local level and that it should contribute to the socioeconomic advancement of the community (CS 78).

Another example of the same kind was in the project to dig drainage and irrigation canals in a rural district of East Pakistan. Of the 24 original projects, 16 were completed, 2 were in progress, and 6 were dropped due to lack of continued participation, in a period of one year. This amounts to approximately 75% success. The primary participation of local people was the contribution of land and labor. All land required for digging had to be donated by villagers without compensation; although the villagers were paid for their work with food, one-half of the payment was in wheat, an unfamiliar food to these rice eaters (CS 105).

As indicated earlier, positive initial participation does not necessarily ensure the success of project goals, since the local people may discontinue their efforts. A good illustration was the effort to introduce latrines into an Indian village which has been described before. The villagers contributed local material, some labor, and a small payment for latrine bases. Unfortunately, the motivational basis for getting a latrine was of a type favorable for initial acceptance but not for continued use or true adoption. No initial need was felt by the inhabitants for latrines, but as a result of the campaign by the change agents, the outhouses acquired a prestige value, so that those who acquired one were thought to be progressive. However, the change agent who was responsible failed to follow up the initial campaign, and the prestige value of having a latrine was not extended to using it. In a later evaluation study, it was found that only six of the 26 purchased had been installed (CS 41).

ORGANIZATIONAL PARTICIPATION

The term is used in this study to denote a general approach to development, usually referred to as institution building. However, a meaning is intended that is somewhat broader than the relatively restricted usage that has usually been employed to mean the creation of relatively formal organizational structures which would expedite group solutions of development problems. Organizational participation, as the term is used here, is utilization of established local organizations as well as development of new ones for the accomplishment of project goals.

Although formal institutions are of considerable if not vital importance on a national level, and although one special kind of effort, community development, is based almost entirely on such organization, there are types of innovations that do not necessarily require institutions to bring about adoption and continuance. Any kind of new practice that is carried on by individuals or individual families and that does not need group sanction is of this sort. This includes many, if not most, agricultural innovations. A change from the use of a wood plow to one of steel does not require an organized group, but rather a change in attitude and a decision by an individual farmer. Also, a change in raising improved livestock does not necessarily require group action; it is quite sufficient for individual farmers to obtain the new animals and learn how to care for them.

Of course, some agricultural innovations, such as irrigation systems, do require group decision and group action. Public health innovations can depend on group action or be matters of individual decisions. Village or slum sanitation campaigns require action by the entire social unit, because if one section cleans lanes while another continues to dispose of rubbish indiscriminately, the effort will quickly fade. On the other hand, the adoption and use of latrines requires individual decisions. This is not to imply that such individual decisions are made irrespective of group opinion, but simply that individual action is theoretically possible without organized group activity. Education, of course, is an institutionalized activity, and community development by definition is of this type; one of the primary activities of community development advisors is to get development committees organized and operating.

Organizational participation, as it is meant here, is similar to making use of the contribution of material goods or labor, in that it is considered during the implementation or trial stage of a project. That is, either existing organizations can be invested with development responsibilities or new ones can be created for this purpose, before a new idea or technique is fully adopted and integrated into a local society. If the project is successful, it is to be expected that such activities will be continued in the organizations, but just as with the contribution of goods or labor, a project can be discontinued after there has been organizational participation, and final adoption will not take place.

Organizational participation is less basic to the innovation process than the other forms of participation discussed, since when it does occur, it is almost always in conjunction with one or both of the other forms. Merely taking part in group activities is not necessarily an index of commitment by participants, since a considerable variety of motivations other than interest in project goals may produce such action. Participants may wish to associate with the local power figures in the hope of future patronage or gains. Community group pressure might also push local people to join such organizational activities. Finally, local people may be interested in such participation because they expect rewards from the change agents. In any event, local people risk far less by participation in organizations than they do by contribution of their labor, which might be used in other tasks, or in the contribution of goods or money, which also might be used for other purposes.

What are the advantages to innovation projects of organizational participation? There are probably two, social sanction and continuity. All peoples are influenced by group opinions even when they are not members of such groups. Organizations are capable of molding and disseminating influence much more effectively than can be done through individual action. The second advantage of institutionalization of a new idea is that organizations have continuity which goes beyond individuals. Thus, if a new idea or practice is incorporated into an organizational structure, it is less likely to be dependent on certain personalities for its continuance than would new practices which lack organizational incorporation. Individuals last only a human lifetime while organizations continue through the lives of many individuals. And often an individual's interest in a certain goal continues for less time than his lifetime.

Thus in these case histories there were far fewer instances of organizational participation (57) than of participation by donation of labor and/or material goods (113). In the great majority of instances where organizational participation was obtained, the projects appeared likely to achieve their goals. The organizations utilized in most projects were newly created for development purposes; those most successful were based on local leadership patterns.

Following are two instances of typical projects. In a community development effort in Kenya, the central focus was on the development of youth clubs, which had not existed in this form in this area previously. The idea was first presented to village committees, elders, chiefs, and the youths themselves. As soon as there was agreement to form a club, 18,000 shillings were collected from the villagers for operating expenses. The club buildings, which were fairly sizable, were built through the labor of the villagers, who later also built a house for each club leader. Staffs were recruited from local youths who had previously taken a youth training course, and members were elected to form club committees. The committees were then responsible for handling the finances and for planning club activities. The main activities of the clubs were to provide free instruction for the local people in craftsmanship and commercial subjects. The project was successful enough initially to bring about formation of 36 such clubs with a membership of approximately 1,400 (CS 73).

A somewhat more ambitious project in community development took place in nine villages on Fiji during 1950 and 1951. It was a pilot project based on self-help efforts to promote agricultural, health, and educational improvements. A cooperative was formed, agricultural projects were started, and a medical clinic put into operation. Considerable amounts of labor and goods were contributed, the most important of which was a donation by the villagers of 50% of the proceeds of the copra crop. This was used as a development fund. After agreement by the most important of the local leaders, including the island chief, the village headman, the local headmaster, and the local Methodist minister, a development committee was formed by electing a member of each participating village and appointing the headman and the minister. This committee then became responsible for planning and implementing the projects selected. The change agents did little more than offer technical advice once the committee was functioning (CS 24).

Just as with other types of participation, the organizational incorporation of an innovation in the implementation stage of a project does not assure its final adoption. The most frequent apparent "cause" for discontinuance of cooperation is that local people who have joined such committees become aware that the innovations being implemented provide less benefit than they expected, and less benefit than their perception of the effort required to keep the projects going. Frequently, the act of joining such groups is not inspired by genuine interest in the innovation in the first place, but rather is due to attraction toward the powerful outsiders, and to local people believing that some material advantages will result from joining such groups. Public health projects are the most typical of those in which there is little understanding by local people of change-agent goals and where interest slackens rapidly in the implementation stage, when it becomes apparent how much time or effort is necessary to reach the project goals. Frequently, the members of local communities are influenced too greatly by intensive communication campaigns and only belatedly learn how much the costs will be in time and/or labor. And the basic reason for such reactions, which tend to appear most often in health projects, is that the concepts being fostered are relatively complex and the benefits are not easily perceivable.

The latrine project in India, mentioned often, was of this nature. There was a very intensive communication campaign through which the change agent was able to get the village leaders committed initially and to have a committee formed to help conduct the campaign. It has been indicated that it became a prestige symbol to have a latrine, but unfortunately this attitude did not extend

to using them, and very few were actually installed or used. Thus the organizational participation, as well as the contribution of money, was insufficient for full implementation or continued use (CS 41).

The reactions of the potential adopters were similar in another project, the venereal disease campaign in Tanzania, described previously. It was an ambitious project to eradicate the disease from an entire tribe. The idea was not based on a perceived need of the local people, who viewed the ailment as no more serious than a common cold. However, the change agents were able to whip up enough enthusiasm to get the initial cooperation they needed, which was based on fairly intensive personal and mass media communication. A local health committee was invested with the responsibility to implement the project, including making many house-to-house visits, where they reportedly gave persuasive talks. As a result a considerable amount of public interest was aroused, but not to the extent of causing the local people to change their habits. The considerable prostitution and extramarital sexual relations continued as before and it was reported after two years that no appreciable results had been obtained. Thus it can be said that the perceived benefits (very few) could in no way counterbalance the effects of the local social practices, despite the communication campaign and despite the organizational effort (CS 158).

PASSIVE PARTICIPATION

The final type of participation to be considered is undoubtedly the weakest. It is defined as nonactive compliance toward a project's goals, chiefly a willingness by the potential adopters to be present when needed. It can also be considered as a contribution of time alone, although it will be recognized that the other forms of participation also involve a contribution of time, but combined with more active behavior. Thus, organizational participation certainly involves a donation of time by members of committees, but they are also taking a more active role—planning or helping to implement the innovation process.

There are a few types of projects in which no more than passive participation is needed, most notably in the field of public health. Inoculation or vaccination campaigns need little more than the willingness of the local people to accept the treatment. The same is true of malaria or other spraying campaigns, where the only cooperation necessary is for the local people to permit access to their houses and the environs. In such efforts, passive participation can be said to contribute to the change process, since the people can refuse to cooperate; at the same time, it is well to recognize that they are not extending themselves very far in terms of commitment. They are not giving any of their labor, material goods, or money. Undoubtedly, this characteristic of participation is one of the reasons why such mass campaigns have been so successful in reaching their goals in the developing world, and influencing the population structure of these countries so markedly. Local people have not had to take on new forms of behavior or contribute actively for the success of the projects.

The results in mass-spraying health campaigns stand out in marked contrast to results in family-planning campaigns. The most obvious explanation is that family-planning innovations require a great deal of active participation by the potential adopters—visiting health clinics, being fitted with contraceptives, keeping a supply available, and following prescribed practices during the sex act. On the other hand, having one's house sprayed requires no new form of behavior except staying out of the house while the spraying is going on.

There were 21 instances of passive participation identified in these case histories and seven were in projects which failed to reach their goals. Three of the seven were in public health and four were in agricultural projects.

Although passive participation in health projects can be sufficient to bring change, even in this field it is a weak index of commitment. People may accept treatment without any intention of changing the behavior which is causing the sickness. In this regard another venereal disease campaign is cited—in Northern Rhodesia, now Zambia. The only participation required of the local people

was acceptance of the treatment. About 95 percent of the population turned out willingly. There was a decrease in the disease during the 4-year treatment campaign, but without any appreciable change in the local sexual habits, so that people were reinfected almost as fast as they were treated. The local Zambians, like the tribesmen in Kenya, did not consider venereal disease a serious ailment. As soon as the campaign was over the incidence of the disease began to rise again (CS 101).

Projects which involve adoption of new forms of behavior, almost by definition, require stronger forms of participation. If wells are being installed or irrigation channels are being constructed and the local people do nothing more than permit the work to be done, they will have little vested interest in continuance of the innovations, nor will they have learned the new forms of behavior necessary to maintain them.

In personal field experience in Laos, the author has seen several such projects, which were technically good, but for which nothing more was required of the recipients than passive participation. The projects either were not used as expected by the change agents or were abandoned as soon as conflicts emerged. Two such examples will be cited, both of which were conceived almost exclusively in technical terms, with the sociocultural problems being almost completely ignored. One was a project to install sanitary wells in villages of southern Laos. The technical expert took care of the installation completely, drilling the holes and installing the pumps without any participation by the villagers, other than accepting the wells and designating the locations. Wells were greatly desired and there was no problem in obtaining acceptance. However, no responsibility or knowledge for maintaining the wells was transferred and the wells were abandoned as soon as they were broken, except for two or three where Buddhist monks took over the responsibility on their own initiative [5].

A project of another technician - change agent in the same region—was to build an irrigation system to increase crop production. The only participation required by the potential adopter-users was to permit the construction of the canal through the area, and to use the water as soon as the system was completed. No participation, either in planning or implementation, was sought from the villagers. When the canal was finished, the local people used it (as cited before), to get drinking water and for washing their clothes rather than for irrigation. Moreover, the villagers took no responsibility for the canal's maintenance and it began to deteriorate very rapidly. The project was soon abandoned by the change agent (CS 81).

Summary

What are the conclusions that can be drawn in regard to participation of the local people in the implementation stage of a change project? First, it can be said that if the members of the local group do not participate in the trial stage, final adoption is almost impossible, since no new behavior will be learned. However, participation in the trial stage alone is not sufficient for final adoption, because the project may be badly conceived, or unexpected consequences may arise to cause cooperation to be discontinued by the local people.

As to the different types of participation, there is little doubt that the contributions of labor, material goods, or money by the local people are the most basic and the best indicators of commitment. Organizational participation is a less valuable indicator of commitment, although important for some projects because it increases assurance that the innovation will continue. Individual interest in a new idea can be transitory, while group involvement tends to continue beyond the concern of individuals. The least important type of participation, primarily because it does not require strong commitment, is passive, or nonactive compliance. In general, it can be said that with the exception of innovations of mass, impersonal treatment such as antimalarial spraying or inoculations, that passive participation is a poor index for final adoption.

Chapter 13

OTHER STRATEGIES

The change process variables to be discussed in this chapter are similar to those in the chapter, *Other Motivation*, in the sense that the variables do not form a conceptual unit except for their less important effect. All have been described significantly less frequently than the strategy factors previously discussed. In addition, except for the patterns of maintenance established, it appears that such variables have had small influence on the outcome of the projects even when mentioned in the case histories.

It must be emphasized, of course, that in comparing these case histories we are relying on what the respective authors considered significant and recorded; and it is always possible that influences of significance occurred frequently but were not described. It is quite possible, and even likely, that such influences as flexibility or continuity of implementation were frequently not mentioned, even when they were significant. After all, these kinds of behavior are not as specific as are the utilization of different communication channels or motivations, or obtaining different kinds of participation. It can be observed or learned with relative ease that a given change agent either did or did not communicate with recipients in certain ways, or did or did not obtain their participation in providing materials or labor. Or, one can learn without too much difficulty whether the change agent did work through local leaders or did try to adapt a cooperative to local social patterns. However, the influence of flexibility would become apparent only when an incident occurred in which the change agent changed or refused to change his plans.

Continuity and timeliness would also become apparent only through viewing the entire history of a project to see whether there were incidents that indicated discontinuity or lack of good timing. We would hypothesize that the frequency of reported occurrence of the influences treated in this chapter is lower than their actual occurrence in the change process, because of the greater difficulties of abstraction.

The influences to be discussed are:

- Flexibility (of project implementation)
- Continuity (of project implementation)
- Timing (utilization of)
- Maintenance (establishment of)

FLEXIBILITY

This type of change-agent behavior is undoubtedly important in any kind of effort at inducing change, whether across cultural boundaries or within a culture. The basic necessity for flexibility in such efforts lies in the change agent's having only a limited understanding of the social situation with which he is working, no matter how much he has studied it. The situation is more difficult in cross-cultural change efforts because he knows less of the social circumstances and is more of an outsider than if he were dealing with people of his own culture. Thus, although the rural extension agent working in the United States would need to be flexible in his efforts to introduce agricultural innovations, theoretically less flexibility would be required of him than when working with farmers in non-Western lands. At the very least, he would share a large part of the value system and social behavior of the farmer in his own culture. An example could be found in reactions to fluctuation of market prices.

While the American farmer may not be particularly happy with price fluctuation of the goods he produces, and may not even understand the basic causes for such fluctuation, he has become habituated to this kind of occurrence as a fact of farm life. If he were to accept a new crop on the advice of the county agent, and by coincidence the price of this commodity would drop the first harvest year, he would not necessarily blame the agent or abandon the crop, knowing that the price might go up the next year. On the other hand, the village peasant who has not been thoroughly integrated into a market economy and who goes through this experience, might very quickly blame the change agent and refuse to plant this crop again, thus losing the opportunity to find out that the depressed prices were only temporary. Because of unexpected reactions of this sort, the cross-cultural change agent, in order to successfully introduce innovations, needs to be willing to alter his innovation or the method of presenting it more often than the change agent operating in his own culture.

In the case histories analyzed, 49 instances were found in which flexibility or inflexibility of implementation was described as a significant influence. There were 40 instances in which the change agent displayed flexibility, and in only four of these was the innovation rejected. Described earlier was the instance of positive flexibility in the literacy campaign in Nigeria, in the process of which the change agent altered his original teaching methods in order to meet the status needs of students who wished to consider themselves more proficient than they really were. This project achieved successful results (CS 96). Another type of flexibility is indicated in a project to introduce "green manuring" into a village area of India. In this case, the district officer realized that the rules of government for dealing with the villagers were affecting the project's chances negatively and took it upon himself to alter them. Instead of merely making the seeds for the new crop available at the government store, in accordance with official instructions, the change agent and his assistants took them to the individual farmers in order to establish more efficient personal communication and to minimize the official aura of the project. The project started moving again and was carried to a successful conclusion (CS 46).

In two of the cases, a change in implementation indicated flexibility on the part of the change agent, but the innovations were still rejected; these were in public health and have been described previously in regard to other influences. In a health education campaign in Pakistan, the change agent printed a series of simple pamphlets on health practices, to be sold at popular prices. The pamphlets were not being bought at the low prices for reasons indicated previously, principally that no advantage was apparent to the villagers, and although the cost was low, it was still considerable to these people. The change agent then changed his policy and began to give the pamphlets away. This, of course, did not solve the problem of no real need felt by the villagers for this kind of health information. They took the free pamphlets but used them for a variety of other purposes, chiefly for wrapping market goods. Then the change agent gave the pamphlets to the village schoolmasters for distribution to literates. But, as has been indicated earlier, health concepts are difficult to transfer and it is extremely unlikely that a technique of merely printing a series of pamphlets to be distributed to a basically illiterate population will do this job, even with experimentation and flexibility of distribution methods. In this instance, no significant change in attitudes toward health was produced (CS 107).

Another instance of flexibility where the innovation failed to be adopted was the animal husbandry project in Laos mentioned in connection with communication. The strategies were uniformly poor, including inefficient communication, little participation obtained from the recipients, and a lack of adaptation to traditional husbandry practices. The only positive factors were a novelty motivation to accept the large, handsome new varieties, and some flexibility on the part of the change agents when they realized that the chickens introduced were not getting a chance to breed. The local birds were driving off the introduced Rhode Island Red roosters, preventing them from breeding with the village

hens. The change agents tried several expedients to correct this situation, but none worked. For example, upon learning of the difficulties in breeding the Rhode Island Reds, the change agents required selected villagers to dispose of the village roosters as a condition for receiving Rhode Island Reds. This improved the flock situation for one generation. However, the sons of the crosses between Rhode Island Red roosters and village hens, being one-half of the village breed, had more fighting ability than their fathers. Upon reaching maturity, they drove their fathers away from the flocks and bred with the hens. The third generation were thus three-quarters village stock and capable of driving off their grandfathers even more easily. In other words, as long as the free-running flock pattern of husbandry was retained, the birds were constantly breeding toward greater fighting ability and losing the productive characteristics of Rhode Island Reds (CS 76).

Nine instances were identified in which innovations were rejected and in which failure could be attributed, at least in part, to lack of flexibility on the part of the change agent. However, in all of these cases there was also lack of consideration for the local cultural patterns and poor innovation techniques in general. It is our belief that lack of flexibility in cross-cultural change is almost always an ignoring of local cultural patterns.

One instance of inflexibility was described in the swine improvement project in the Philippines, where the introduced pigs were actually inferior to the local ones. The Filipino change agent followed the rules laid down by his government office and insisted that the recipients keep and take care of the swine, which had been agreed upon, despite their inferior quality. Thus, not only was no improved variety introduced, but also the villagers developed a negative attitude toward this type of assistance (CS 128). This project evidences almost a perfect reverse image of the green-manuring project in India. There the change agent was wise enough to recognize that the government rules were harmful and disregarded them, bringing his project to a successful conclusion (CS 46).

One other project which is almost a classic of how not to produce innovation, and which also included inflexibility, was the range management effort in Somalia (cited several times). The change agents attempted to build water storage basins and limit the number of people and grazing animals using the area. The site chosen was a relatively restricted area which aroused tribal sentiments against the idea, since it appeared that favoritism was being shown. The idea of controlling the water in the area was referred to as the "American system" since it was being managed by Americans and was considered foreign by the recipients. Using this method went against local grazing practices, according to which thirsty nomads were permitted to obtain water for themselves and for cattle from any permanent water system. Denial of such rights brought on feuding and tribal warfare. There were numerous other violations of tribal customs in the planning of the project. The final difficulty was caused by a custom in the cattle breeding area of East Africa; because a man's prestige depended on the size of his herd, the herders were reluctant to sell part of their livestock at the bidding of the change agents. Moreover, large herds were regarded as insurance against prolonged drought and disease. There is no evidence that the change agents found out the major cultural barriers to this project, nor did they alter their plans in any significant way. At the time of the analysis, the local people were cutting dikes and fences in order to graze their animals where they wanted, in disregard of the purposes of the project advisors (CS 145). This case history is a clear example of the relationship between lack of adaptation to local cultural patterns and inflexibility. In general, it is probable that those change agents who are inflexible will usually operate with the immediate replacement theory of change, and will usually be unaware of, and/or disinterested in, local cultural patterns.

Flexibility of the change agent is a secondary innovation technique in the sense that it is not absolutely required. It is theoretically possible to replace the old with the new in a straightforward, preplanned manner, but this

will take place only with those innovations which have clear-cut, immediate, practical benefits which are perceptible to the recipients. Probably the majority of innovations are not so simple. Flexibility of the change agent is more necessary in cross-cultural situations than in intracultural, because of the greater potential cultural misunderstanding—the values and beliefs of the recipients are likely to be at considerably more variance from those of the change agent in cross-cultural than they would be in intracultural situations. And because the normal change agent will have at best a limited knowledge of local cultural patterns, he can make up for this lack by being willing to modify his plans as difficulties arise. In this sense, flexibility can compensate to a certain extent for lack of cultural understanding. Theoretically, if communication between the change agent and the recipients is efficient, and he is willing to alter his project plans as difficulties arise, in many situations he can operate successfully with only minimum knowledge of the local cultural patterns.

A reasonable hypothesis is that the degree of flexibility required of the change agent is directly proportional to the degree of difference between the culture from which he comes and the culture in which he is working. The more cultural differences there are, the more flexibility is required. Lack of flexibility has been found to be present almost always along with unawareness and disinterest in the local culture.

CONTINUITY

The influence of continuity presents particular difficulties in analysis, especially in regard to its positive effect. A certain degree of subjectivity is almost inevitable in deciding whether or not a particular effort was followed through continuously. Judging the presence and effect of continuity is made particularly difficult because it does not depend on any act at all—it is nothing more than steady pursuance of the goal. Because of the nonobvious nature and impact of this influence when it is positive, it is believed that mention of it has been neglected by the case history writers in many reports. On the other hand, the negative aspect, discontinuity, is more apparent to an analyst since specific breaks in the action can be identified.

One other point should be made clear. In the analyses, the abandonment of a project is not classed as discontinuity. Discontinuity is an irregularity of the process as it continues through a period of time. Abandonment is, of course, the ultimate kind of discontinuity but it may be a product of irregularity in implementation or a product of other factors in the change process. But since abandonment of the effort is the clearest indication of negative project outcome, we do not consider it as a process variable at all. Our interest is in learning why a project was abandoned, for which we attempt to evaluate the influences; therefore, we classify intermittency as an independent variable, and ultimate cessation as a dependent variable. Because of this characteristic, continuity usually becomes an influence of significance only in the middle and late stages of the change process. In a project which never got well started because of inefficient communication, continuity or discontinuity would be irrelevant.

Continuity, or its negative counterpart, discontinuity, were identified in 56 of the case histories. Continuity was similar to flexibility of implementation in that its positive use normally occurred along with other positive innovation techniques. It took place in those projects that appear to have been most efficiently planned and implemented. Consequently, there was only one case in the total of 29 where continuity was mentioned as a positive factor but in which the innovation was not accepted. Moreover, the lack of continuity did not necessarily mean rejection of innovation. Of the 20 cases in which significant discontinuity was noted in the analyses, six of the efforts still proved successful.

As might be expected, those cases with positive continuity were undertaken after fairly detailed planning and with serious commitment by the change agents. Most were projects that lasted over a considerable length of time, which, of course, increased the probability of success because of the considerably greater amount of interaction and continued concentration on the problems at hand. Projects that have lasted no more than a few months would be expected to have less chance of making major impact on the local communities than projects that have lasted several years. Within the group where positive continuity occurred, projects have lasted 6, 9, and 13 years, and the longest was 30 years. One such continuous effort was the well-known Vicos project in highland Peru. Beginning in 1952, the change agents initiated a potato improvement program but branched into other efforts, particularly in health, education, and economic reorganization. By 1957 the Indians were in the process of purchasing ownership of their own hacienda. At this time the principal change agent left the site and assistance to the Indians was steadily diminished. The period of intensive continuity would thus have been about five years (CS 112).

An agricultural improvement effort in Jamaica can be considered to have lasted for about 15 years. Success in this project exhibited discontinuity due to external conditions beyond the control of the change agent. However, due to his persistence, this project succeeded despite the adverse external conditions. Consequently, this can be regarded as a case of continuity in terms of change-agent behavior. The project, which has been cited several times, was the effort to introduce tomatoes as a cash crop into a small district of Jamaica, and the establishment of cooperatives for marketing. Tobacco cultivation, the previous cash crop, had been eliminated by the depression of the 1930s. Tomato cultivation, along with the cooperative, became well established through five years of effort in the middle 1930s but World War II ruined export possibilities. From 1942 to 1945 the cooperative lost money. Despite this difficulty, it was held together until the war was over, at which time full exporting was resumed. A record year was achieved in 1946 and there was steady growth from that time through 1949 (CS 61).

The longest project for which we have any record was a self-help school building program in a state of Colombia. It was begun in the 1920s by a woman who had settled in the area after having worked with Catholic missions in several other Latin-American countries. The work was continuing in 1963, so the effort lasted at least 35 years (CS 11).

Project duration does not necessarily determine project success or failure. This is made clear by a previously mentioned project, which failed to be accepted after two years of continuous effort to induce Peruvian housewives to boil their water. The change agent was well accepted since she was a native of the region and quite dedicated to her task. Her persistence was not enough, however, to make up for the lack of any felt need for a task that was burdensome to housewives already busy. They did not have much time to boil water, vessels were scarce, the hearth was usually quite crowded, and wood was scarce. The basic difficulty, however, probably was their lack of belief that boiling water would help in improving health (CS 110). There were no obvious advantages to them for this new practice.

Lack of continuity in projects was generally attributable to one of two causes. The most frequent was bureaucratic inflexibility and inability of the aiding agencies to provide assistance as it had been offered. Second in importance was lack of commitment by individual change agents who were not sufficiently interested to keep to the task in a continuous manner. It should be fairly evident that where commitment by the change agent is lacking, too much cannot be expected. However, it must also be remembered that lack of continuity in such projects is seldom the sole deciding cause for failure, but merely a by-product of a general lack of serious, knowing implementation. Thus, the coffee improvement project in Southern Laos, while lacking continuity of contact with the potential recipients, was also lacking in most other needed innovation techniques, especially efficient communication (CS 79). There were

several animal husbandry projects of the same nature in this group of cases. The change agents introduced new varieties and made sporadic return visits to see what progress was being made, but very intermittently. Such was a poultry improvement project in Jordan where the change agents held three meetings with villagers, after which supervision was not maintained. The stock degenerated, largely because the complementary programs of housing and feeding were not carried out. The effort was abandoned (CS 67).

Projects that are discontinuous because of bureaucratic inflexibility or inefficiency do not appear to be as likely to be abandoned as those that are discontinuous because of a low degree of commitment by the change agents. We believe this is so largely because discontinuity occurs in all kinds of human activities and men have learned to adjust in many, if not all, cultures. Therefore, when lack of continuity occurs in change projects in the rural areas of the agrarian countries, the local people tend to compensate for such interruptions if the general purpose of the change is relatively clear, and there are positive motivations for accepting the innovations.

One of the best examples of the limited negative effect of discontinuity in the total change process is found in two cases of community development in southern Laos, sponsored by the American assistance agency. The effort was the same in both instances, to initiate economic and educational self-help projects in rural villages. However, the first effort, from 1958 to 1960, was halted, principally because of lack of supervision and the consequent diversion of much of the material into noneconomic projects such as Buddhist religious structures, and to projects engineered by members of the elite for personal or political gain. There was lack of continuity in the provision of material to the villages but this was not the reason the project was terminated. There was every evidence that the local people were quite willing to continue the projects they had selected, if more material would be provided (CS 77).

The second phase was almost identical to the first except that considerably more supervision was built into it. There was the same strong felt need for schools and market places as there had been for Buddhist pagodas. There was perhaps a somewhat higher degree of participation in both planning and implementing the constructions and there was perceived practical benefit, even though it excluded the religious benefit that had been a part of the previous effort. There was just as much, or more, discontinuity from the assistance agency. When the planning stage got well started in August 1960, a military crisis interrupted the flow of materials that had been promised, and halted further planning. Nothing happened from August to December. In January 1961, the military situation improved and the program started again. It operated at a steadily accelerating speed until July of the next year (CS 78). Of greatest significance in both these projects is that discontinuity affected them relatively slightly. Although more continuous effort on the part of the development agencies undoubtedly would have improved the projects, the lack of steady assistance was not enough to alienate the participants in view of their strong desire to have the schools, marketplaces, and roads.

Discontinuity of effort was described in seven other projects but they still ended successfully. In all but one, the lack of continuity was due to the inability or unwillingness of the assistance agency to provide help at the time it had been promised. One project was to improve the water supply in a village in Ghana. In this instance the government-supplied cement ran out and the participants refused to contribute anything further. For almost 12 months nothing was done, despite the efforts of the community development advisor to get more cement. However, when the material finally came, the project was completed (CS 26).

Another project was one of the literacy campaigns in Nigeria where school supplies did not arrive on time (CS 89). In a community development project in Nigeria, the difficulty was the extremely erratic and unpredictable support in money and materials that had been promised. The discontinuity was enough to slow project progress markedly, although the participants did continue (CS 97).

A literacy and community development campaign in Tanzania bogged down seriously in its early stages. Due to a very active communication campaign and a genuine desire on the part of the locals to learn to read and write, they became enthusiastic for the classes to begin quickly, so quickly, in fact, that the staff was unprepared; neither the necessary equipment nor the readers had been obtained. Then there was a delay of some months during which a strong reaction set in. However, when the materials finally came, the participants started and the project went on to a successful conclusion (CS 157).

TIMELINESS

The positive aspect of this influence of timeliness is defined here as the occurrence of some special event that promoted acceptance of an innovation, usually when the change agent deliberately adapted the project to those conditions. The negative aspect would be the occurrence of special circumstance that inhibited acceptance, or maladaptation in timing by the change agent. In the chapter on local economic patterns we described another type of timing utilization—adaptation to local work schedules. There is a difference in that work schedules are parts of the customary patterns of behavior, whereas the occurrences described in this chapter are unusual.

It has been mentioned that timing is probably under-represented in this group of case histories. Timing as a strategy cannot take place unless there is some special occurrence which the change agent adapts to. Failure to note the special event or assess its import may often be unrecognized and thus would not be reported. Also, timeliness as an influence variable differs from most of the previously described influence factors in the sense that it can occur only after a project has gone into the implementation phase. It is not a constant such as communication, participation, or change-agent role. While it is not possible for a project to begin without open communication channels, or to continue without participation of the recipients, factors of positive or negative timeliness can take place only after these other behavioral sets are in operation. Flexibility and continuity are the same types of sets; they can take place only after the change process is in motion, while maintenance patterns will be relevant at the final stages only.

The influence of timeliness was identified in 18 of the case histories, of which 15 showed a positive influence where either a beneficial coincidence occurred, or the change agent took advantage of a special occurrence. In only two of the 15 cases where there was positive timeliness were the innovations rejected. However, we do not think that timeliness alone was the critical factor in these instances. Rather, it came about along with several more important innovation techniques, as a product of effective innovation generally. In all of the successful projects there was adequate participation by the recipients, indicating that the change agent had sold his project fairly well. In most of them there was also high motivation by the recipients, as well as effective communication and adaptation to the local culture by the change agent.

One of the most instructive cases in which there were generally effective innovation techniques, and in which positive use of timing was also present, was the soil erosion campaign in Somalia. Communication efforts were fairly intensive, including formal classes for officials and the public, followed by intensive touring of the area during which discussions were held with chiefs, religious leaders, and the recipients in general. A short film was made and shown to the participants, and the traditional leadership was brought into the project actively. Participation was obtained in the form of donations of time and labor and in new organizational activities of the recipients. They hauled stones and planted trees to help in the efforts to correct soil erosion and later contributed labor to help build roads. They also organized themselves into communal, self-help societies based on village units, and drew up their own rules for the preservation of grazing lands. The timing factor appears to have been incidental to the other techniques but probably still contributed a minor

positive effect. The area chosen had been beset by two famines during the previous ten years and another was impending. Most of the cattle had already been lost and the people were resorting to cutting trees for making charcoal as a means of livelihood. The situation was in such a sorry state that anything that could demonstrate some progress would probably have received support (CS 146).

One more illustration of the positive effect of timeliness again indicates its secondary importance. This was the blood donor campaign in Ibadan, Nigeria, where several positive influences in the project have already been discussed, including effective communication, utilization of local leaders, and flexibility of implementation. The influence of positive timeliness resulted from the fact that a major rail disaster occurred just as the campaign was beginning. The disaster was widely publicized and the change agent took full advantage, by preparing posters illustrating the crash with a caption, "Blood Saved Lives Here; Give Yours Too." Volunteers flooded in to donate blood during the next few weeks (CS 94). Again, it seems likely that this project would have achieved most of its goals without the timeliness influence, which nonetheless probably helped.

One of the two cases in which positive timing on the part of the change agent did not help to bring the project to a successful conclusion was the public health education campaign in Pakistan which has been cited in relation to lack of adaptation to local cultural patterns. This project had everything against it except positive flexibility and timing. The motivation of the recipients was about as poor as it could be, the cost of the pamphlets was economically burdensome, and the change agent hardly utilized the local cultural patterns. The only positive techniques were his willingness to alter his plans, which included a timing element. Just as the first pamphlet on the need for boiling water was going to press, a typhoon hit the country and there was serious danger from polluted water. He quickly re-edited the pamphlet to fit the threat. When the typhoon was followed by a cattle epidemic, he brought out a pamphlet on inoculation, which included information on where farmers could receive help (CS 107). If this agent's flexibility and positive utilization of timing had been matched by effective communication techniques and utilization of the local leaders, or another aspect of the local culture, there might have been a possibility of success, but these two innovation techniques alone were hardly enough.

The other project which failed despite utilization of timing was a particularly difficult kind of effort. It was the previously cited community development project in an Indian village that was split by rival factions to such an extent that no easy solution seems to have been possible. But if the change agent had been more careful in avoiding identification with some of the factions, he might not have alienated the others. In any event, his use of timing was insufficient to get around this problem. He tried to hold a village improvement meeting by taking advantage of a sober period among the factions which had followed a violent fight (CS 183).

The poor use of timing, as mentioned before, was not reported often and also appeared to be a by-product of generally inefficient innovation techniques. There were three such instances. One was a latrine-building campaign in Costa Rica in which the poor timing was the commencement of the project when the *patron* of the hacienda was absent. Except for this lapse, the change agent's techniques were fairly efficient. He established effective communication, obtained full participation, and did prove himself flexible in implementation. The poor initial timing thus was easily counteracted (CS 13).

In the phosphate fertilizer campaign of Nigeria, mentioned earlier, there were few positive influences described and there was a very negative view of government agents and projects. Negative timing resulted from the fact that the project was started just a few weeks after the village head had forced the villagers to take part in a literacy project (CS 95).

Another project with negative timing was a swine improvement effort in a Filipino village. The poor timing resulted from the fact that a hog epidemic

broke out just at the time the new pigs were distributed. Whether or not this was a coincidence, many local people blamed the death of their pigs on the new animals (CS 129).

Thus, timeliness in the change process appears to be a valid influence but one of the least important of all innovation techniques. It assists in the progress of a project if other factors of change are already favorable; but if other factors, such as communication techniques, adaptation to local cultural patterns, and participation of recipients, are unfavorable, it is unlikely that good timing will save the effort.

MAINTENANCE

The last type of innovation technique to be discussed, maintenance, is relevant only in the final stages of the change process, although means for establishing it may be planned in earlier stages. It is relevant in the later stages because it assumes that a new idea or method has already been partially transferred, and that for final integration into the recipient society, only the means for its continuance have to be assured. If the change process is disrupted by other influence factors, the problem of maintenance will never become relevant. Thus, there should be very close correlation between establishment of a pattern of maintenance and final integration of the innovation into the society, which has been mentioned as our basic definition of successful change.

There were 56 case histories in which maintenance of innovation was identified as a significant consideration, and, in all but two, the project outcome was the same as the direction of the influence.

In all 43 case histories in which provision for maintenance was described as a factor contributing to success, the project goals were achieved. The principal kinds of maintenance were the training of local people in new skills, and the establishment of organizational responsibility to see to the continuance of the new idea or technique. A significant feature of these projects was that they practically always contained the other innovation techniques that normally insure success. That is, where the change agents were knowledgeable enough to establish effective communications, obtain needed participation, and adapt their innovations to local cultural patterns, they were also knowledgeable enough to assure continuance by establishing the needed maintenance patterns.

Two illustrations are provided. In a project to improve the agricultural practices of an Arab village in Israel, an effort sponsored by the American Friends Service Committee, generally efficient innovation techniques were included throughout. Training to ensure maintenance of the practices was built into the project, although a dramatic step was required at the end to transfer the responsibility to the recipients. To establish maintenance, local youths were trained in farm machinery skills and were given leadership experience. Also, a trial management period was conducted for the purpose of teaching the members how to administer their agricultural co-op. Despite all these efforts, a difficulty was encountered when the sponsors decided it was time for the villagers to take over their co-op, at the end of four years. The villagers were quite content to let the American Friends do the administrative work and showed no interest in the offer to sell them the machinery. It was indicated that the villagers just did not believe the Friends would leave. However, in order to shift responsibility, the Friends sold the machinery to the Israeli Ministry of Agriculture with the understanding that it would continue to work in the village. This was enough of a stimulus. The villagers quickly organized a co-op and made arrangements to buy the machinery from the Ministry. The change agents then left the project. In effect, the Friends had called the villagers' bluff and it seems that this dramatic step was necessary to bring them to face the responsibilities of maintaining their own project (CS 59). It is significant that training of the local people in new skills and in organizational responsibility had been transferred to the locals.

Another project where maintenance patterns were established contained all the necessary ingredients for innovation. The change agent began by operating on the basis of an existing felt need. The headman in the New Guinea village where the project took place specifically asked the change agent to help the villagers obtain and operate a rice mill. The agent informed the local people that if they provided 100 pounds (\$300 approximately) he would obtain the rice mill and the balance of the payment could be made after the harvest. In two days the local people collected 35 pounds and later paid the remaining 185 pounds of indebtedness. They also contributed all materials to build the mill-house, and furnished human portage to carry the diesel engine 14 miles. It is fairly clear from these negotiations that communication between the change agent and the local people was effective. There was also utilization of local leadership. The village headman was instrumental in all phases of the project since he had initiated the idea. Also, local Catholic missionaries were brought into the project actively. The agent suggested that they bless the rice mill, a move which pleased the local people as well as the priests. A special procession and feast were held in honor of the occasion. To provide maintenance, the agent sent villagers to a special training course in engine upkeep and repair. At the end of project the local people were operating the mill themselves (CS 88).

A specialized kind of maintenance found in relation to literacy campaigns was the requirement for establishing a source of material, as soon as people had acquired a reading facility. If the mere teaching of reading is regarded as an innovation, which it is in the narrowest sense, then provision of material for continuance is unnecessary. However, if the goal is to improve the population's ability to maintain or further improve reading skills, then the provision of material is a vital necessity.

In the cases studied, four dealt with this kind of maintenance problem. In the rural reconstruction project in China, which began as a literacy campaign, the change agent helped the local communities to organize "people's libraries" with 1,000 simple books in each, to be sold at prices the villagers could afford (CS 9). Most of the literacy campaigns found were in Africa, presumably because the British were particularly interested in this kind of local improvement. In one successful project in Kenya, village libraries were established to keep up the literacy skill of the trainees. Also, classes were started to teach writing, and in some villages special classrooms were built for adults (CS 69). In a combination literacy and community development campaign in Tanganyika, the change agents produced followup literature for new literates. They helped produce pamphlets on pottery manufacture, tree and grass planting, and hide and food preparation. Most of these were too sophisticated, although the pamphlet on tree and grass planting was successful enough so that the newly created demand for young plants exceeded the available supply. A locally established newspaper was more successful (CS 157). A third project, a literacy campaign in Buganda, was quite similar in regard to materials maintenance. In this instance, the followup literature for new literates which was developed totaled almost 40 titles. Also, a Buganda version of *Life*, the illustrated colonial magazine, was produced and sold at a subsidized price. Particular attention was given to literature distribution by stocking shopkeepers with materials, and organizing traveling booksellers (CS 169).

In all instances where patterns of maintenance were established, the projects were successful. The fact that establishment of maintenance was significant is indicative that the change process had already progressed almost to the point of acceptance. Where such patterns were not established, with two exceptions, the projects failed to be integrated. Projects without provision for maintenance were, in general, poorly managed, depending principally on strong extrinsic rewards for the recipients. For example, there were three animal husbandry projects in which new varieties were introduced but where there was a minimum of followup. In the projects in Jordan, Laos, and the Philippines, the animals degenerated and the projects were abandoned by the change agents.

as well as by the participants (CS 67, CS 76, CS 129). Two projects to introduce wells for better water supplies, one in Ecuador and one in Laos, have been described as being concentrated almost exclusively on the technical aspects of getting the wells drilled. In neither was there any concentration on the problems of involving the local people in taking responsibility for maintaining the new devices (CS 18, CS 80). In all of the above examples, the participants received considerable material donations from the change agents, either village wells or new breeds of animals, which is probably the primary reason for their initial participation.

There was also a latrine project in the Philippines where the change agent made no attempt to follow up the original installation by getting the people either to use or to maintain it (CS 134).

An effort to establish a cooperative among village weavers in India was marked by a type of failure to which outside change agents are frequently prone—assuming too much responsibility when problems are large. In this instance the assistance agency assumed the difficult task of developing markets and other outside contacts necessary for getting the organization going. As a result, the local members had few responsibilities and were given few chances to become involved in the administration of their organization. Although this was not the only reason, it was considered contributory to the dissolution of the co-op that was expected as soon as the change agency left the scene (CS 45).

We conclude that providing adequately for maintenance of innovations is the single most important of the secondary sets of innovation techniques. However, it is relevant only when the process of change has neared termination, when this is all that remains to ensure integration of the new idea or technique into the local cultural patterns.

The two most important types of maintenance patterns to be established are training of the local people in new skills and establishment of organizational responsibility for the continuance of the innovations.

The two most common reasons for neglecting the establishment of maintenance patterns were an almost exclusive concentration on technical problems and a tendency to take over the more difficult organizational needs of participants on the assumption that they were incapable of fulfilling these functions themselves. Thus, when the change agents were finished with the projects, the recipients were incapable of continuing them on their own.

Summary

Establishment of maintenance patterns is probably the most significant of the four secondary innovation techniques, even if it is relevant only at the terminal stages of a project. After there has been initial adoption of a new idea or technique, the most vital requirement is that patterns for its continuance be established, after the periods of interaction with the change agent are completed. The two most important kinds of maintenance to be established are organizational incorporation, and implementation of the new skills among the recipients.

Chapter 14

SUMMARY

Prior to the 20th century, most cross-cultural diffusion of new ideas or practices took place accidentally or through force. It came about through the movements of people from one cultural group to another, who coincidentally brought new ideas to the groups they were visiting, or by a people who dominated others and introduced innovations which they deemed useful, using force to obtain cooperation when necessary.

A third type of change, which is characteristic of our era and culture, is voluntary on the part of the recipients although planned by outsiders. While such induced change occurred before, it is the predominant type sponsored by the Western industrial nations in the 20th century to induce development. Many agencies, national and international, have been created to fill this need. In recent years military organizations have become involved in civic action programs which include efforts to assist in development activities by promoting self-help projects among village people.

In the post-World War II period there have been three main types of specialists involved in such change programs in the developing countries: economic planners, technicians, and administrators. A need has been recognized for economic planning and administration on a high level and for technical knowledge on middle and low levels. None of these job types imply recognition of a need for cross-cultural understanding or for understanding the process by which these ideas are to be transferred. It is the proposition here that this transfer process is just as complex as the technical and macroeconomic problems.

The process of induced voluntary change described herein is a product of case-history analysis of efforts to introduce innovations to small communities in the nonindustrial nations. Such a process is visualized as the introduction into a local community of a new idea or technique, which continues through a period of interaction between outside change agents and members of recipient communities, and becomes integrated into the local community. Briefly, the report is an effort to identify primary influences in the change process: those strategies or techniques which bring about the acceptance of new technical and social ideas.

LOCAL LEADERS

Local people will adopt innovations most quickly if they are adapted to existing cultural patterns. Further, the local leadership pattern is probably the most significant characteristic of local cultures to adapt to, and through which to present a new idea. Leaders influence opinion and leaders have vested interests in their positions. If powerful influences come into communities without the sanction of the leaders, their positions are threatened. When ignored, leaders have the choice of either accepting a position of powerlessness or opposing the outsiders. The usual reaction is to oppose the outside influence, since few leaders willingly relinquish power.

In the rural areas of developing countries there are basically two kinds of administrative leaders: appointed bureaucrats on all levels above the village, and the traditional village headmen. This division is a product of the constantly increasing central control of the governments. The bureaucratic leaders are civil servants with support from the authority of the government, while the

headmen are traditional leaders with the support of the villagers, but without effective authority. Both are important in efforts to promote change.

The local teacher or headmaster is significant to the implementation of new ideas for several reasons. He partially fills the gap between the traditional life of the past and the modernization trends that are coming from the cities. Although a member of the educated class, he still works and sometimes lives among the villagers. Also, he brings a gift which the villager appreciates highly—education. And finally, he works with the children, who are more amenable to change than their parents.

Religious leaders reflect traditional values far more than teachers, but they are also in a crucial position to influence village people. They too bring a gift which is highly desired—religious assistance. Moreover, in many countries they are members of hierarchies through which new ideas can be passed relatively easily. While in principle most religious leaders are not primarily concerned with mundane affairs, village people do look to them for advice on all kinds of problems. Their sanction can be vital.

Civic leaders are dedicated to local development and it is to be expected that they would help in innovation attempts. A disadvantage is that they tend to be younger people and, while they are interested in change, their influence within the authoritarian traditional system is not great. However, the leaders of farmers' clubs, cooperatives, PTAs, and welfare institutions can be useful supporters of civic action projects.

Noninstitutional leaders are those who have position and following stemming from personal characteristics, wealth, religious merit, or some other locally accepted criteria for prestige. While they are significant less frequently than other leaders in the change process, the cooperation of such wealthy or important men can be vital.

SOCIAL STRUCTURE

All human societies are composed of organized groups of people, each with some common goals for its members, and each with some common patterns of conduct. Innovations can also come into conflict with these patterns unless they are presented as adaptations. Another significant characteristic of local social groups is that they help insure the continuity of a new idea. When individuals adopt an innovation there is little assurance that it will continue beyond their lifetime; but if the innovation is incorporated into group patterns, its continuity is much more likely. Cultures survive due to group patterns, not individual lives.

The single most frequently occurring kind of group behavior in all societies is that based on marriage and procreation, the family. Probably the two most important kinds of behavior in the family which have affected change projects of the past are sexual relations and the division of labor between males and females. Other kinship relationships are also important and take precedence over most other kinds of associations in village societies.

In industrial societies, egalitarianism and lack of strong class distinctions have been emphasized, but in most of the world there are clear distinctions based on relative wealth and education. Such classes or castes have certain patterns of conduct which distinguish them from other groups within the same hierarchies. Moreover, the members of upper classes or castes usually have vested interests in their positions. And the basic reality is that when such interests are violated through the introduction of an innovation on an egalitarian basis, resistance is produced. Adaptation to the existing norms and caste-class relationships will increase the likelihood of acceptance of new ideas even if it will not directly assist in producing an egalitarian society. The change agent must then decide if he is more interested in technical or in social change.

Ethnic groups are, to a large extent, like classes or castes, except that they tend to be larger and in most countries each group has a real or supposed common ancestry and usually a distinct language as well. Like other social groups, ethnic groups have some distinct customs and beliefs. In the modern

developing countries, ethnic considerations often become involved in politics. The change agent who ignores them does so at the risk of project failure.

Political party membership on a local level is frequently associated either with class or with ethnic interests and when members feel that their interests are being threatened, they resist. Moreover, political groups usually have considerable capacity to manipulate power. Local political parties tend to react to an innovation as it will affect them directly more than they react to it as a part of national policy. Village factionalism is frequently a result of political party interests.

The final group attitude of significance is that which separates the mass of the people, primarily rural villagers, from the national government. It is the attitude toward central authority by the peasantry, mainly a product of treatment they have received in the past. Since the central government of a developing country has, in the past, principally been an instrument for land regulation, tax collection, support of the wealthy, and military conscription, the attitude toward it usually has been negative. In most of his dealings with a government official, the villager has lost something, and services he received in return have been either very slight or not apparent.

ECONOMIC PATTERNS

Besides patterns of social structure, local communities in developing countries are organized within the framework of specific economic patterns, which the change agent ought to be aware of. While economic systems among peasant peoples may be deficient by Western standards, they do permit survival for the villagers and will not be abandoned or changed unless clear advantages are presented for doing so. Local systems have been tested by the village people and they do work, while changes are frequently untested in the local social environments. Moreover, seemingly simple economic changes can affect many kinds of behavior not directly related to an innovation. Effective diffusion of new economic ideas requires consideration of the larger system and where possible, adaptation to it.

All peoples have traditionally learned manual techniques for the production of goods. And once habituated to such methods, people tend to resist changing them simply because they need to go through another learning process to do so. Usually, new habits of work will be undertaken in proportion to the degree of perceived advantage of the innovation; that is, the more that advantage is perceived, the more likely that change will be accepted.

A vital necessity for work accomplishment in all cultures is that it be scheduled in some manner. People in nonindustrial rural communities tend to schedule their work according to seasonal variations or the requirements of the agricultural cycle, rather than according to the clock and the calendar. If this kind of scheduling is kept in mind, innovations can be introduced to fit with local practices and resistance will be less likely.

Work is also controlled by who will do it. Although most village work is probably done on a family basis, some projects require larger group participation. The whole philosophy of community development rests on this assumption. Fortunately, there are traditional work groups in many parts of the developing world to which such concepts can be grafted.

There is no aspect of traditional economic practices that has been given more study by development agencies than land tenure. This is probably a partial result of Western bias. While land tenure has probably been overemphasized, it is important, particularly because it is linked with caste or class privilege. Even so, it can be adapted to without favoring the landlords exclusively.

The pattern of distribution of most significance to innovation is the marketing system. Although all other features of a new practice may be of advantage to the producer, if he does not have a place to sell his goods and cannot consume all of them himself, he may reject a new practice. Thus, means of transportation, and particularly road systems, become of great importance.

BELIEFS

All cultural systems embody patterns of beliefs which predispose individuals and groups to respond to innovations in accordance with such beliefs. The change agent should be sensitive to this fact, in addition to adapting innovations to the social structure and economic pattern of local communities. In the main these beliefs are concepts that explain the universe and support man's place in it. Beliefs are important because they give individuals a rationale for their acts and a feeling of confidence in their way of life. Where too many individuals doubt the traditional beliefs of their culture, dissolution of the system is a strong possibility.

Probably the beliefs most significant in regard to technical change projects are those concerning the supernatural, or religious concepts. Basically, these are ideas relied upon to explain and establish harmonious relations with supernatural power, not dependent on observational "proof." Supernatural belief systems are relied upon the most when cause and effect relationships are least clear. Thus, we find that they have more influence on health programs than on any other kind. In general, the most effective innovation technique seems to be to adapt to, or at least not to oppose, such beliefs when they are present. If a given innovation is superior in effectiveness it will replace the traditional concepts on its own demonstrated merits.

Apart from supernatural beliefs, the common people of the nonindustrial nations have specific concepts concerning the nature of the human body and physical ailments. Most such ideas are based on seemingly plausible cause and effect relationships of the natural order. Furthermore, such beliefs are not easily amenable to refutation through "rational" argument. The suggested solution for this kind of impasse is to attempt to associate new beliefs with old beliefs and to provide innovations with clearly perceived benefits.

The people of small communities in the developing nations have somewhat different concepts about the possibilities of change through self-effort than do more favored Westerners, based primarily on past experience. Usually, they are much more negativistic than outside change agents, and with good reason—in the past they have not had many opportunities for such change. Fortunately, most human groups are willing to try again, even if they are pessimistic. And there is no solution more useful than the dramatic demonstration.

LOCAL PRACTICES

Local practices and habits are a relatively minor source of problems when new ideas are introduced to another society. The main ones appear to be consumption and recreation patterns. Whatever the "causes," all peoples have customary foods and resist new ones to a certain extent simply because they are new. People will hold on to patterns of pleasure seeking also, unless there are very strong advantages for giving them up. The suggested strategy for dealing with these problems is to introduce innovations which provide high benefits, and attempt to graft them to existing patterns of conduct.

FELT NEEDS

Individuals, groups, and communities in all cultures have certain needs and aspirations regarding the continuance, maintenance, or improvement of their current mode of life. Thus, one basic characteristic of innovations which is related to their acceptability is whether they satisfy existing needs in the local communities. If no needs for a new practice exist, and if a change program is to succeed, it will be necessary to generate needs—a relatively difficult task. On the other hand, if projects of technical and economic improvement can be selected for which positive motivation already exists, the problem will be greatly simplified.

Demonstrated felt needs, that is, those in which the local people have attempted to solve their own problems, appear to have the strongest motivational

influence. In general, where there are such needs, it is probable that little more than technical know-how is necessary for the introduction of a new idea.

Probably the most common type of felt need which occurs in village-level projects is that based on solicitation. The local people hear of a change agency operating in the area and go to them for the solution of their problem. A difficulty with this motivation is that most change agencies have the dual function of providing assistance funds as well as technical advice to local communities. The second of these roles is probably paramount in the minds of many villagers in developing countries; thus, solicitation may be primarily for the expected rewards.

Ascertained felt needs are those which are decided upon through mutual consultation of the change agent and the potential recipients, and not through physical surveys made by the change agent. Needs decided upon on the basis of such surveys would be those recognized by the change agent, and while they might be significant, they would not necessarily be agreed upon by the potential recipients and consequently would lack positive motivational force.

PERCEIVED PRACTICAL BENEFITS

Apart from whether apparent needs exist in local communities, it is useful to have some idea what the most common needs are; that is, what kinds of motivations spur the peasant villager and his poor urban brother to take action? Western change agents frequently have assumed that village people of Asia, Africa, and Latin America are as much or more interested in "other-worldly" concerns as in the affairs of this life, and that they are not primarily concerned with practical problems. The peasant, who lacks understanding of many ideas which are common to the foreign or local elite change agent, frequently cannot recognize practicality where the change agent can. The villager seeks practical goals in this life, but the particular ways of achieving them that have been suggested may not, in his eyes, promise to fulfill them.

The most common consideration of village people is whether a new idea or practice will improve their local budget. But it must be emphasized that they are spurred to action not by what will happen to the Gross National Product but by what they perceive will happen to their family and their kindred.

Health benefits which are clearly perceived to provide what the term implies, appear to invoke quick, positive responses. But it must be admitted that the cause-and-effect relationships of many health innovations are difficult to prove. This is particularly true with preventive measures such as sanitation. Latrine projects, water boiling efforts, and village cleanup campaigns frequently find little willing cooperation because it is unclear to village people how these practices will improve health. However, when the benefits are clearly perceived, the innovations are readily accepted.

In practically all developing countries village people and urban poor have accepted formal education for their children as a worthwhile goal. Perhaps the almost total lack of resistance to education is that it does not appear to threaten traditional ways, although in the long run it may transform such societies more than any other kind of innovation. The usual underlying motivation for educating children is for them to get white collar or urban jobs, but there are more immediate practical considerations also: the advantage of reading and writing, and the knowledge of arithmetic gives the villager more ability to deal with government agents or traders.

Very few, if any, change programs sponsored by Westerners or local governments have been based on a goal of making traditional activities easier or more convenient to accomplish. However, this is frequently the reason local people have reacted positively to proposed innovations.

OTHER MOTIVATION

In the broadest sense, all positive motivations can be construed as providing practical benefits to the recipients but some provide indirect kinds of advantages

rather than the direct, material benefits such as those that are economic or educational in nature. Thus, literacy is a skill that enables the possessor to keep a farm budget—a direct, expected, "practical" benefit. However, it may also provide the individual greater prestige among his fellows (competition), an "indirect" social benefit. The same would be true of project subsidies or donations. The change agent does not provide food, cigarettes, or money as ends in themselves (reward to the recipients), but in order to get them to work more, or to take new pills, or to grow more food (the practical benefit). It seems likely, however, that motivation among village recipients, at least initially, is frequently for these "secondary" advantages. This is particularly true for subsidies (rewards).

Competition is a force which exists in all human groups as indeed it does with all forms of life. Individuals and/or groups are always in competition with one another for survival or for achieving the desired things of life. Innovations particularly get caught up in competitive considerations simply because whenever an advantageous new idea or technique is introduced, the non-adopters are immediately put at a disadvantage. This is true of groups as well as of individuals. On an individual basis, this competition is usually phrased as *status climbing* or *prestige acquisition*.

Individuals will take part in a change effort, because for participation, they expect to receive something they value through the change agency (reward), or because they believe they will be punished if they do not participate, or because they see positive value in the innovation itself. Reward is the most common type of inducement nowadays, although it is probably a weak prognosticator for final success. In most successful projects where reward has been reported, it seems to have provided an initial motivation for cooperation, but if there were no material benefits apart from the rewards, the projects tended to lapse at the termination of the change agents' efforts. Punishment appears to have invoked much the same response, except in those instances where it has been continued over long enough periods for the innovations to be internalized.

The novelty of an innovation can also affect reaction to it in two ways, attraction or repulsion. The attractiveness of an innovation is frequently associated with a reward motivation. However, novelty characteristics appear mainly to influence initial reaction only.

IMAGE CHARACTERISTICS

Apart from adapting innovations to local cultural patterns and utilizing existing motivations, the change agent must consider the image he projects to local people. While he may visualize himself simply as a dispenser of technical knowledge, only rarely will the people he is trying to influence consider him only in this light. They will evaluate him according to certain rules which have meaning to them, and his technical expertise will be only one such characteristic. Moreover, their evaluation will influence their behavior toward him.

The personal characteristics of a change agent, principally, enable him to establish rapport or empathy with the local people. He is outgoing and aggressive versus being quiet and reserved, or he is oriented toward social relationships versus being concerned only with "technical rationality." His basic personality configuration is probably fixed to a considerable degree but he has the ability to make some changes. He can make an effort to suppress aggressive tendencies in a society which values modest quietness.

Unlike the situation in Western industrial countries, the experience that goes with age is given great deference in agrarian societies. In simplified terms, by virtue of his greater years the older person is considered to be wiser. And since many other kinds of status markers for an outsider are unavailable to villagers, they will tend to apply the age criterion to him. The outsider cannot change his age, but if he is young, he can attempt to appear older and more sober in an age-based society. The elders usually do have the power to undercut his projects even if the youth are active cooperators.

Practically all change agents in local communities have been trained to some degree in technical specialties, and they are presented as "experts" to villagers. Unfortunately, they sometimes move into technical areas where they do not have expertise, or they fail to consider local conditions sufficiently. In such instances, they can produce negative demonstrations which will create an image of technical incompetence among the prospective adopters.

Very few change agents enter a community merely as individuals. They are either government civil servants, members of foreign technical advisory bodies, missionaries, soldiers, or from other organizations. There is usually a stereotype of the members of such organizations in the rural areas. And this stereotype will affect the reaction of local people unless or until it has been altered by actual behavior of the individuals. They will not be able to change their affiliation but they will be able to emphasize or deemphasize it.

COMMUNICATION

It will come as no surprise to those interested in the change process that the methods of communicating are vital for the transfer of ideas. Almost by definition, such action is a prerequisite for all other forms of interaction. The most acceptable innovation available will remain useless, unless there is some way of informing the prospective adopters about it, moreover of convincing them to try it. Ideas may sell themselves, but only when people learn about them. Although communication techniques are significant in any relationship, it is suggested here that they are even more important in cross-cultural change situations, simply because of the greater difference in cultural assumptions and values.

Use of the local language by the change agent is principally a problem with foreigners, although government workers can come from different parts of a given country and consequently not be conversant in the local language. It is suggested that knowing the local language provides three advantages: establishing rapport more easily with the local people, learning the local cultural patterns more efficiently, and transferring ideas through other communication channels more efficiently. But direct communication channels are not necessarily open simply because a change agent knows the local language.

Formal communication, which is relied upon heavily by all kinds of change agents, is the transmission of information through group meetings, which are usually called by the change agent. In formal communication, the form of speech-making is widely used in the agrarian nations. This kind of communication has the advantage of permitting the change agent to contact relatively large groups of people but it minimizes the possibility of feedback, or response by the local people. It is probable that village people rarely decide to undertake a new activity on the basis of nothing more than formal presentations, but it makes them aware of new possibilities.

Mass media communication is the transmission of information and messages by means of printed matter, pictures, charts, films, radio, and other technical aids that have been developed in the industrial nations for influencing public opinion. As far as inducing change on a local level is concerned, mass media is a great deal like formal communication. Large numbers of people can be contacted at comparatively small cost, even though opportunities for feedback are very limited. Thus, mass media communication is also primarily significant as a means of creating awareness of an innovation.

Demonstration is the technique of showing, in a pragmatic fashion, the advantages of a new idea or practice as a means of convincing local people to adopt it. Demonstration is different from all other forms of communication in that it provides "proofs" of advantages. Moreover, it has the advantages of formal or mass media techniques in being able to transmit messages to large numbers of people. Demonstration can probably create needs more easily than any other form of communication.

Interpersonal communication is the transmission of messages by means of face-to-face interaction, usually in paired or small group situations. The most commonly used type in development programs is the home or field visits. It has just the opposite characteristics of the other communication channels; it is more intensive and a type which is commonly used among the villagers themselves, but it requires a large amount of effort from the change agent to reach large numbers of people. Consequently, it is relatively expensive. However, interpersonal exchange permits feedback more easily than any of the other communication channels.

While a change agent may establish certain channels of communication to transfer his ideas to the potential adopters, interaction does not stop at this point. Informal conversation or gossip about the proposal begins among the villagers, and it is probably at this time that decisions are actually made to adopt or not to adopt. Most often such gossip is not taken into consideration by change agents, unless it takes the form of malicious rumors. However, it is suggested that such gossip be considered seriously as an indication of the local reception of the proposed innovations. Positive gossip will indicate that other communication channels are open and that the innovations are perceived as advantageous while negative gossip, or rumors, will indicate that communication is one-way only and that dangers are perceived from the project. When the latter occurs, efforts to improve communication can be made or changes made in the innovation.

PARTICIPATION

It might seem superfluous to mention the need for participation in projects by the recipients of new ideas. The problem in this area would not occur if change agencies did not usually serve two functions: providing material assistance to local people and providing new ideas and practices. Because it is always easier for outsiders to provide material assistance, and because it is extremely rare that village people will refuse such subsidies or donations, the problem of getting them involved in committed participation is frequently neglected. Thus, when the period of subsidization or donations is over, the local people cease to continue the new practice.

At least four kinds of participation apparently are possible by local people: labor, material contributions, organizational, and passive. Labor by the local people, either for themselves in agricultural or other individual kinds of innovations, or in group efforts such as community development activities, is probably the type of participation most frequently sought. Material contribution, usually in the form of locally produced items, or money, or land, is perhaps the second most common type of contribution sought. In general, of these two, material contributions probably indicate the greatest degree of commitment, since the individuals are risking some of their own resources and thus should have a strong vested interest to continue the project. Labor is more easily obtained but indicates less commitment since it takes from the contributor only his time and some energy.

Organizational participation is used principally in group-based change efforts such as community development projects or cooperatives. Such participation has the advantage of promising continuity, since it puts the projects on a super-individual basis which makes them less vulnerable to the loss of a few particular people. However, organizational commitment takes nothing from the local people other than some of their time and possibly some manipulative energies. People may join or organize development groups merely because it appears to be an easy means to obtain subsidies or donations. Passive participation is merely a willingness to be present when requested, which, in general, is a poor indication that a new idea is being transmitted, since only time is to be sacrificed, and usually little of that.

OTHER STRATEGIES

Besides utilizing communication strategies and obtaining people's participation during the planning and implementation stages of a development project, there are several other strategies that the change agent can follow.

Flexibility in change projects is a willingness to alter method or innovation characteristics when unforeseen problems occur in the implementation process. In a sense, flexibility compensates for lack of understanding of the total culture and of possible cultural linkages which may impede acceptance. And it should be recognized that a cultural system is a complex entity. Complete understanding of such a system is well nigh impossible for most change agents. Thus, flexibility would be more important when cultural differences are greater, which is true of cross-cultural change.

Continuity is persistent action to introduce a new idea even with modifications. When it is lacking, it is usually due either to lack of serious commitment by the change agent or to policy changes by the agency. And when projects are not continuously implemented, the prospective adopters may lose positive motivation for continuation. Continuity or persistent effort can compensate for many other innovation strategies which may be lacking.

Timing is the *utilization* of a special event, or conditions, which will improve the chance of introducing an innovation. This strategy also appears to be of secondary importance, but it will increase the probability of adoption.

Establishing patterns for maintaining an innovation is a final but crucial technique needed for integration of an innovation. Integration of the new idea or technique into the local society will not take place unless there are patterns for maintaining it when the change agents leave. The three most important needs are: training local people in new skills; establishment of organizational responsibility for continuing the innovation; and establishment of a source for new materials, particularly reading material for new literates.

Concluding Comment

A number of variables were suggested as potential influences on the process of change in small communities. It must be emphasized that those described in this report are believed to be merely the principal variables, and furthermore, it should also be noted that these are not considered as mutually exclusive. That is, most of these variables may operate as an interdependent and interactive set of influence factors in the process of change. Human interaction is complex and the process of diffusion, of transferring new ideas and practices from one people to another, is probably as complex a situation as there is among men.

The crucial implication, which the present research has brought forth, is that cultures in developing countries have their characteristic patterns of leadership, of social structure, of economic system, of beliefs, of motivations and of perceptions about the change agent. All of these significantly influence the outcome of development programs. Consequently, the change agent needs to understand the significance of critical cultural influences such as those mentioned above, so that he can develop a sensitivity and a strategy in order to adapt innovations to the local culture. The change agent must also utilize and develop culturally acceptable channels of communication as a strategy in the introduction of innovations, and in obtaining local participation. Participation by the local people at the planning and implementation stages can help greatly in adapting the project to the local culture.

To reemphasize: The local-level change agent should, as far as possible, introduce such innovations and follow such strategies as are compatible with local patterns of behavior, as compared to those innovations for which markedly different new behaviors are required. He should be sensitive to the simple but fundamental principle that as a change agent, he has a significant control on the nature of innovations to be introduced and the kind of strategies to be utilized, but he has little or no control on the cultural styles of the local people.

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13. ABSTRACT This report is an effort to provide operationally relevant concepts and guidelines for persons responsible for planning and implementing development projects in agrarian countries. A framework for describing or evaluating the conduct of development projects is proposed, and applied to the results of an analysis of 203 case studies of past projects. Influences, conditions, and techniques which appear to affect project outcome are: (1) <i>local cultural characteristics</i> , such as leader patterns, social structure, and economic patterns; (2) <i>motivation for change</i> , including felt needs and perceived practical benefits; and (3) <i>project strategies</i> , such as the innovator's image characteristics, communication, and participation. The case study analysis suggests that factors of special importance to success in development projects are cooperation of local leaders, degree and immediacy of practical benefits which recipients anticipate, innovator skill in communication processes, participation of recipients in implementing the change, and establishing arrangements for maintenance of the innovation by the local people.		

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